From Don Williams ; small.corgi@verizon.net

1) In Chapter Seven of Arming America, Bellesiles describes the 1815
Battle of New Orleans.  Bellesiles' account seems to be significantly at
odds with primary sources and with the accounts of some other
historians.   In my opinion, his description is inaccurate and provides
a misleading description of the militia’s performance to the average
reader.   Details follow.   I would be grateful for corrections or
additional information from H-OIEAHC.

2) On page 258 of Arming America, Bellesiles dismisses the importance of
the Battle by noting "Some contemporaries thought it appropriate that
the militia finally drew itself together after the war had ended ".
 This comment is misguided in several ways.  First, the American
militias had performed well in some earlier battles--e.g., Battle of
Thames River and Battle of Baltimore.  Second, the war was not over at
the time.  The Treaty of Ghent had been agreed to by the negotiators but
Andrew Jackson's Chief  Engineer  Arsène LaCarrière Latour noted that
British officers had been ordered to fight (and plunder) until they
received confirmation from London that President Madison had received
and signed a peace treaty --which did not occur until several months
after the Battle[1]

3) Bellesiles continues with his putdown of the militia: "The classic
vision is of frontier riflemen mowing down British Regulars with
brilliant marksmanship.  But as in the Revolution, there is little
evidence of such skill in the handling of firearms."
Later, on page 259 , Bellesiles reiterates this point: "But the myth of
Kentucky riflemen picking which eye of British officers to shoot  out
fulfilled some deep national yearning.  An imagined American equality
seemed to demand that every man could be the equal of the best-trained
troops in the world --at least in popular songs and tall tales."

However, Arsene Latour indicates that (a) the Tennessee militia were
excellent marksmen and (b) they scared the British troops by hunting
them at night and whenever the British ventured into the swamp on
Jackson’s left flank.  On page 92 of his book, Latour notes: "The
Tennesseans, on account of their well-known skill at the rifle, were the
terror of the British sentinels and advanced posts."  Latour notes that
the brown hunting shirts of the Tennesseans allowed them to creep close
to the British in the brush and grass of January.  As an example, Latour
then  recounts one case in which a Tennessean killed 3 British sentinels
in succession and stole their weapons.

In his 1999 book on the Battle, Pulitzer winner Robert Remini largely
agrees with Latour's account.  On page 101, he notes that Jackson's left
flank extended into a swamp and was relatively weak but that "the
British tended to keep as far away as possible from the swamp and from
the deadly accuracy of the Tennessee sharpshooters."   Don Hickey quotes
a British testimonial to American sharpshooters and Wilburt Brown cites
a case in which a British officer was shot at 350 yards at the start of
the January 8 attack. [2]

Note that markmanship was not essential in the main battle on January
8.  The main attack -- a column under Gibbs consisting of several
thousand men  spaced 60 men wide -- would have been hard to miss at less
than 200 yards.

4) Bellesiles next goes on to note: "Andrew Jackson himself was less
than complimentary.  Writing to James Monroe the day after the battle,
Jackson doubted that militia's usefulness."

This statement by Bellesiles is inexplicable.  Writing to Monroe on 9
January, Jackson in fact strongly praised the Tennessee militia of
Carroll/Coffee and Kentucky militia of Adair:
 "early on the morning of the 8th. the enemy, after throwing a heavy
shower of bombs & congreve rockets, advanced their columns on my right
&
left, to storm my entrenchments. I cannot speak sufficiently in praise
of the firmness & deliberation with which my whole line received their
approach:-more could not have been expected from veterans, inured to
war. For an hour the fire of the small arms was as incessant & severe as
can be imagined. The artillery too, directed by officers who displayed
equal skill & courage did great execution- Yet the columns of the enemy
continued to advance with a firmness which reflects upon them the
greatest credit. Twice the column which approached me on my left was
repulsed by the troops of genl. Carrole - those of genl. Coffee, & a
division of the Kentucky Militia, & twice they formed again & renewed
the assault.  At length however, cut to pieces, they fled in confusion
from the feild, leaving it covered with their dead & wounded.  The loss
which the enemy sustained on this occasion cannot be estimated at less
than 1500 in killed wounded & prisoners..." [4]

In his dispatch, Jackson did criticize a retreat by a SMALL group of
Kentucky militia on the West bank of the Mississippi – but that was on
the other side of the River from where the main battle occurred.
Moreover, Latour makes plain that Jackson's criticism was unfair --the
Kentuckians on the west bank were in an untenable position.  Latour
includes the minutes of a hearing held by General Carroll (Tennessee)
absolving the Kentuckians of  blame --see Appendix LXII (page 299) of
Latour’s book.

