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To: H-OIEAHC@H-NET.MSU.EDU Reply-to: vze2t297@verizon.net X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.73 [en]C-CCK-MCD BA45DSL (Win98; U) X-Accept-Language: en Delivered-to: H-OIEAHC@H-NET.msu.edu Original-recipient: rfc822;john.saillant@vmh.cc.wmich.edu From: Don Williams, small.corgi@verizon.net Bellesiles appears to show a strong bias against the militia concept in his description of the Revolutionary War battle of Cowpens (Arming America, page 197): "The Battle of Cowpens in 1781 offered further evidence that it was still possible for the militia to fulfill their vaunted role. But that victory was the consequence of Daniel Morgan's careful planning in placing the militia in front of his Continental units, and his working out a deal with the militia whereby they agreed to fire a volley and then leave the field. Even then, Morgan repeatedly had to cajole and even beg the militia to keep their part of the bargain in the face of Banastre "Butcher" Tarleton's English forces, and most of the militia initially made to flee as soon as the English started to leave the field. It seemed as though the militia understood any movement as full-scale retreat, and Morgan and Colonel Andrew Pickens had to place themselves between the militia and their horses, waving their swords threateningly in order to keep them from turning victory into rout. The militia kept blundering around the field, convincing the British that the Americans were in flight. At that very moment when the British confidently charged, Morgan had Lieutenant Colonel John Howard's Continentals perform a perfect change of direction, fire a withering musket volley at ten yards, and then charge the British with fixed bayonets. Tarleton's forces collapsed before the American bayonets, and the militia, which had to fire only that single volley, managed to hold on to their guns this time. " Other historians give a much different account. See , for example, the US Army Military History at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-04.htm (scroll down to "Greene's Southern Campaign"). See also the Cowpens Staff Ride monograph developed by Colonel Jerry D. Morelock (Combat Studies Institute of U.S. Army Command and General Staff College) at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/CSIPUBS/Moncure/moncure.htm . See the National Park Service description of the Battle of Cowpens at http://www.nps.gov/cowp/batlcowp.htm. Finally, see Lawrence E. Babits' in-depth study of Cowpens in A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens (1998). All four of these sources give a consistent account which is much different from Bellesiles'. Their account is as follows: 1) Morgan chose battlefield at Cowpens --an open area several hundred yards in width sloping upward to a broad hill. Forming up at the hill, Morgan laid out his lines as follows: Line number 1 was a skirmish line formed by sharpshooters (McDowell's North Caroline militia plus Hammond's South Carolina State Troops) tasked with picking off British officers. 150 yards back was Line 2, consisting of four battalions of South Carolina militia commanded by Colonel Pickens. Morgan ordered this line to fire two volleys and to then retreat to the rear of Line 3 in order to reconstitute (reload rifles) and form a reserve. 150 yards behind line 2 was Line number 3 -- regular Continental troops under command of Colonel Howard plus Virginia militia units under Major Triplett and Captain Tate. Hidden behind the hill to Morgan's rear was a troop of cavalry under Col. Washington. 2) As planned , Line 1 shoots Tarleton's officers during British advance and retreats to augment Line 2. As ordered by Morgan, the 4 South Carolina militia battalions on Line 2 fire 1-2 volleys each and retreat to the rear left flank of Line 3. The skirmish unit under Hammond forms the left flank of Line 3 while McDowell's skirmish unit falls back to defend the right flank of Line 3.) When Tarleton sends cavalry to attack Line 2 on its retreat, Washingtons cavalry makes surprise charge around hill on Line 3's left flank and scatters Tarleton's cavalry. (Note: Babits says that part of militia also retreated through center of Line 3 -- where a hole was temporarily opened for them.) Note that the militia riflemen in Lines 1 and 2 inflicted heavy damage on the British. Babits notes that the "American rifle fire was incredibly effective". General Morgan said that the militia Line 2 ""gave them a heavy and galling fire." 4) As British line advances toward Line 3, each line fires. Tarleton orders his cavalry to attack Morgan's right flank but McDowell's skirmishers delays the British until Washington's cavalry can intervene. Tarleton orders his reserve behind his front line (71 st Highlanders) to attack Morgan's Right Flank on Line 3. Howard orders Virginia Continentals (under Wallace) on his right flank to swivel around on a diagonal to protect right flank. Order is misunderstood, Wallaces' unit retreats rearward about 100 