Where Germans Dwell: Transnationalism in Theory and Practice
Luncheon Talk, GSA 2006, Pittsburgh
Michael Geyer, University of Chicago

Among my newspaper clippings on transnationalism I found two pieces that
reflect the theme of my talk quite well. One comes from the sports
section of the _New York Times_ and is entitled "German Coach and
American Ways Are a Tough Match." Quite obviously, the article refers to
Jürgen Klinsmann, the past coach of the German national soccer team,
whose home is in California. A second clipping comes from the Arts
section of the same newspaper and invokes location and identity under
the title "A Homecoming, in Los Angeles, for Looted Klimts."[1] The
home-coming in question refers to the return of, among other works, the
famous Klimt portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer to her descendants in
southern California. Both articles beg the question whether California
(and southern California at that) is a _Heimat_ for Germans (and
Austrians respectively) and thus might legitimately be studied as part
of German history. It is clearly where Germans and Austrians dwell and,
if we add governor Schwarzenegger, do quite remarkably well in addition
to occasionally doing good--living out hopes and dreams that may not
have been sustainable in the old country. And quite apparently, these
dreams no longer concern the extrinsic, never-to-be-realized exoticism
of yearning for the "Land, wo die Zitronen blühen."

There are other clipping files on Aldi and Wal-Mart in the United States
and Germany respectively, as well as on Annette Kolb or René Schickele,
just to introduce different locations and themes. Bu the two articles
confirm what so many papers at this year's conference suggest.
Transnational existence has very much become an everyday occurrence. It
is so common that it often remains unthought. Further, as the Klimt case
indicates, it is not some rootless phenomenon either, but inexplicable
without reference to national history. And last but not least, as the
title of my talk "Where Germans dwell" indicates, it is more
ideologically loaded than we might think in the thrall of new discovery.
Let me, therefore, offer some suggestions what this thing called
"transnational history" might entail so as to contextualize
deterritorialized football coaches, paintings that come home to where
they belong (but never were) and emigrated body builders who live the
dream of upward mobility.

Transnational History: The New Consensus

It may yet transpire that the current excitement about transnational
history will prove to be another flavor of the month. However, it has
effectively led to a reorientation of scholarly perspective and an
emergent new consensus. Most everyone, it seems, agrees on the basic
presupposition that there is a history to be had "beyond the nation
state," as Jürgen Osterhammel has put it so memorably, and that this
history is more than a history between nations.[2] Nations and their
subject(s), or so it appears, operate within the "context" (this would
not be my choice of word, but it is the word of choice for many) of
movements, forces and circuits involving people, things, knowledges,
arts and not least, money among others that reach across borders. That
is, there is a history other than national and inter-national history
that we call tarnsnational history. This history explores actors,
movements and forces that cross boundaries and cut or fuse into the
political, economic, social, cultural fabric of nations, peoples or
lands to transform them, to be adapted and incorporated, or, as may be
the case, to rub against them. This history explores and makes sense
grander-than-national--in short: a transnational--horizon for thought,
vision, and action.

Simple enough, or so it seems, but not if we believe Hans-Ulrich Wehler,
who--warning us not to underestimate the importance of national identity
and of loyalty to the nation--insists that colonial discourse does not
matter for real Germans and agrees with the Pope that Turkey must not
join Europe because of cultural incompatibility and who argues that
transnational history is one of the lesser histories, to be relegated
into an attic in the roomy boarding house of the nation and its
history--a next door neighbor, perhaps, of _Alltagegeschichte_, which
was stuck there in the eighties.[3] Transnational history is
emphatically not a new high road or _Königsweg_, he insists. Then again,
had Schwarzenegger or Klinsmann taken the high road, they would have
gotten nowhere fast. This kind of preemptive talk, which sets the nation
over and above the transnation, preempts what matters--the overdue
debate about (and histories of) nationality and territoriality in an
interconnected world. In my view, this is the very subject and the very
attraction of the emerging transnational history. Transnational history
opens up the issues of territoriality and nationality for renewed
questioning. It marks the seams between the nation as the quintessential
"inside" (say, the German national soccer team) and the worlds of
cross-border traffic as the quintessential "insider-outside"(say: its
coach) as the spaces for a new history and it identifies the people,
goods, images and ideas that cut across as subjects that are worthy of a
history "beyond the attic."