Jackson's 4000 man force only had about 750 regulars -- and they did not
receive the main attack on January 8.   Carroll's Tennessee militia and
Adair's Kentucky militia received the blunt of the attack  and Jackson
praised them heavily in his General Orders of January 21.[5]   It's
strange that Bellesiles overlooked this given that he cites  pages from
Latour.

5) Moreover, Jackson thought that a decisive action  had also occurred
several weeks earlier, on December 23.  On that date, Jackson launched a
hasty nighttime attack on the British vanguard as it debouched onto the
Mississippi riverbank several miles below New Orleans.  Jackson's force,
comprised of roughly 1400 militia and 800 regulars, hit the British
vanguard with sufficient shock to intimidate British General Keane
–thereby forcing Keane to dig in and await the arrival of the main
British army.  This halt by Keane was vital for Jackson because the
resulting delay of several days gave Jackson's army essential time to
bring up cannon and dig a fortified line.

Bellesiles's description of the earlier December 23 battle is, in my
opinion, highly inaccurate.  He states(p.258): "During a preliminary
engagement with the British on December 23, 1814, the militia had fired
wildly the moment they sighted the British, inflicting almost no
casualties, and then disengaged, leaving the fighting to Jackson's
marines.  His retreat was saved by the attack of Colonel John Coffee's
mounted riflemen, who fought a ferocious hand-to-hand battle with the
British...."

By contrast, Jackson's description of the battle to Monroe was as
follows: "In this affair the whole corps under my command, deserve the
greatest credit. The best compliment I can pay to general Coffee and his
brigade, is to say, they have behaved as they have always done while
under my command. The 7th, led by major Pierre, and 44th, commanded by
colonel Ross, distinguished themselves. The battalion of city militia,
commanded by major Planche, realized my anticipations, and behaved like
veterans. Savary's volunteers manifested great bravery: and the company
of city riflemen having penetrated into the midst of the enemy's camp,
were surrounded, and fought their way out with the greatest heroism
bringing with them a number of prisoners. The two field pieces were well
served by the officers commanding them."  [6]

Coffee's "mounted riflemen" were Tennessee militia, Planche's forces
were New Orleans militia, Savary's volunteers were a militia of free
blacks, and the "city riflemen" were Beale's Company --the group of city
merchants who had a yen for rifle marksmanship.
In contrast to Bellesiles, General Andrew Jackson praised the militias
strongly.  Bellesiles
also fails to note that Jackson’s background was Commander of the
Tennessee militia –although Madison’s War Department had recently given
Jackson a federal commission because he was able to win battles, unlike
some of the Generals in Bellesiles’ vaunted “regular army”.

6) Later in his narrative, Bellesiles states: “Cannon, not firearms, won
the Battle of New Orleans.  The myth, and the old song, give all credit
to the Kentucky riflemen.  Every military historian knows, as John Ward
so concisely put it, that  ‘it can be flatly asserted that  Jackson’s
overwhelming victory can in no way be attributed to the sharpshooting
skill of the American frontiersman.’…”  Bellesiles then proceeds (p.259)
to vaguely describe the order of battle where the main attack occurred.
He makes much of the Kentucky militia being only partially armed and
that Coffee’s Tennessee riflemen were
deployed in the swamp far to the left of the main attack.

