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Re Jon Krohn's commmenst posted August 18, 2006 12:31 pm Thanks to Jon for his interesting observations. Yes, the internationalization of military security issues and decisions to project force extraterritorially has long historical roots, as long as the formation of relatively stable boundaries between territorially identifiable power systems. Internationalization is inherent into, I would say a sine qua non of, the conditions of conflictive interactions between territorially identified power systems. Conflicts and military security issues are international because they take place across borders, even if these border are not contiguous. Like in the case of the U.S. decision to attack and invade Iraq. Since power systems are defined in territorial terms, it is important to distinguish between international and internationalization, and between international and global, as well as between global and globalization. All military security issues between states or territorially defined power systems are by nature international. This does not mean they are global, though they can become globalized. Likewise, internal conflicts within territorially defined power systems or entities may become internationalized, like the American civil war to some extent, the Russian and Spain's to a much larger extent, or Bosnia's to a still larger extent. The events Jon Krohn refers to -the Boer War, the Boxer Rebellion, the Venezuelan crisis, the Canal issue and Panamanian revolution, unrest in Cuba, revolution in Haiti and the Russo-Japanese War- were all international, and thus subject of strong attention from a newly evolving media complex. They were however not really global but discreet events concerning the specific powers involved and the stakes were likewise limited to them, even if if now know they may have entailed turning points in imperial disintegration and power substitution, like the Philippine-American war. The American Iraq war, approached as a discreet event for comparative purposes, does not appear essentially different from say the Philippines war, an international but not necessarily global event, like the Vietnam war. Preemption in the larger historical context means nothing new but a recurrent context of justification of hostilities, constantly practiced especially by expansive powers, like Germany on Poland in September 1939, and perhaps even more so on Denmark and Norway in April 1940, allegedly to preempt an imminent French-British occupation of the two countries. In fact, most of the decisions to use force aggressively in history -that is, attacking first- have included some variation of preemptive argument. Now, in real time analytical term, the American Iraq war, unlike the American Philippines war, is an actually instant global event in its making, and a quasi global event in its process. In its making, because of the extent of public perceptions and involvement. In its process, not quite global, because several key countries and regions, like China, are only marginally related and simply contemplate how the U.S. bleeds itself and its territorial conquests in its imperial delusions. The outcome of the conflict may however alter its quai globality. Leo Lovelace Chapman University