What emerges is a history that explores the deep and irremediable
entanglement of nations in the world, the efforts to seek out the world
and pull it in--people, territory, goods, knowledge--and the equally
insistent attempt to put the world off and negotiate a separation that
sets the nation, its territory and its culture over and against the
world. Typically, class, gender, ethnicity--indeed the very sense of
nation--change in the presence of migrants, as has been demonstrated in
abundance. As a result, endogenous national histories are giving way to
a fuller and richer exploration of the capacity, and its limits, of
people (and things) to act; of their ability to harness collective
resources; and the challenge to set up viable life-worlds and rules of
conduct to live by. The wager of transnational history in all of this is
that even the most parochial and inward-turned worlds are imbricated in
other worlds of action and imagination that range beyond parish or nation.

In this programmatic orientation, transnational history resembles, in
many ways, the _Gesellschaftsgeschichte_ of forty-odd years ago. Much as
it was obvious then that society could not be negated as a subject of
history, notwithstanding a then-prevailing historiography, it is quite
as self-evident now that the nation is not a "monad" or a "container."
Rather, making the body social and politic turns as much on the
(extrinsic) transactions between the nation and the world and the
intermediaries that make it happen as on the osmosis between an
(intrinsic) past, present and future.

Approaches to Transnational History

If this is what transnational history is, what does it do? This is where
the jostling over approaches begins. Typically, the most enticing
element of transnational history, as a recent departure, is its sense of
openness and experimentation. It is not quite that "anything goes." But
certainly most everything is being tried in terms of subjects,
methodologies and even epistemologies. Typically, two of the main
proponents (of otherwise quite different versions) of transnational
history in Germany, Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, refuse--and
make a virtue of refusing--to make over transnational history into a
theory or even into a unified approach beyond insisting that it must
uncover "connections and constellations, which transcend national
borders."[4] In the same vein, a leading French scholar in the field,
Pierre-Yves Saunier, has insisted that transnational history must not
peddle a new paradigm, but should be "adopting a perspective [or] angle"
by virtue of paying attention to "movements and forces that cut across
national borders."[5]

An open mind suits transnational history--any history--well. But
historical practice is a bit more limited. Like any history,
transnational history needs subjects--and in this case, there are three
of them One kind of history proceeds to study the nation in its
entanglement in the world. It asks where Germans dwell or how Klinsmann
got to California, only to become the German national soccer coach. We
might want to call its perspective "local transnationalism." Another
kind of transnational history looks at actors, forces and movements that
transit nations--such as migrants in search of labor, or asylum seekers
in search of security, or money in search of profit. We might call this
latter perspective "global transnationalism." In between, we find a
history that is concerned with the problematic of territoriality and
transnationality. Purists would argue that "global transnationalism"
yields the only transnational history there is. I think the "local
tarnsnationalism" captures historical reality better while the latter
may well explain it better. Practice suggests (and this is not simply
because we are among national historians here) that the former is where
most of transnational historiography is actually situated--and this is
what I want to concentrate on.

(a) The Transnational Horizon of the Nation

A first research strategy explores the transnational horizon of the
nation. The vantage point here is from the inside out, that is, from the
nation to the world, although outside influences will dent and fracture
the interior lines of sight and action. This approach has been worked
out most succinctly in US-American initiatives to "internationalize"
American history, which quickly drifted toward an exploration of social
solidarities stretching across borders as well as the perennial question
of the American frontier.[6] Though lacking the programmatic focus of
the American project, transnational history in the German context has
this approach at its center. Typically, historiographic controversies
have arisen over the very fact that Germans have reached beyond their
lands by way of travel and migration and, by the same token, that
_Ausländer_ have persistently and in significant numbers migrated into
German lands. That Germany's prosperity depended, throughout the modern
era, on the export of its goods is still not fully incorporated even
into postwar histories. That German arts and knowledge traveled far and
wide has become a more commonly accepted story, but the expulsion,
flight and sheer destruction--and the transnational survival--of
knowledge and the arts, while well researched, is still treated very
much as a separate story. That Germans reached into the world as an
exceptionally violent force--in its colonies and metropolitan wars--is
commonly accepted, although there is considerable debate on the
effect.[7] Everyone talks memory, but what about irremediable loss? Add
to this that Germans over the past two centuries have had a particularly
lively imagination of the world beyond the nation, ranging from their
cosmopolitan knowledge and their proverbial embrace of the world to a
sense of superiority and supremacy ("Am deutschen Wesen ...") and on to
utter panic. All of this makes the transnational horizon of the nation
an extraordinarily rich area of study and, so one would think, a
significant aspect of the German past; that is, significant not least in
the sense that such cross-border projections shape the national project
right into the everyday habitus, mentality and world pictures of
ordinary Germans. The nation as a space of identity and solidarity, we
may conclude, always encompasses and incorporates the world.