Bellesiles’ description is misleading in that he fails to note that the
main British attack was met by over a thousand of  Carroll’s Tennessee
militiamen reinforced by about
600 of Adair’s armed Kentucky militia, giving a total of roughly 1600
men. [7]  Contrary to Bellesiles’ suggestion of a lack of arms, this
unit was fully armed.    2000 of Carroll’s men had firearms when they
left Tennessee. [8]  During the month in which their boats floated down
the Mississippi River to New Orleans, they overtook a shipment of 1100
muskets dispatched by Monroe from Pittsburgh to New Orleans. [9]   The
550 men of Adair’s Kentucky militia  sent to the line were armed when
they arrived in New Orleans on January 4.[10]  Plus New Orleans had
received 1500 muskets from Monroe several months earlier [11] and
General Coffee’s roughly 1200 Tennessee militiamen were armed. [8]

While criticizing the militias, Bellesiles fails to note that 5000
muskets shipped from Pittsburgh arrived six weeks late  because of
incompetence and/or corruption in the Army quartermaster corps and their
contractors.  [11]

7) Bellesiles’ assertion that cannon won the Battle of New Orleans is
not consistent with eyewitness accounts of the Battle nor with Jackson’s
Order of Battle, as described in Latour(p.104-105).   The main attack
was launched against Batteries 6 and 7 on Jackson’s left flank (p.108
and Latour’s map of the January 8 battle). [12]   About 200 yards in
front of Jackson’s line, the swamp on his left flank curved inward.
This curvature protected the main attacking British column from
Jackson’s fires until the column was about 200 yards from Jackson’s
line.[13]   The light canister shot used in cannon for that range had
projectiles with weight (1.5 oz ball) and velocity similar to that of a
musket round.   Batteries 6 and 7 could have shot about  595 balls per
minute.  Battery 5 could have shot about  340 balls per minute, giving a
total of    935 balls/minute.   By contrast , Carrolls and Adairs
militiamen , arranged in 4 rotating ranks, could have fired between 1600
to 3200 balls per minute, depending on the mix of rifle vs musket (
musket could be loaded and fired twice a minute whereas rifle could be
loaded and fired once).

In other words, the rate of fire of the “musketry” (rifles and muskets)
would have been much higher than the fire of the cannons.   Morever, the
musket/rifle fire would have been on a horizontal sheet aimed at the
column.  By contrast, only 50% of cannon canister shot might have been
effective at 200 yards because the large pattern spread (64 feet in
diameter) would have caused some shot to go over the column or to plow
into the dirt before the column.[14]  The musket fire would have been
effective  out to 200 yards, given the huge target ( large column of
men.)

8)   The combined effect of cannon and musketry(incl. Rifle fires) would
have been enormous.  This is supported by eyewitness accounts.  General
Coffee said “Before they reached our small arms, our grape and canister
mowed down whole columns, but that was nothing to the carnage of our
Rifles and muskets.” [15]
Latour (p.108) described the main attack as follows:
“Batteries Nos. 6,7,and 8, now opened an incessant fire on the column,
which continued to advance in pretty good order, until, in a few
minutes, the musketry of the troops of
Tennessee and Kentucky, joining  their fire with that of the artillery,
began to make an impression on it, which soon threw it into confusion.
It was at that moment that was heard that constant rolling fire, whose
tremendous noise resembled rattling peals of thunder.”   Latour notes
that the column moved toward Battery 6 away from Battery 7 –which
corresponds with the greater rate of fire calculated for Battery 7.
Latour notes that the British main column broke after 25 minutes of
fire, recovered in a rear assembly area, attacked a second time, and
again broke under the combined “rolling fire of musketry and
artillery”.   Latour’s account matches that of Jackson, given in
paragraph 4 above.

Louisiana Governor WCC Claiborne noted “At the commencement of the
firing, I repaired to the scene of action and arrived there, before the
battle was ended …
The fire of the Kentucky and Tennessee forces on the left was
particularly fatal to the enemy”.[16]

One especially effective cannon shot did occur when General Keane , in a
stupid blunder, led a Highland unit (the 93rd) of about 900 men  from a
diversionary attack on the Jackson’s right flank to support Gibb’s main
attack on Jackson’s left flank.  As this unit crossed Jackson’s front,
the huge 32 lb cannon in Battery 4 tore a tremendous gap in Keane’s
unit, killing and wounding hundreds.

9) Bellesiles protested in the January William and Mary Quarterly that
he gives source citations in Arming America –but Bellesiles’ choice of
sources seems odd.   Bellesiles account of the Battle of New Orleans
appears to be based largely on John Williams Ward’s 1955 book “Andrew
Jackson: Symbol for an Age”.  (His citations of early newspaper accounts
match those in Ward’s book.)

