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[Disclaimer: I am not writing here as an H-German editor, and my views do not necessarily reflect the views of the H-German editorial team; in fact, I'm not sure there is a consensual view at H-German.] Thanks to all the forum participants, and to Eve Duffy for organizing this on-line conversation. It's great to see these themes addressed by leading scholars in the field. The contributions have illuminated the potential for history beyond the nation-state. Even so, I think there's still plenty of room to debate the implications of jettisoning the old "master narratives" in German history. The core problem, in my view, involves the choices we make in narrating the past. Once we acknowledge the fluidity of economic, social, and intellectual processes, it can become difficult to define the boundaries of our research. (Social scientists might call this the "unit of analysis" problem.) For a quick illustration, I'll take two problems from my current research. In writing about Germany, the United States and the Bretton Woods monetary system, how much do I need to know about the situation of the pound sterling, the French franc, or the Japanese yen? In studying the origins of the non-proliferation treaty, isn't it arbitrary to focus on Germany's particular role when I know full well that Japan, Italy, and India were also pressing the United States for modifications to the treaty text? International history quickly runs up against limitations of archival access and language training. One solution, the more radical, would be for historians to foster the creation of a sub-field of truly "international" historians who do not identify with any particular nation-state. (In this context, the term "transnational" appears superfluous.) Books written along these lines already exist; Matthew Connelly's study of the Algerian conflict, mentioned by Granieri, is exemplary [1]. But Connelly's book is ahead of its time. Who is the audience for histories of the international system? Whatever "master narratives" we may have in mind when considering the international system are quite rudimentary, and the absence is keenly felt. Connelly makes a claim for the Algerian war as a key moment in the making of the "post-Cold War era," but it is difficult to evaluate this claim given the paucity of competing interpretations on the nature of international politics since 1945. The same could be said of Akira Iriye's work on NGOs, or Carole Fink's fine book on minority protection treaties [2]. The historiography on such problems is growing, but thus far international history lacks the kind of penetrating, widely shared questions that have driven generations of scholarship on Imperial Germany, say, or any other familiar period in German history [3]. This may lie in the more diffuse nature of international relations. A study of alliance politics after 1715 may have nothing to tell us about the "Concert of Vienna" after 1815. By contrast, most of us routinely invoke traditions and patterns spanning the centuries _within_ a given cultural or national community. Perhaps international historians may yet define certain "longue durée" issues -- globalization? migration? -- that are broad enough to engender wide-ranging debate but that are still specific enough to help define a practical research agenda. In the meantime, most of us are not doing rigorously international history, and perhaps this is one justification for the adoption of the term "transnational." In essence, this involves situating Germany in a wider context, either in relations with a particular society (France or the United States, commonly) or with respect to the broader environment. As Jenkins suggests, this does not so much toss away our favorite historiographical puzzles (say, the nature of civil society in the Kaiserreich) as enrich them. Historians of U.S. foreign relations have made a similar, equally valid choice. Comparative history is "out," as Jarausch indicates; and rightly so, for it suggests artificial boundaries between societies. When one recognizes how deeply, say, France and Germany have influenced one another, both directly and indirectly, black-box comparisons among nation-states seem likely to obscure too much. However, insofar as "transnational" history involves merely an enlarged perception of one's chosen national society, it may be less revolutionary than many of its adherents claim. We choose to make Germany (or the German-speaking world) our point of reference, after all, and we attend the German Studies Association. It's worth noting that there are journals devoted to international history, but no annual conferences. (Scholars of European foreign relations can be found at meetings of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations [SHAFR], but they cannot be certain of an audience.) Our investments in language acquisition, professional relationships, and -- yes -- historiographical training are likely to stem any large-scale movement of Germanists toward complete internationalism. But the new "transnational" enthusiasm will surely invite and more scholars of Germany to take account of less-studied European neighbors -- Scandinavia, the Netherlands -- and new problems -- like international drug-trafficking and nuclear non-proliferation. Given the realities of the Anglo-American job market, where scholars of large nation-states have a clear advantage in securing employment, I consider it almost a professional duty for comfortably situated Germanists to take on the world (figuratively of course). NOTES [1] Once again: Matthew Connelly, _A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War World Era_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). [2] Akira Iriye, _Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Carole Fink, _Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938_ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). [3] I do not mean to imply that there haven't been fruitful controversies on more limited subjects, such as "appeasement" in 1938 or the origins of the Cold War. By the standards of historical debates _within_ national traditions, though, such debates stand out for their extreme chronological specificity.
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