(b) The Transnational History of the Nation/State Decision-making and
Action-Spaces

A second strategy focuses on the rise of the nation in particular and on
the nation-form as global regime of organizing territoriality in
general. In this research agenda, transnational history moves
analytically from the outside in. This approach explores, in one part,
how exogenous "forces and movements" condition the nation as a political
space of decision, even if the latter is instantly historicized as being
rooted in a millennial cultural or ethnic tradition. The debate on this
matter is fierce--and it seems to me that this is the debate worth
having.[8] For it asserts that the formation of nations as discrete and
distinct decision-making spaces is the product of accelerated
interconnectivity. The other part is the growing interest in
transnational organizations, associations and corporations, in addition
to the emergent research of transnational regulation.[9] The history of
transnational "governance" is still in its infancy (and would do well to
link up with a revived and expansive international history), but we will
hear much more of it in the years to come--and may then decide whether
or not it matters.[10]

Charles S. Maier's has lifted this entire debate territoriality and
nationality on a new level with his grand perspective on the
"Transformations of Territoriality, 1600-2000."[11] Maier suggests that
we consider the creation and transformation of territorial regimes and,
in this context, the rise and demise of the integral nation as the key
force in modern history. At its apogee, roughly between the 1860s and
1970s, the nation state was both "identity" and "decision" space. It
became the territory "to die for." Maier rather conventionally flags
technology (railways) and the rise of industry as main factors of the
nationalization process. In my mind, a fuller version of the
transformation of territoriality in the modern age--especially if we
consider identity and decision space as the central features of a
territorial regime dominated by nations--would figure in the
intensification and extensification, as well as the accelerated
velocity, of interaction, to use the lingo of globalization theory.[12]

This strategy might yield a research strategy for the elusive problem of
Europe. It is not quite the decision-making space that the history of
European integration would like it to be. Neither is it the
identity-space that a European historiography propagates, although it
has elements of both. However, in a transnational history, regions like
Europe are of utmost importance, because transnational interaction never
spreads evenly and nothing ever converges smoothly. As connectivity
spreads, intensifies and accelerates across space, it also thickens or
"clots." There is no more successful "clot" of intense connectivity than
Europe or, possibly, the North-Atlantic seaboard. My suggestion
therefore is to think of Europe as "clotted" sphere of action. That such
action includes war might be worth recalling, because the obvious is
often forgotten. It follows that such concentrated spaces of actions as
places of connected, even if agonistic, memory--of European _lieux de
mémoire_.

(c) Histories of Transnations

The third strategy is possibly the most controversial one. It explores
the forces, movements, people, things and knowledges that circulate
across boundaries. And it studies the effects the effects of these
extrinsic or global actors on local or national conditions.

One of the sites for this kind of approach is ecological history, both
in its man-made and in its natural variety. Global warming is not
something you can control in anyone country. Chernobyl was a Ukranian
disaster with transnational effects.

The history of religion and religiosity also figures prominently in this
field. While a great deal of work has been done on secularization, it is
intriguing that we still lack a good handle on the tarnsnational
significance of religion, religiosity and, for that matter, churches.
Transborder pilgrimages or missionary activities are by now better know
as Islamic than as Christian phenomena. By the same token, the
_Kulturkampf_ is still mainly seen as a national rather than as a
transnational event or as a global issue.

