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I don't think I clearly addressed the issue of whether or not
Nixon and/or Kissinger believed that the 1973 agreement would lead to the
establishment of an independent non-communist Vietnam (in which case the
war would have been a "victory" every bit as much as Korea had been) or
whether they believed that Paris would lead to a "decent interval" - a
kind of sophisticated sell-out. I am not sure that I can read Nixon's tea
leaves on this issue. However, I think Kissinger's intentions are a little
more understandable. Kissinger admired the great diplomats of the 19th
Century: Metternich, Bismarck, etc. Bismarck in particular never thought
that events could be predicted with precision. When a policy was pursued a
range of outcomes could be expected. The trick was to develop policy where
the minimum outcome (today we might call it a worst case scenario) was
acceptable. If a triumph ensued great. If it was something in between,
don't die of surprise.
It was no secret that many "Henry watchers" inside and outside the
administration thought that Kissinger considered Thieu expendable. (Thieu
thought this.) He did not desire the fall of SVN, but believed that LBJ
and others had grossly overestimated the harm that a Hanoi victory would
have on America's position. Kissinger was, however, extremely concerned
about the overall course of the Cold War and wanted American concentration
firmly pointed in the correct direction - dealing with Moscow. I rather
think Kissinger enjoyed juggling the fears and desires of Moscow, Beijing
and other lesser players. The biggest obstacle to playing the game, as
made clear in his memoirs, was the Vietnam War. Therefore Paris was a good
deal from Kissinger's point of view. The minimum outcome was an American
withdrawal from Vietnam and a face-saving interval of peace: an acceptable
position from which to get down to truly important business even if the
GVN failed in the end. The maximum outcome, which I suppose sounded
feasible, was that Thieu would stick it out and the US could, at some
future date, claim victory. The important point is that wherever events
fell on the minimum-maximum continuum, America was out of the war and had
its hands free to play the great game on even terms. In sum, I think
Kissinger would have considered Paris good work regardless of what took
place ultimately in Vietnam.
Eric Bergerud
 Humanities & Social Sciences Online 
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