Democracy
Date: 8 March 2004


Hamburg elects a “Superstar”:
Ole von Beust and the Dilemma of German Social Democracy

William Smaldone

On 1 March Hamburg’s citizens returned Mayor Ole von Beust to office by
giving his Christian Democratic Party a resounding 47.2% of the vote for an
absolute majority of 63 seats in the city’s 121-seat assembly.  In
increasing its support by 21% over the last election in 2001, the CDU’s
achievement is unparalleled in post-1945 German history.  More importantly,
however, the Social Democratic Party’s miserable showing of 30.5% (41
seats), down 6% from 2001, marks a fundamental break in its 44-year
electoral domination of the city.  With 13 more state and local contests
scheduled for this year, the Hamburg debacle may indicate that a long string
of SPD defeats is in store.  Ole von Beust’s charismatic candidacy was the
most decisive factor in the Hamburg election, but one cannot separate the
SPD’s failure there from its disastrous policies on the national level.  The
latter have driven tens of thousands of party members in the last year to
quit, and polls show voter support at low ebb.

        In Germany’s multi-party landscape there were, of course, other
winners and losers in Hamburg.  Picking up large numbers of disaffected
Social Democrats, the Greens substantially increased their percentage of the
vote from 8.6% in 2001 to 12.3% (17 seats).  The liberal Free Democratic
Party (FDP), on the other hand, won only 2.8%.  Despite try to ride on
Beust’s coattails – the FDP slogan was “Ole! Ole! Nur mit der FDP! - it
failed to even meet the 5% threshold required to sit in the assembly.  The
most stunning development, however, was the collapse of the right-wing
extremist Partei Rechtsstaatliche Offensive, or the “Schill Party,” named
after its founder, Interior Senator Ronald Schill.  After winning 19.4% just
three years ago and then ruling in coalition with the CDU until December,
the Schill Party and a related splinter group won only 3.1% and 0.4%,
respectively.  While Schill has announced his intention to go into self-
imposed exile in South America, most of his former supporters doubtless
intend to stay.  Over 80,000 of them abandoned Schill and voted for the
CDU.  They accounted for more than half of its increased support.

        The story of this election really begins with that of 2001. After
over four decades of SPD or SPD-led governments, Hamburg’s voters gave the
CDU and the Schill Party a bare majority after a campaign focusing largely
on Hamburg’s declining quality of life and especially its high crime rate.
The new coalition did little to satisfy public expectations, however, and
soon fell into disarray mainly due to Schill’s scandalous private and public
behavior.  Schill provided regular headlines for allegedly using cocaine,
for allegedly packing a weapon in the assembly, and for making outrageous
statements about immigrants or crime policy.  In August 2003, after Schill
allegedly tried to extort political concessions from von Beust by
threatening to publicly accuse him of doing political favors for his male
lover, the Mayor fired him and went public with the story and his
homosexuality.  In December he ended the ineffective coalition and called
new elections.
        Von Beust and the CDU did not focus their election campaign on any
particular set of policies.  Instead they bet the ranch that the Mayor’s
personal charisma would win the day.  And they were right.  It did not
matter that surveys indicated at least 60% of Hamburg voters were
dissatisfied with his government’s performance or that 75% said that his
alliance with Schill had damaged the CDU. Von Beust seems to embody what
many voters in this Hansestadt want in a 21st Century leader, one who
is “liberal, open to the world, modern, independent, and slow to make
decisions.”(1) These perceptions are complimented by von Beust’s powerful
public presence.  Tall, blond, quick to smile, but also dignified, the Mayor
is effective from the speakers’ rostrum, is the darling of the boulevard
press, and does well on television.  In the nightly talk shows he makes
conversation easily, comes across as confident but not arrogant, and is
willing to reveal details about his private interests while at the same time
protecting the essence of his private life.  Few in Hamburg seem to care
about his now open homosexuality.  That 60% of the voters over 60 years old
supported him speaks volumes about a public willing to forgive his alliance
with Schill and uninterested in with whom he sleeps.

        Von Beust’s personality-driven campaign benefited greatly from the
fact that the SPD’s issue-oriented candidate, economics expert Thomas Mirow,
could not hope to match his opponent’s charisma.  Mirow tried to keep the
contest focused on the city’s weak finances, rising unemployment, the need
for more kindergartens and improvement in the schools, and the CDU’s
proposal to privatize the public hospitals. He scored so well in one-on-one
debates with von Beust that the Mayor backed out of the final contest
planned for the last week of the campaign.  Von Beust clearly knew where his
strengths lay.  In December he said that this campaign was a referendum on
his person and, despite the poor performance of his government, many voters
were ready to give him the benefit of the doubt.  As one group of older
voters commented as they left their polling place, “the SPD had 44 years to
pursue their politics.  After only two years Beust should have another
chance.”(2)

        Although three quarters of those surveyed in Hamburg claimed that
local motives drove their electoral decisions, there can be little doubt
that, as Mirow pointed out after the results were in, the SPD’s national
policies had not exactly put the wind at his back.  On the contrary, the neo-
liberal reform course of the SPD-Green coalition in Berlin acts as a
powerful headwind, against which all state and local SPD candidates will
have to struggle this year.