And what about the remarkable ability of families and kin not only to
stretch over huge distances, but to retain and, in fact, regain distant
authority about local affairs. This is simply to remind us that some of
the most effective actors on a transnational plain are private one--and
that some of the most intimate and local ones are also capable of global
reach.

A prominent site for this kind of study is the history of labor and
capital. The sheer force of transnational industry is most blatantly
evident in the proliferation of rust-belts in Europe and North America
in a world in which steel-production skyrockets. Hence, it is no
surprise that the history of labor and of corporate culture have come to
speak most evocatively of the entire issue. (I am thinking here, among
others, of Marcel van der Linden and Jeffrey Fear respectively.[13])
Whichever way you turn, labor and management very visibly have become
part of a transnational world of production, in which the nation defines
the margins whereas the transation establishes its very own, tangible
territories of production.

Add to this the Wal-Marts of this world, the expansive sphere of
transnational retail and consumption. Victoria de Grazia has looked at
this phenomenon most carefully and has, most recently, turned to the
"Globalizing Commercial Revolutions" in a remarkable essay that compares
cross-border retailing by Woolworth and Wal-Mart (and Carrefour). In the
transnational circuitry of Wal-Mart, China and Great Britain belong to
the Wal-Mart "nation," as it were, whereas until recently Chicago
(because of its minimum wage ordinances) never did and Germany has just
been thrown out because its picky customers (trained by Aldi or Lidl in
different, if class-specific modes of shopping) are too difficult to
handle. Whether Wal-Mart is an American or actually a Chinese success
story--or not just simply a transnational one--is one of those issues
that bedevils this approach. The question is whether transnational
actors can, indeed, be said to stand on their own, constitute their own
transnation, as it were.

We need not resolve this issue today. The bottom line is that "forces
and movements" beyond the control of nations interlace the seemingly
autonomous unit of the nation, define or deny opportunities and options
and create material and cultural incentives for locals to act. For the
most part you notice these transnationals only when the transnational
"pie" is no longer in the sky, but manifestly in your face --which is my
way of saying that we should get real about transnationals and study
them, historically and otherwise, rather than ventilate. This means also
research into where they cause pain and humiliation and where they
alleviate misery--and often do both at the same time. It turns out that
colonial and post-colonial historians have often a far better
understanding of this predicament than German and European ones, which
suggests, not least, that the European metric may not be the most
suitable one to explore transnational history even in Europe.

But Does Transnational History Explain Anything?

While it is well and good that there are the Klinsmanns and
Schwarzeneggers of this world, do they amount to anything beyond their
individual fortunes? Do they provide insight into continuity and change?
Does transnational history help us understand, explain, and narrate the
past--and does it do so better than other histories? I can think of
three instances, where transnational history has had or has a potential
impact.

First, the main attraction of transnational history for historians of
Germany is undoubtedly the extension of a historiography that thinks of
Germany and the Germans from the margins and peripheries. It opens up
these social margins, borderlands, and exclaves to encompass the entire
world. What has been emerging here is the exact opposite of a
_Königsweg_: a genuinely subaltern history of Germany, which by its very
nature must be transnational or, in any case, translocal history. It is,
among other things, the history of the landless, the vagrants, the
migrants, the pilgrims, the scholars, the expelled and the expats.
German history would be a royal pain, if after forty years of
_Gesellschaftsgeschichte_ there were still no place for them and if they
were still treated as the expendable, and hence, disposable excess of
German history.

In one respect, the anxiety here is quite acute and quite real. Where,
for example, do we put the history of Displaced Persons? Is it properly
German history or is it not? Should German history extend and
incorporate the history of Belarus, because Nazi politics and strategy
turned the country upside down? Where do we put the expelled and the
expatriate and their present absence? Fortunately, there is a history of
these groups of people. There are places, there are histories and there
are even reflections on where they belong--and it is in this latter
dimension that I see their "theoretical" purchase. From the margins,
they show the center in sharp relief. Thus, how could we possibly
understand the issue of "class" or, for that matter, "status" (the same
is true for gender and ethnicity), if we did not look at all those who
never made it r tried and failed. Such an "extrinsic"--or more plainly:
transnational--history is not a matter of comparative approaches, which
have their undeniable value. Rather it is a question of who is left out
or pushed out in constituting solidarities, loyalties, or spaces of
belonging. _Heimat_ has a way of traveling, but it also has a way of
ostracizing and even killing.

