[The following is cross-posted with the kind permission of Dr. Lonnie Johnson
and the editors of the HABSBURG list.  The essay, posted in two parts, is Dr.
Johnson's contribution to a vigorous discussion occuring on HABSBURG concerning
the "Haider phenomenon."  Both posts remain the property of Dr. Johnson and
HABSBURG.  Please cite only with proper attribution.  For more information,
including numerous responses to the following essay and further commentary by
Dr. Johnson, I refer you to the HABSBURG website (http://www.h-net.msu.edu/~habsweb/). - H-German Editor Jay Lockenour]

<<<CROSS-POSTED FROM HABSBURG>>>
Date:    Mon, 7 Feb 2000 20:14:06 -0600
From:    "James P. Niessen" <habsburg@ttacs6.ttu.edu>
Subject: Essay: Austria's New OeVP-FPOe Government and Joerg Haider, Pt.2

Here is the second part of the HABSBURG essay by Lonnie Johnson.--Ed.

        Austria's New OeVP-FPOe Government and Joerg Haider

                       by Lonnie Johnson
                              Pt. 2

Judging by the patterns of western European politics, however, there has
been an Austrian political "Sonderweg" for the past twenty years, and it
is related in part to how Austrian political parties have attempted to
manage the Freedom Party (and Joerg Haider). In other western European
democracies, conservative governments came into power in the late 1970s
and early 1980s (with the assistance of smaller "junior parties," such as
the German liberal FDP as the feather on the parliamentary scale for the
CDU/CSU), and labor and social democratic governments made their comebacks
in the late 1990s (such as Tony Blair and the German SPD, with the Greens
playing the key role of "junior partner" in coalition building).

Statistical normalcy could be defined as a move from left-of-center to
right-of-center and back to left of center. This did not happen in
Austria, and the establishment of a right of center government may be
described as a "belated development" that reflects to what extent Austria
has been out of synchronization with general European political trends.
Furthermore, Austria has moved from a left-of-center government to
right-of-center one at a time when the great majority of other EU
governments are being ruled by left-of-center parties or coalitions. Part
of the criticism of Austria from abroad may very well have partisan
motives.

When the SPOe lost its absolute majority in parliament in 1983, it entered
a coalition with the pre-Haider or "liberal" FPOe to stay in power. When
Haider putsched his way into the party leadership in 1986 (a victory of
the party's "national wing" over its "liberal wing") neither the SPOe nor
the OeVP were prepared to cooperate with the "new FPOe," and they
"renewed" their "great coalition" reminiscent of the years 1945-1966: an
unhappy marriage that lasted 13 years characterized by lukewarm
compromises that failed to address an entire series of issues related to
structural reform that are now looming larger and larger in Austria.

The strategy of both parties for dealing with Haider was to marginalize
him ("Ausgrenzung"), especially in light of his historical revisionism.
The rise of the Green Party in Austria (represented in Austrian parliament
since 1986) and a split in the FPOe between a handful of liberals)
spearheaded by Heide Schmidt and disillusioned with the populist drift of
the party under Haider (that led to the establishment of the Liberal Forum
in 1993, first as a parliamentary faction, then after the elections of
1994, as an elected political party, were symptomatic of the increasing
diversification of the Austrian political spectrum that has taken place
primarily at the expense of the SPOe and the OeVP, and the rise of the
FPOe (from a 5% party in 1986 to 27% today) cemented the SPOe-OeVP
coalition as the only viable majority constellation in parliament: the
Greens being to weak to provide the majority for a "red-green" coalition
and the Liberals being too weak for a "black-liberal" coalition.

In the election of 1994, OeVP chairman and Vice Chancellor Erhard Busek
made it perfectly clear that he was in favor of a renewal of the OVP
coalition with the SPOe "without ifs or buts" ("ohne wenn oder aber"), and
the OeVP and Busek paid a dear political price for their commitment to the
coalition. The OeVP not only lost votes. Busek lost his position as head
of the OeVP before the extraordinary parliamentary elections of 1995 and
was replaced by Wolfgang Schuessel.

Before the elections of October 1999, Wolfgang Schuessel said that the
OeVP would go into opposition if it did not finish second after all of the
votes were tallied. The SPOe received 33.15% of the vote and 65 seats
(-4.91% and a loss of 6 seats in comparison to 1995); the OeVP received
26.91% held its 52 seats (-1.38% and unchanged); the FPOe also received
26.91% of the vote and 52 seats (+5.02 and an increase of 11 seats); and
the Greens received 7.40% (+2.59 and plus 5 seats). The Liberal Forum
received only 3.65% (-1.86%) and fell below the threshold necessary to be
represented in parliament and hence lost all of its seats (previously 10).
Although the OeVP and the FPOe finished ex aequo with 52 seats in
parliament, the OeVP technically finished third (a mere 415 votes behind
the FPOe) and therefore it initially decided to honor its pre-electoral
promise to go into opposition. This excluded the possibility of a renewal
of the SPOe-OeVP coalition (or tactically upped the ante for its renewal
because the SPOe would have to make greater concessions to get the OeVP to
cooperate.)