        Social Democracy’s difficulties have been long in the making.  After
defeating the CDU’s almost perpetual Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, in 1998, the
SPD and it Green junior partner made little progress in dealing with
Germany’s massive unemployment problems, especially in the east, stagnating
economic growth, and strained public finances. After muddling along for four
years, Schroeder won reelection in 2002 primarily on the basis of his
effective response to a major flood in the east and his opposition to
Germany’s involvement in the U.S attack on Iraq.  He made no systematic
proposals to resolve the country’s economic difficulties until March 2003,
when, without prior debate within the party, he announced his “Agenda 2010.”
A package of essentially market-oriented, pro-business economic and social
reforms designed to “stabilize the welfare state” and “make Germany fit for
the future,” these policies contradict most of Social Democracy’s
ideological and programmatic principles.  By threatening repeatedly to
resign and arguing that any alternative would be worse, Schroeder
successfully pushed through reforms in the health and pension systems and
the labor market that burden workers, the poor, and the unemployed, while
they enrich capital.

        Although the business elite has praised these steps “in the right
direction,” the impact of Schroeder’s agenda on the SPD has been
disastrous.  Over 38,000 (about 6%) members quit the party in 2003 and party
activists and trade unionists have found themselves at a loss to explain to
their constituents how cuts in retirement and unemployment benefits, rising
health care costs, and fewer job protections are good for them.  This very
basic dilemma, along bungled implementation of some reforms, such as the
cash co-payments now required when visiting the doctor, has alienated many
supporters from the party.  Finally, in February, with the internal crisis
deepening and surveys showing voter support plummeting to about 25%,
Schroeder resigned as SPD chairman.  He remains Chancellor, while his
replacement, Franz Muentefering, the popular leader of the Bundestag
delegation, is charged with reinvigorating the party base.

        His task will not be easy.  Like the cavalry coming over the hill to
save the day, Muentefering arrived in Hamburg to add some charismatic spunk
to Mirow’s campaign, but the “Muente-effect” proved to be too little too
late.  While many SPD supporters were relieved that the party received at
least 30%, that isn’t saying much in a city where the SPD regularly won
between 45% and 55% of the votes for decades.  It remains to be seen whether
Muentefering can rally party activists and mobilize SPD voters in future
elections, but he has little maneuvering room.  If the party sticks to its
current reform course, it will be hard to convince disgruntled voters to
return to the fold.  If it changes course, it loses credibility and exposes
itself to sharp criticism from its political rivals firing away from a
position of “splendid opposition.”

         For the Greens, the SPD’s weakness is both an opportunity and a
problem.  As the Hamburg elections showed, although 36,000 former SPD voters
turned to the CDU and 19,000 stayed home, over 10,000 switched from Red to
Green, boosting the latter’s strength substantially and allowing the two
parties to still claim a total of 42% of the electorate.  This scenario
could be repeated in other parts of the country because many left-oriented
voters do not hold the junior coalition partner in Berlin equally
responsible for the unpopular reform course. The Greens are pleased about
their increasing strength, but if it comes at the expense of the SPD, they
may find themselves out of power on the federal as well as the regional and
local levels.  The Green leadership is publicly claiming fealty to the
current partnership, and much depends on the electoral fate of the CDU’s
traditional ally, the FDP, but some in the party are now quietly mulling
over the possibility of a cooperation with the CDU in the future.

        Finally, the Hamburg election provides a striking example of
politics as “entertainment,” in which charismatic individuals, rather than
party programs, take center stage.  This is not a new phenomenon in Germany,
but it is one that has accelerated in recent years as political parties
increasingly tend to function more as electoral machines for individual
leaders than as rival institutions for the generation and dissemination of
ideas for a better society.  Von Beust certainly used the CDU as an
electoral vehicle rather than as a source of political ideas.  In fact, his
support for Turkey’s entrance into the EU and the controlled distribution of
heroin among drug users stand in direct opposition to the CDU’s political
program. In this regard he is similar to Schroeder, whose commitment to the
SPD’s program and traditional working-class constituency has been less than
firm.  It is likely that he, too, will be banking on the power of his
personality in the struggle for the Chancellorship in 2006.
                                                William Smaldone
                                                Willamette University

William Smaldone is a Professor of History at Willamette University in
Salem, Oregon. Currently he is a Fulbright Fellow at the Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung in Bonn. In 1998, he published a book entitled "Rudolf Hilferding:
The Tragedy of a German Social Democrat" with Northern Illinois University
Press.

(1)     Astrid Hoelscher, “Der Ole-Effect,” Frankfurter Rundschau 51 (1
March 2004): 3.
(2)     Rene Wagner, “Gute Verbindungen nach Madagascar,” Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung 51 (1 March 2004): 3.

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