Ward’s book is not really history – it is an early essay in American
Studies –the study of our culture.  Ward notes in his book that he did
not investigate the Battle deeply since the work had already been done
by other –Ward is recounting the Battle mainly to examine how the “myth”
of the frontier sharpshooter developed.  This is part of his overall
attempt to examine how Jackson became a “symbol” of American values in
the early 1800s. (Ward, page 16-27).

At this point, military historians may be smirking.  They are likely to
collapse into helpless laughter if they actually read Ward.   For
example, Ward sees some mass psychological process at work in accounting
for why the “myth” of New Orleans does not include the heroic efforts of
the regular soldiers, free Blacks, and New Orleans Creoles who made up a
significant part of Jackson’s army.  However, Latour notes (p.161) that
these units were located in the center of Jackson’s line and did not
fire a shot during the battle because the British did not attack there
and were out of range.  That is not to detract from the courage of those
units – they were ready to fight, as Jackson acknowledged in his general
orders of January 21.   Moreover, the British reluctance to attack those
units was not due to some Anglo prejudice – it was due to the huge 24 lb
and 32 lb cannon in Batteries 1 through 4.   [17]

Ward speculates that the militia could not see to aim because of cannon
smoke – yet several historians note that Adair had Batteries 8and 7
cease fire at one point to allow the smoke to clear.  Smoke would have
risen in the cold air of January 8, even in New Orleans.[18]

10)  On page 259 of  Arming America , Bellesiles states “Andrew
Jackson’s own description of the battle credited the cannon manned by
members of the US Navy and Army and some of the Barratarian pirates,
with the victory”   (Bellesiles’ citation is difficult to check because
he cites the 1816 edition of Latour, not the recent reprints—forcing one
to go to the Rare Book room).

 Bellesiles’ citation –to Andrew Jackon’s January 21, 1815 address to
his troops – fails to note the following statement by Jackson: “a fire
incessantly kept up, directed with calmness and with unerring aim,
strewed the field with the bravest officers and men of the column which
slowly advanced, according to the most approved rules of European
tactics, and was cut down by the untutored courage of American militia.”

Bellesiles also overlooks the fact that the main British attack was
against Battery 6 –which was manned by the New Orleans militia led by
Senator Garrigue  de Flaujac; as noted and commended in Jackson’s
General Orders of January 21 – an attachment to the very Address
referenced by Bellesiles.  (Latour, pages 337-342)

11) At the bottom of page 259 in Arming America, Bellesiles continues to
display his idea of scholarly objectivity by noting:
“In battle after battle the militia had performed terribly, if at all.
The only view that most regular troops had of the militia in the midst
of battle was of their backs as these “citizen-soldiers” fled in
terror.  At least at the Battle of  New Orleans they had stayed in their
positions behind the barricades.  That was good enough for constructing
a myth of democratic heroism.”

The US Army, in its reference work “American Military History” has a
different view of militia performance in the War of 1812, stating:
“The militia performed as well as the Regular Army. The defeats and
humiliations of the Regular forces during the first years of the war
matched those of the militia, just as in a later period the Kentucky
volunteers at the Thames and the Maryland militia
before Baltimore proved that the state citizen soldier could perform
well.”

12) Bellesiles wins up his account by gleefully recounting an anecdote
from Ward—
that some of Coffee’s Tennessee militiamen lost a rifle match to
Beale’s Rifle Company, a group of New Orleans merchants and lawyers with
a devotion to rifle shooting.  Bellesiles joins with Ward in stating “
‘It is almost to happy for present purposes’ that Beale’s urbanites won
a complete victory over the frontier riflemen. “

There are several errors of logic in this anecdote.  Even today,
civilian marksmen compete against elite military teams at the Camp Peary
national rifle matches.   Regardless of who wins in any one year, all
contestants are superb marksmen.