Due to the intercession of Austrian Federal President Thomas Klestil, who
wanted a "government on the broadest possible basis" (i.e. a renewal of
the SPOe-OeVP coalition), the SPOe and OeVP entered into negotiations on
December 9,1999, but they failed just short of an agreement at the very
last minute on January 21, because the OeVP insisted upon having a
"non-party expert" as minister of finance (instead of an SPOe minister)
and having the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions (an autonomous
organization closely affiliated with the SPOe) sign the coalition pact
(which would be standard coalition-building operating procedure but which
the unionists refused to do). The SPOe and the trade unionists were not
willing to compromise on these issues, arguing that they had reached their
absolute limits, and the OeVP insisted on these concessions. The coalition
agreement collapsed. Both the OeVP and the FPOe made it clear that they
would not tolerate an SPOe minority government, and this, in turn, opened
up the avenue for an OeVP-FPOe coalition as the only means of establishing
a government with a parliamentary majority and a conservative coalition.

This is when the European Union intervened in an unprecedented and unusual
manner. While OeVP-FPOe negotiations were in process, Portugal, which
currently holds the position of the Presidency of the EU, a position that
rotates among member states every six months, issued a statement that the
14 member states of the EU would reduce their bilateral contacts with
Austria to an absolute minimum, i.e. effectively diplomatically quarantine
Austria, should the FPOe be represented in an Austrian government. This
statement was made without diplomatically consulting Austria or Austrian
foreign minister and OeVP party chairman Wolfgang Schuessel. This was
truly a controversial and premature measure. How can the European Union
uphold the principles of parliamentary democracy, on the on hand, and, at
the same time, threaten sanctions against a member state that has not
violated EU conventions but is in the process of establishing a coalition
government based on the principle of parliamentary democracy, on the
other?

The threat of EU sanctions was a an unprecedented example of the EU
intervening in the domestic affairs of a member state without any material
cause. There was no Austrian government with a program that violated EU
conventions when the threat of sanctions was made. Now there is an
Austrian government that has not violated EU conventions, but the EU
sanctions have become effective. Everyone has been surprised how quickly
the EU has reacted, or, according to some of the more judicious commentary
appearing in European papers, overreacted, and some critics of this
measure consider it a considerable political and tactical blunder. (It
would have been nice to have seen the EU demonstrate this type of speed
and firmness of resolution in other "crisis situations," such as Kosovo or
Bosnia.)

The _Neue Zuericher Zeitung_, always a judicious commentator on
European affairs and a breath of fresh air, observed in its February
1 edition (p. 3) that the "actual reasons for the excitement in
western Europe are the domestic political situations [in respective
EU member states]." It is truly unusual when Austria is condemned
by a Gaullist president in France, a Portuguese socialist head of
government, and a conservative Spanish minister president, whose
own party has never really dissociated itself from its Franco roots,
for "rightist extremism" without defining exactly what that is.

Furthermore, international reactions to the pending formation of an
OeVP-FPOe government and the threat of EU sanctions motivated Austrian
President Klestil's desire to include of a "preamble" to the OeVP-FPOe
coalition agreement, which, given Austria's political track record since
World War II, consists of a series of political commonplaces. Therein, the
Federal Government reaffirms its commitment to individual freedom,
political liberty, the rule of law, democracy, human rights, pluralism,
tolerance, the European Union, cooperation, etc. The preamble recognizes
Austria's "responsibility arising out the tragic history of the 20th
century and the horrendous crimes of the National Socialist regime"; the
singularity of the Holocaust, and entails a commitment to "a self-
critical scrutiny of the National Socialist past."

The inclusion of this "preamble" in the coalition agreement was an express
wish of President Klestil, who has been open about his disapproval of the
OeVP-FPOe coalition, and its ultimate intention was to dispel any doubts
other European countries might have about the intentions of a OeVP-FPOe
government. At the same time, based on Austria's track record as a
functioning Western European democracy, it was not a necessary exercise,
unless one is prepared to assume that the new coalition government has or
could have the intention or the capacity to violate EU conventions.

There are two sovereignty issues that come up here. One is related to the
sovereignty of the people in a democracy, when the minority is truly
disaffected by the fact that the majority has a political program that
does not conform with the minority's interests. This is the current
Austrian domestic problem. The European problem is to what extent the
European Union may prophylactically intervene in the domestic affairs of a
member state. Although the EU intervention in Austrian domestic affairs
provides an unprecedented example, the commentary of Austrian experts of
European and international law on the EU measures has been circumspect and
reserved, and I frankly have been surprised that no one has had the irony
to suggest that the EU appoint a commissioner to rule Austria: the alleged
renegade among the democracies of the Union.

The threat and the implementation of EU sanctions, in addition to
addressing the precarious issue of limits of national autonomy in the
Union using a less than auspicious occasion, have turned Joerg Haider into
something he had never been before: a politician of "European format" with
a European audience.

