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To: 'John Saillant ' <John.Saillant@wmich.edu> X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Original-recipient: rfc822;john.saillant@vmh.cc.wmich.edu Whether Bellesiles is "biased" or not, his account of Cowpens falls well within the range of interpretation of that battle by well-respected professional historians. I'm not a military specialist, but I've got a fair shelf of standard books on the revolution and I checked them out. Charles Royster in _A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783_, for example, quotes Daniel Morgan as advising AFTER Cowpens that commander should put the militia in the front with picked continental troops behind and orders to shoot any man who ran (p. 321-322). That hardly sounds like Morgan was impressed with the militia's performance at Cowpens. James Kirby Martin and Mark Lender in _A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789_, says the militia lines "broke" after giving some damaging fire (p. 168). John Alden in _The American Revolution, 1775-1783_ describes Morgan's placement of troops as brilliant, the milita as having "fled by a prearranged route" and then then returning to the field when the continentals held (p. 237). Marshall Smelser has a similar description in _The Winning of Independence_ (p. 320). Howard Peckham in _The War for Independence_ notes that after the militia "filed off" Morgan "rallied the militia" and sent them back into the fight (p. 152). Harry Ward in _The American Revolution: Nationhood Achieved, 1763-1788_ Notes that Morgan set up his troops at Cowpens in a way that planned for the milita retreating because "Morgan knew they would anyway" (p. 143). Hugh Rankin's _The American Revolution_ is more explicit about the milita's confusion and careful planning Morgan did to get any use out of them. (pp. 268-272). What unites all of these interpretations is that the historians praise Morgan for his astuteness in figuring out a way to make the militia useful in a pitched battle and to take into account the likelihood of them breaking ranks. Thus back to my point - Bellesiles is hardly alone in considering the militia a weak reed in battle. Historians do differ on the degree of orderliness in the militia's retirement from the field at Cowpens, but that is typical of historical interpretation. We all don't all read the same evidence in the same way. JRG
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