A second purchase of transnational history is more uncertain and
untested. Transnational history entreats us to think productively of the
_longue durée_ of the German lands as part and parcel of a European
"shatter-zone" of empire, as Ulf Engel and Matthias Middell has recently
argued.[14] It seems entirely plausible to think of central European
history as a very long and interconnected history of the shattering of
empires and of its reconstitution as nations. This history leads us back
to the Thirty Years War, to the collapse of the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth, to 1806 and the end of "old empire" and surely to the
erosion of the Ottoman and Hapsburg hold on Europe--up to the present,
in which we find a Europe of Republics, a continent that is free of
empire. We may not think of the latter as a destiny, but it is surely an
intriguing outcome of a past that seemed to pivot around empire or
nothing, around history and all those who had none. In a way, this is
also a history that moves from the margins to the center--except that
this experiment requires a re-juggling of mental maps. For the centers
are at the outside (Russia, Britain), whereas the margins are, as it
were, "in the middle" and Germany is among them. (I figure, if India can
be placed there, it cannot be such a terrible transgression to put
Germany in the same place.)

At stake, here, is the issue of Europe as a sphere of action. National
histories construe this European space from inside out, as it were.
However, national histories only gain their proper place and time, if we
see them, not only as national and international histories, but as
fragments or elements in an interconnected plain that are moving
together and moving apart at a rapid pace.  It seems to me that only a
transnational history will be capable of making sense of the politics of
attraction and of repulsion that propel them.

Third and, as far as I am concerned, most importantly, transnational
history allows us to explain one of the grand puzzles of the era of the
German nation state. The grand question to answer, and only
insufficiently answer by an intrinsic history, is why the German nation
that is so deeply embedded in Europe and the world, that generated its
prosperity, well being, its artistic and scientific achievements and its
civility in close exchange and in response to the recognition of others,
and that, not least, derived its security and territorial stability so
often in dependence or in concert with others--why is it that this
nation has lashed out so furiously against the world? Why is so
interconnected a nation so extraordinarily "autistic" in its interaction
with others, to borrow a phrase from my admired colleague Isabel
Hull?[15]What we can discern studying the German case (and comparatively
Japan) is the entire complex of transnational vertigo, a sense of being
unbalanced even and especially in the most secure places and times and a
sense of disorientation that radicalizes--and not just among the radical
Right--into veritable panics of sovereignty. What we can explain better
with transnational history than with any other subset of approaches is
the peculiar German imperialism of space and, for that matter, of
race--the obsessive effort to gain control over all that effects the
sovereign body (of men, of women, of the nation) and, if need, be, to
eliminate what cannot be controlled with "dead certainty."[16]

For this kind of history to happen, the benevolent liberal pretense of a
world coming together, converging, through transnational connectivity
needs to fall by the wayside. Action across boundaries is never an easy
or self-evident process. It is always fraught with tensions. Therefore,
rather than ever-growing peace, the persistence of cross-cutting
disturbance is the very substance of transnational history.

Where then do Germans dwell?

My initial claim for transnational history was that it gives us more
German History and a better one at that, because it widens the spatial
and temporal scope of the German past. I would like to suggest that it
also makes so much more sense of the nation; that is, it helps us
understand both the German nightmares and a persistent civilizing
process that has always been advanced most auspiciously in moments of
openness to the world, as Konrad Jarausch has shown so admirably in his
recent study on postwar Germany.[17] Beyond that, we enter the world of
transnational territoriality, which is the proper subject of global
history. National and global history intersect, but they are not the same.