Furthermore, Austria has a good record on European integration. One should
not forget that two-thirds of the Austrians voted for accession to the
European Union in 1994. The personal and political record of Wolfgang
Schuessel as a "European politician" and of the OeVP as a "European party"
are impeccable. The case is less so with Joerg Haider and the FPOe because
they have appealed to anti-EU sentiment in Austria but the FPOe political
commitment to integration is anchored firmly in the OeVP-FPOe coalition
pact. The _causa Haider_ has become a _causa unionis_ for the EU: an issue
of power and prestige. It will be interesting to see if and when the EU
will back down on this issue if the new Austrian government succeeds in
not conducting itself as a renegade democracy, and there is no reason to
assume that it will.

The problem with this entire affair (aside from the usual emotions and
name-calling) is the tremendous gap between a differentiated picture of
Austria and the type of simplification with which one constantly is
confronted in most of the media. If we look back on the Waldheim affair,
Kurt Waldheim was many things, but not a Nazi war criminal who had
inexplicably escaped justice. Analogously, Joerg Haider, a much more
enigmatic figure, is many things, but he is not a neo-Nazi, and Simon
Wiesenthal has come to Haider's defense. One frequently ends up in the
peculiar position of "defending" Haider because his critics frequently do
not get the accusations right and are more than willing to indulge in the
type of rhetorical excess that is characteristic of Haider himself.

As for the general mood in Vienna right now among the people I associate
with (and they are not FPOe voters for the most part) I observe a
combination of impotence, anger, anxiety, and resolve among the Social
Democrats and Greens, who oppose the coalition. The Social Democratic
departure from power after thirty years hurts, of course, but Haider's
rise to power is related to the shortcomings of Austrian social democracy
in a number of respects. The Social Democrat-Green minority in Parliament
have threatened to introduce a vote of no confidence at the inaugural
session of the Parliament this week. This is an unprecedented move. Under
"normal" circumstances in Austria, governments have been given a 100 day
"period of grace" to show what they can do. Austrian trade unionists, the
structurally most conservative lobby in Austria with a wide array of
acquired and expensive entitlements, are talking about "combative
measures" (_Kampfmassnahmen_). Consensual politics is out; class struggle
is in.

More widespread is a certain quiet desperation: the feeling that the
damage has been done, on the one hand, and there is no changing course at
this point without abandoning the principles of parliamentary democracy,
on the other. The new coalition government is caught between "pressure
from the street" ("Druck von der Strasse"), an euphemism for social
democratic-Green dissatisfaction and popular protest, and "intervention
from abroad" ("Einmischung von aussen"), another euphemism for premature
EU sanctions. And the former domestic dissatisfaction does not refrain
from legitimizing itself by referring to the latter criticism from abroad.
In addition to these two pressure fronts, there is a third one that may or
may not bear down on the new government: J=F6rg Haider himself. He may
chose to let the government work or to undermine the coalition. However,
everyone has been waiting for Joerg Haider, the young polemic agitator, to
finally turn into a "statesman." He has his opportunity to do so. The open
question at this point is whether he will take it or not.  Many seasoned
Haider-watchers are skeptical.

Should the opposition parties in Austria and the community of democratic
nations measure the new born Austrian government on the anticipations of
its detractors or should it be given the time to be measured on its deeds?
Recently sworn in as Federal Chancellor, Wolfgang Schuessel has been
praised by his supporters for his composure and the admirable job he had
done in the past week of managing a truly precarious political situation
just as he has been damned by his critics for destroying the reputation of
Austria. He has pleaded for a "de-escalation" of the situation
(domestically and internationally) that would give the new government an
opportunity to demonstrate its abilities. The vitality the opposition in
Austria has shown in the course of the establishment of an OeVP-FPOe
coalition indicates how lively critical voices are in the Republic of
Austria, and there is no reason to assume that the opponents of the
OeVP-FPOe coalition will not vigilantly monitor the political conduct of
the government. On the contrary. Under these circumstances, one may ask if
Austria needs additional monitoring by the EU or anybody else.

Politically or rhetorically downgrading Austria to the status of a
semi-democratic state with a neofascist government is unfair and for most
Austrians an insult. Qualifications or excuses for Haider's previous
revisionism are untenable. So is a collective condemnation of Austria
because a party led by Haider is participating in a democratically elected
and constituted coalition government. The 73% of the Austrian electorate,
who did not vote for Joerg Haider or the Freedom Party, are now confronted
with international sanctions, and disqualifying the 27% of those Austrians
who did vote for Haider and the Freedom Party (as neo-Nazis or neofascists
or whatever) misses the diversity of his constituency and many of the
larger domestic and structural issues at stake.

However, these larger domestic issues not only are too small but also too
complicated to be taken into account when the outside world looks in to
the microcosm of Austria affairs. Sound bites and complexity are
incompatible. That is one part of Austria's current problem. As for the
rest, Austria will have ample opportunity to show that it has a strong
enough democratic traditions and institutions to keep its own house in
order. Historians inevitably will make references to 1938 and 1934. As far
as I can see, Austria has learned some political lessons in the twentieth
century. Neither dictatorship nor civil war are on the horizon.

   Copyright Lonnie Johnson and HABSBURG, 2000.  All rights reserved.

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