yards, and rest of Line 3 follows. British line breaks into a charge. Suddenly , Line 3 turns arounds from retreat and lets the British have it with a volley. Line 3 then charges with bayonet. Center of British Line is disrupted and panics but 71st Highlanders continue attack on Morgan's right flank. Suddenly Pickens' militia of Lines 1 and 2, who have circled AROUND the small hill from Morgan's left flank to his RIGHT flank, fall on the Highlanders from Morgan's right flank. Washington's Cavalry charges from the left. (Famous double envelopment). British infantry forces collapse in panic and surrender -- British cavalry flees , pursued by Washington. Babits (page 119) notes that "Only after the militia came back on the field did the 71st break ...the first instance of a Highland regiment running from the enemy." 5) Point is, the militia performed brilliantly and AS ORDERED. Not only did the militia weakened the British advance with two volleys and disrupt their attack on Morgan's right flank, the marksmen in Line 1 promoted the final panic in the British infantry by killing a number of British officers during the advance -- 18th century British infantry advanced into fire at the urging and threats of officers. McDowell's militia protected Morgan's right flank at a critical moment and Colonel Picken's militia units attacking at the crest broke the 71st Highlanders. Moreover, mounted militiamen made up one third of Washington's cavalry. Contrary to Bellesiles, the only unit "blundering around the field" was Wallace's Continentals -- Tate's and Triplett's militias stood fast on Line 3 with Howard. Size of both armies was in neighborhood of 1000-1200 men? End result: British losses: 110 dead, over 200 wounded and 500 captured. Morgan's losses: only 12 killed and 60 wounded. 6) Certainly Congress was pleased. Howard and Washington received medals. For his "spirited conduct" at Cowpens, the Continental Congress presented militia commander Pickens with a sword and the State of South Carolina promoted him to Brigadier-General in the state militia. (http://www.nps.gov/cowp/pickens.htm) Congress' kudos were not just for tactical genius. The mere existence of Morgan's army, along with the militias' victory at King's Mountain, convinced Southern patriots that they would prevail. It was a potent political force for recruitment of militia, for resistance to British occupation, and it demoralized the Tories. This was in 1780 -- a year of a time when General Lincoln had lost almost the entire southern part of the Continental Army (almost 5000 men) in the defeat at Charleston, the economy was collapsing and the Continental money was worthless, Washington's Continental Army was starving in New York due to lack of support from Congress, and the Patriot cause had seemed almost lost. The destruction of Tarleton's command removed Cornwallis's light, mobile troops. Later, Cornwallis would abandon his baggage trains in a desperate attempt to catch the nimble Army of Morgan and Greene. Eventually, with his army exhausted by hundreds of miles of futile marches chasing Greene, Cornwallis took refuge in the trap at Yorktown. 7) The US Army still studies Cowpens and use of militia today: See training exercise at http://call.army.mil/products/ctc_bull/99-8/cowpens.htm . There have been few military units able to carry off a double envelopment -- Hannibal's destruction of the Romans at Cannae and Hindenburg at the Battle of Tannenberg are among the few rare examples. 8) What Bellesiles also fails to mention is that roughly two thirds of Morgan's forces at Cowpens were militia -- whose rifles had deadly accuracy compared to the muskets of British infantry and American Continentals. Consider the following eyewitness account from a British officer who fought at Cowpens: Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie served in the 71st (Frasier's) Highlanders at the battle of the Cowpens. After his return to England, he attacked his former commander, Tarleton, in the press. This letter appeared in the London Morning Chronicle on 9 August 1782.3 " You got yourself and your party completely ambuscaded, completely surrounded, upon all sides, by Mr. Morgan's rifle men. What was the consequence? The two detachments of British were made prisoners after a great slaughter was made among them, your legion dragoons were so broke by galling fire of rifle shot that your charging was in vain, till prudence, on your side, with about twenty men who were well mounted, made your retreat good, by leaving the remains of the poor blended legion in the hands of Mr. Morgan who I must say, though an enemy, showed great masterly abilities in this manoeuver." Source: US Army Command and General Staff College web site on Cowpens at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/CSIPUBS/Moncure/moncure.htm#staff Appendix E, item 2 (near bottom) 9) Based on the above, who believes that Bellesiles gave an accurate, objective portrayal of militia performance at Cowpens?
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