Moreover, there’s a lot more to military service than marksmanship.
Perserverance,courage,  and self-sacrifice under difficult
circumstances, for one.   Generals Jackson and Carroll both noted the
overriding importance of victory at New Orleans – it  prevented the
breakup of the Union.  American use of the Mississippi River was vital
to the economy of the western states.   Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee etc.
would been forced to ally themselves with an European power controlling
the mouth of the Mississippi.  If the union split, the scenario dreaded
by the Founding Fathers would have arisen:  continual war and  an
inevitable lost of freedom as the two subnations were transformed into
an oligarchies or monarchies  under the pressures of an ongoing military
challenge

But the 1815 victory had a horrible and now-forgotten cost.  Latour
notes that  the Tennessee and Kentucky militiamen on Jackson’s left
flank had to spend weeks in the swamp’s knee deep mud and water.  While
there were few American deaths (10?) in the battle of January 8,
hundreds of militiamen men died in the subsequent weeks from diseases
contracted in the swamps.   Latour notes that  500  had died at one
point.   Robin Reilly estimates 1000 of the Tennessee militiamen died
within two months after the Battle from yellow fever.  [19]

Those men deserve a better memorial than Bellesiles’ sneers.

*************
REFERENCES
[1] "Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in
1814-1815"; Arsène LaCarrière
Latour ; Appendix.  Note: Latour's book was published  in 1816 but cited
page numbers refer to 1999 reprint.  Latour's book is the primary
eyewitness account of the Battle of New Orleans and includes Andrew
Jackson's letters to
Secretary of War James Monroe.

[2] "The Battle of New Orleans"; Robert Remini; 1999; p 101
See also Don Hickey, “The War of 1812”, p.212, para 2 and Wilburt Brown
“The Amphibious Campaign For West Florida and Louisiana,1814-1815”,
(1969), page 149, bottom paragraph

[3] "The War of 1812"; Don Hickey; p.212
[4] Jackson to Monroe, January 9,1815 -- see
http://www.ecsl.org/documents/Freedom%20Shrine/new%20orleans.html  or
the Appendix in Latour
[5] Latour, page 339
[6] Jackson to Monroe; 27 December 1814; see
http://www.hillsdale.edu/dept/History/Documents/War/America/1812/South/1814.12.27-Jackson.htm
or Latour's Appendices.
[7] Latour, page 106.  Jackson and Adair listed somewhat different
counts but roughly similar.
[8] “The US Army in the War of 1812”, Robert S Quimby ; 1997
[9] “The Amphibious Campaign For West Florida and Louisiana, 1814-1815”;
Wilburt S Brown (1969); page 87.  Brown cites Marquis James’ “The Life
of Andrew Jackson” ;1938,p.215 as source of info.  Marquis James (p.215)
indicates that info on Carroll’s intercept of 1100 muskets was based
(p.820, note 48) on “An incomplete manuscript
narrative, in Carroll’s hand, describing incidents of the river journey
and the subsequent
engagements near New Orleans, including that of January eighth, gives
December
twentieth as the date of his arrival (private collection of Albert
Lieutaud, New Orleans).
Other authorities give the dates of December twenty first and twenty
second).  Jackson was mistaken in his assertion (correspondence II,110)
that Carroll arrived without arms.”
Note: Quimby’s 1997 book (see above) and Robin Reilly’s “The British at
the Gates” also note Carroll’s intercept of the muskets but give no
source for the info.   It would be good if James’ source document could
be located and if it was collaborated by other sources.  (The Priestly
Narrative at Tulane describe the voyage of Carroll’s militia down the
Mississippi but I have not been able to see it – see
http://www.tulane.edu/~lmiller/Military.html#Warof1812  .)

[10] Latour, p.100-101; Remini, p. 141-2.   Note that the Kentucky
militia’s condition was Secretary of War Monroe’s fault.  Latour has an
Appendix with orders from Monroe to the governors of Tennessee and
Kentucky.  On Sept 25, Monroe tells Governor of Tennessee to send 5000
troops to Jackson “without a moments delay after the receipt of this
letter” (Latour,p.181)  On October 3, he asks Governors of Tennessee and
Kentucky to send 5000 and 2500 men respectively (p.206,207).  On Oct 10,
Monroe overrides his earlier order and tells Governor of Tennessee to
send all 7500 militia  to Jackson.  Finally, on October 25 the light
dawns in Monroe’s mind.  He writes to Governor of Kentucky: “I trust
that the 2500 men you were requested to send to General Jackson moved on
and that they are armed and equipped.”   On Nov 3, 1814, Monroe sends
letter to governors of Tennessee and Kentucky stating that he’s
(finally) ordered 5000 muskets dispatched to Baton Rouge from
Pittsburgh.(p.211)   Note that Kentucky had already met
several militia drafts in previous years for fighting near the Great
Lakes area.

