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John Earl Haynes & Harvey Klehr <Haynes@cwix.com, email@example.com> Professor Sandilands asks, indeed, demands to know why we identified Lauchlin Currie as assisting Soviet intelligence but failed to so identify Harry Hopkins. The answer is simple. There is convincing evidence for the former but not the latter. The former KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky remembered Akhmerov, then in his 60s, reminiscing of his career as the chief KGB illegal in the U.S. in W.W.II, identifying Hopkins as a important agent of influence. Gordievsky, however, concluded from what Akhmerov and others said that Hopkins was an unconscious agent, someone manipulated by the Soviets, not someone who was providing intelligence, documents, or performing tasks that assisted Soviet intelligence. Gordievsky's remarks are interesting as far as they go, they just don't go far enough for us to conclude that Hopkins was a Soviet intelligence asset. There is no archival evidence supporting Hopkins meeting with Akhmerov or any other Soviet illegal. There are no deciphered Venona messages showing Hopkins with a covert relationship with the KGB. Here we note that there is in Venona an intriguing but unidentified and ambiguous cover name "Source no. 19." This cover name occurs in a single KGB message in May 1943. The KGB only rarely used numeric cover names, and it is possible that here the New York KGB was reporting about a GRU contact (the GRU used numeric cover names more often). Source no. 19 reported on a private conversation he had with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill during the just ended 'Trident' conference of the two Allied powers in Washington. The message, from the New York KGB office to Moscow, is signed by the KGB illegal officer, Iskhak Akhmerov. It states "19 reports that Kapitan [Roosevelt] and Kaban [Churchill], during conversations in the Country [USA], invited 19 to join them and Zamestitel." Unfortunately much of the subsequent text is only partially deciphered. It is clear, however, that Source no. 19 reported on Churchill's views on why a 1943 Anglo-American invasion of continental Europe was inadvisable. The message also reported that Zamestitel supported a second-front and that it appeared that Roosevelt had been keeping Zamestitel in the dark about "important military decisions." The partial nature of the readable text in this message along with two of its cover names, Source no. 19 and Zamestitel, occurring only once in the deciphered Venona traffic, gives too little material for a firm judgment on the identity of Source no. 19 and also makes exactly what was occurring unclear. It appears that Source no. 19 was at the Trident conference or one of its ancillary events and very highly placed in as much as he was asked to join a private conversation with Roosevelt and Churchill. Beyond that, however, it is difficult to get much of a clue about Source no. 19's identity. NSA/FBI analysts footnote it only as unidentified. It is not even clear that Source no. 19 was American because possibly he was part of the British delegation that accompanied Churchill, and there were a few Trident events attended by senior officials of other Allied powers and several governments-in-exile. Unfortunately, the deciphered parts of the message do not give the exact date of Source no. 19's conversation with Roosevelt and Churchill. Nor is it even clear who Zamestitel was. The word Zamestitel means Deputy in Russian, and originally analysts thought this designated Vice President Henry Wallace. However, in five later Venona messages Wallace was clearly designated by the cover name Lotsman, Russian for Channel Pilot. While the KGB had a practice of changing the cover names of its covert sources for security reasons, it rarely changed the cover names used in its cable traffic for institutions or individuals who were written of frequently but who were not covert sources. The KGB, for example, used the cover names Captain [Kapitan] and Boar [Kaban] for Roosevelt and Churchill throughout the span of Venona traffic. Having second thoughts about the Zamestitel identification, analysts later added an annotation to the Source no. 19 message suggesting that Zamestitel was more likely Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's chief aide, rather than Wallace. However, aside from this appearance of Zamestitel, no cover name for Hopkins has ever been identified in the Venona traffic. Hopkins' name occurs in the clear in several later Venona messages and are simply references to him as a high American official. While KGB cipher clerks did not always use a cover name when one had been set, they generally did. All of this adds up to uncertainty and is why the analyst who added the annotation also added several question marks. One is left, consequently, only with the knowledge that the Soviets had a very high level contact, Source no. 19, at the Trident conference who reported on a sensitive political/diplomatic conversation between Roosevelt, Churchill and a third high American official (possibly Wallace or Hopkins). The historian Eduard Mark argues on the basis of a close reading of the attendance records of the Trident conference and other evidence that he located that the most likely Deputy (Zamestitel) was Wallace and Source no. 19 was Hopkins. [Eduard Mark, "Venona's Source 19 and The Trident Conference of May 1943: Diplomacy or Espionage?," Intelligence and National Security, April 1998] He concludes, further, that the readable portions of the message do not allow a decision between Hopkins/19 as a Soviet covert source or as a benign diplomatic contact with one of FDR's designated contacts with the Soviets. We agree that the partial decryption and ambiguity of the message does not allow a confident judgment on Source no. 19's relationship to the Soviets (it could have been back channel diplomacy) but while we are impressed by Mark's analysis, we also view the evidence as too slim to reach a judgment about Source No. 19's identity. In addition to the dearth of evidence about Hopkins in Venona, none of the KGB documents to which Weinstein and Vassiliev had access described Hopkins as a Soviet intelligence contact. None of the material we have examined at the RTsKhIDNI archives points to Hopkins. There are no FOIA FBI investigative files which contain evidence suggesting a Hopkins relationship with Soviet intelligence. Perhaps something will turn up in the future, if so, we will reconsider the matter, but for now we regard Gordievsky's remarks as too weak a basis for any identification of Hopkins as a Soviet agent, conscious or unconscious. By contrast, the evidence regarding Lauchlin Currie is convincing. We have detailed that evidence in our book, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (Yale University Press, 1999), and have several times summarized it in earlier postings in response to Professor Sandilands and see no point in repeating it once more. John Earl Haynes & Harvey Klehr