I must say that I have found the collected views presented by the panelist
to be of very high quality and very useful.  As a current PhD candidate in
War Studies, the insights into the discussed works are very welcome and
represent a very valuable contribution to my program of study.  It was
especially useful as I must admit to not having read any of these works -
yet.  Based upon this discussion these works and others discussed by the
panelists will definitely added to my program.

I would like to offer a number of observations and comments to the follow-on
discussion.

It may be bringing coals to Newcastle, but I do want to note that in my own
program I am making a distinction between war as a phenomenon and warfare -
the later being "how war is made" or "how wars are fought."  I have found
that this facilitates my own study.

As regards the question of culture and war, the military as a part of or as
something distinct from a larger culture - I have long argued that how a
society makes war, how and what kind of 'military" it chooses to create, all
reflect upon the larger society or culture, its values, and its resources.

A number of comments offered by the panelists also, I am forced to admit,
brought to mind the military proverb that "amateurs talk strategy,
professionals talk logistics."   I believe that an examination of the
logistics support systems and capabilities available to the various
militaries, armies, etc under discussion will shed some light on why certain
societies in different periods of history made war the way they did.  For
example, compare the logistics support available to the army of a Grecian
city-state to that available to the Roman legions of the late Roman republic
or of the early to middle years of the Roman empire.

In response to Wayne Lee's useful observation on Lynn's assertion that
"early" societies progressed through "stages" of military development - it
may be useful to cast the net a bit wider even to include in this discussion
the changes introduced under Shaka Zulu to how wars were fought, as well as
the changes made by some of the Native Americans as they adapted to the
introduction of horses and eventually of fire arms and especially repeating
rifles.  While not claiming to have a final answer on this point myself,
such a broader study may well produce answers or at least deepened our
understanding of how societies adapt their military and their way of war to
technological change (to include new organizational and administrative
ideas).

Wayne Lee's discussion of Lynn's treatment of enlightenment warfare does not
address whether or not Lynn drew the links and distinctions between siege
and warfare and decisive battle that I expected.  For example, both
Marlborough and his French opponents used sieges as a means of drawing the
opponents field army into battle in pursuit of a decisive clash.  Nor does
the discussion appear to address the logistics importance of the fortified
places for the support of the field armies, the fortified cities placed
under siege were selected at least in part for the potential logistics
importance.

Mark Grimsley offered some thoughtful comments on the question of the impact
of racism in war, especially in the Pacific theater during World War II.  If
he is not aware of it, he may find of interest a fragment I read from an
early war Japanese Army intelligence brief that discussed the reluctance of
American troops to cease fighting and be taken prisoner even in clearly
hopeless circumstances.  If in fact such reluctance existed, and I don't
doubt it, I would personally attribute this in part to the reports they must
have had regarding the Japanese treatment of prisoners.  I assume that there
are statistics available on the number of US soldiers taken captive by the
Japanese from the Guadalcanal campaign to the end of the war which might
shed some light on this assertion as well.

I would second Mark Ramsay's comments on Lynn's discussion of South Asia,
noting that even the older British military accounts discuss the distinction
between India's "martial" and "non-martial" races, suggesting a strong
cultural influence on how they made war.

With regard to several valuable observations by Stephen Badsey - there
certainly is an Egyptian discourse on the 1973 war as reflected not just in
the Suez Canal memorial but in the army museum and the October War memorial
complex in Cairo.  -  regarding the connection or disconnection between the
function and the uses of a military by the society of which it is a part.
I would argue that armies are designed and intended for the conduct of
warfare - but this has in no way prevented the larger society from using the
army to maintain internal security, to provide general education and
socialization of immigrants, and to provide higher education and specialized
skills that will contribute to building national infrastructure.  But these
functions are not normally  "designed" into the creation and structure of
the military but are additional tasks sometimes assigned knowingly or which
arise as ancillary and not designed functions.

Thanks to all the panelists and I look forward to the follow-on discussion.

Robert A. Mosher

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