[11] Robert Quimby, in his book “The US Army in the War of 1812”(1997)
recounts that Monroe sends orders in early November to the Quartermaster
Dept in Pittsburgh, ordering
the shipment of  5000 muskets and 300,000 cartridges to New Orleans with
“the least possible delay”.(page 822)  The estimated time of shipment
was 20-23 days and arrival of the shipment should have occurred around
first week of December.  Instead of using an available steamship
however, the quartermaster sent the shipment via cheaper private
flatboats, the  captain of the boats stops en route for private business
(war speculation?), and the shipment arrived six weeks late.  Latour (p.
101) noted Jackson’s angry complaint
to War Secretary Monroe on January 3.   Note, however, that Louisiana
Governor WCC Claiborne had received 1500 muskets from the federal
government around September 1814 – see Claiborne’sOctober 25,1814 letter
to War Secretary James Monroe in “Official Letterbooks of WCC Claiborne
(1801-1816)” (ed. Dunbar Rowland, 1917)

[12] ]  Batteries 1-4 were occupied with counterbattery fire against
British artillery and with a diversionary attack on Jackson’s right
flank. (Latour, p. 111).   There is some question of what role Battery
5, located 36 yards to right of Battery 6 played.  Latour does not
mention it’s role but Jackson praised it for “greatly annoying”the
enemy (Jackson, General Orders, Jan 21 1815 as listed in Latour, p.
341.).    Major Tatum indicated that Battery 5 fired on the the
attacking column ( “Journal”, p.125  as cited on page 124 of National
Park Service’s Historic Resource Study for Jean Lafite Chalmette Unit,
1985)
Latour indicates that Battery 8 , a small brass carronade sixty yards
from Battery 7,  “rendered very little service, on account of the ill
condition of its carriage.” (p.103)

[13] Latour , p.110

[14]  According to Philip Haythornthwaite’s “Weapons and Equipment of
the Napoleonic Wars”,  a 6lb cannon shot 85 balls of 1.5 oz canister
shot at ranges 0-250 yards.  (The heavy canister shot –3.5 oz –could be
used out to 600 yards but would have roughly half
the number of projectiles per shot.)   Similarly,  9lb cannon light
canister had 127 balls,
12 lb cannon had 170 balls, and 18 lb cannon had 255 balls per shot.
(The cannon were identified by the weight of lead thrown per shot.)

Latour gives the following configurations for Jackson’s artillery
Batteries:  (a) Battery 7:
18lb (255 balls) plus 6 lb (85 balls)  (b) Battery 6:  12 lb (170
balls)  (c) Battery 5: two
6lb (170 balls) .  Assuming that the 6 lb cannon could be continually
loaded and fired twice a minute and the 12lb and 18 lb were loaded and
fired once a minute, the calculated rates of fire are as follows:
Battery 7: 425 balls/minute, Battery 6: 170 balls/minute  Battery 5 :340
b/min

Haythornthwaite indicates that canister shot had a 32 foot spread at 100
yards, that a 12 lb cannon could be loaded and fired once a minute.
[15] Remini, “The Battle of New Orleans”, p.148
[16] WCC Claiborne January 9 1815 letter to James Monroe, “Official
Letterbooks of WCC Claiborne (1801-1816)”, Dunbar Rowland ed. 1917
[17]  The British did mount an attack on Jackson’s right flank as a
diversion, but the attack was largely defeated by the huge cannons of
Batteries 1& 2 plus fires from the cannon battery on the other side of
the Mississippi -- the west bank.  However, some regular troops were
engaged in fighting off the British attack.
[18]  Robert Leckie, “The Wars of America”; Wilburt Brown “The
Amphibious Campaign For West Florida and Louisiana, 1814-1815”
(1969),p.149
[19] Latour, p. 150.  Robin Reilly “The British at the Gates”, p. 316

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