Transnational history, like _Gesellschaftsgeschichte_ half a century
ago, is not really a singular approach. It emerges from the experience
and the recognition that the nation--any nation--makes only sense in its
entanglements; that its citizens have regularly reached beyond its
boundaries with irreversible and frequently catastrophic effects; and
that even the most removed and elevated sovereigns have eventually been
shaped and transformed by forces and movements that cut across the
sovereign realm and reach deep into the national fabric. It took a while
until the pretense of national autonomy crumbled in the metropolitan
world. The entire enterprise is surely not helped by neo-liberal
pundits, politicians and bankers who see globalization everywhere,
busily rewriting the Communist Manifesto into a neo-liberal manifest
destiny: "All that is solid must melt into air." Either way, the
entanglement of nation and world has become a vital and indispensable
subject for historians.

Notes

[1]. Jere Longman, "German Coach and American Ways Are a Tough Match,"
_New York Times_ (March 20, 2006), p. D1. Sharon Waxman, "A Homecoming,
in Los Angeles, for Looted Klimts," _New York Times_ (April 6, 2006), p.
B1.

[2]. Jürgen Osterhammel, _Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des
Nationalstaats: Studien zur Beziehungsgeschichte und
Zivilisationsvergleich_ (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2001);
Prasenjit Duara, _Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning
Narratives of Modern China) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.

[3]. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Transnationale Forschung--der neue Königsweg
historischer Forschung?" in _Transnationale Geschichte: Themen,
Tendenzen und Theorien_, ed. Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad and Oliver
Janz (Göttingen: Vadenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2006), pp. 161-174.

[4]. Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, "Einleitung," in _Das
Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871-1914_, ed.
Sebastian Conrad and Jrgen Osterhammel (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und
Ruprecht, 2004), p.14.

[5]. Pierre-Yves Saunier, "Going Transnational? News from Down Under:
Transnational History Symposium, Canberra, Australian National
University, September 2004," _Historical Social Research/Historische
Sozialforschung_ 31 (2006): p. 119.

[6]. David Thelen, "The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on
United States History." _Journal of American History_ 86 (1999): pp.
965-975 as well as _The Journal of American History: The Nation and
Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History: A Special
Issue_ 86 (1999). Thomas Bender, ed., _Rethinking American History in a
Global Age_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002) and Bender,
_A Nation among Nations: America's Place in World History_ (New York:
Hill and Wang, 2006).

[7]. See, however, Ute Frevert, "Europeanizing German History,"
_Bulletin of the German Historical Institute_ 36 (2005): pp. 9-24.

[8]. Michael Geyer,"Deutschland und Japan im Zeitalter der
Globalisierung: Überlegungen zu einer komparativen Geschichte jenseits
des Modernisierungs-Paradigmas," in _Das Kaiserreich transnational:
Deutschland in der Welt 1871-1914_, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen
Osterhammel (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2004), pp. 68-86.

[9]. Akira Iriye, _Global Community: The Role of International
Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World_ (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2002).

[10]. Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann, eds., _The Mechanics of
Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the
First World War_ Studies of the German Historical Institute London
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

[11]. Charles S. Maier,"Transformations of Territoriality, 1600 - 2000,"
in _Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien_, ed.
Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad and Oliver Janz (Göttingen: Vadenhoeck
und Ruprecht, 2006), pp. 32-55. See also his "Consigning the Twentieth
Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era."
_American Historical Review_ 103 (2000): pp. 807-31. See also Charles
Bright and Michael Geyer. "Where in the World is America? The History of
the United States in the Global Age," in _Rethinking American History in
a Global Age_, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2002), pp. 63-99.

[12]. David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton,
_Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture_ (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1999).

[13]. Marcel van der Linden, _Transnational Labour History:
Explorations_ (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2003). Jeffrey R.
Fear, _Organizing Control: August Thyssen and the Construction of German
Corporate Management_ (Cambridge.: Harvard University Press, 2005).

[14]. Ulf Engel and Matthias Middell. "Bruchzonen der Globalisierung,
globale Krisen und Territorialitätsregime--Kategorien einer
Globalgeschichtsschreibung," _Comparativ_ 15 (2005): pp. 5-38.

[15]. Isabel v. Hull, _Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the
Practices of War in Imperial Germany_ (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 2005).

[16]. Arjun Appadurai," Dead Certainty: Ethnic Violence in the Era of
Globalization." _Development and Change_ 29 (1998): pp. 905-925.

[17]. Konrad H. Jarausch, _Die Umkehr: Deutsche Wandlungen 1945-1995_
(Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2004_.

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