H-NET BOOK REVIEW
Published by H-German@h-net.msu.edu    (August, 2003)

Kenneth Macksey. _Guderian: Panzer General_. Revised edition. London:
Greenhill Books, 2003. xii + 228 pp. Maps, illustrations, notes,
bibliography, index. $34.95 (cloth), ISBN 1-85367-538-5.

Reviewed for H-German by James V. Koch <jkoch@odu.edu>, Old Dominion
University

If Germany had defeated the U.S.S.R. militarily in 1941-42, it is likely
that the tightly knit Guderian clan would still today occupy the estate at
Deipenhof in the Warthegau in West Prussia (now part of Poland) that was
given to Generaloberst Heinz Guderian in October 1942 by Adolf Hitler.
What should we make of this gift from the _Fuehrer_ to Guderian, the
acknowledged genius behind German armored forces in World War II?  Was it
simply one among many such secretive gifts that Hitler lavished upon the
paladins and favorites of the Reich on the occasions of their
anniversaries and birthdays, or when they recorded an especially notable
achievement?  (Guderian had been awarded the rare Oak Leaves to the Iron
Cross in July 1941.) Alternatively, was it a subtle bribe to muffle an
occasionally insubordinate general who, despite demonstrated affinity for
National Socialism and Adolf Hitler, might have been viewed by Hitler as
potentially disruptive and contentious?  He was, after all, "always a
rebel in his profession," according to Downing, and known for speaking his
mind to nearly everyone, even to his _Fuehrer_.[1] Does the gift further
suggest that Hitler regarded Guderian, who had been sacked for ordering a
retreat south of Moscow contrary to the _Fuehrer's_ orders in December
1941, as, nonetheless, an ideological comrade?

These are among the interpretative dilemmas Kenneth Macksey, veteran
military historian, tackles in his revision of his original 1975 biography
of Heinz Guderian.  Guderian is justly celebrated as a military leader of
"brilliant gifts," who was bold, inventive, charismatic and supremely
determined.[2] His inspired, "lead from the front" generalship hastened
the fall of Poland in September 1939, keyed the spectacular German armored
dash across France to the English Channel in May 1940, led Panzer Group
Two to unprecedented victories in the U.S.S.R. in Fall 1941, and delayed
the collapse of Germany in the face of the Soviet onslaught, 1943-45.  He
was, during these years, one of the most effective generals in the world
and certainly the apotheosis of leadership in armored, mobile warfare.
More so than any other general, his leadership satisfied Saint-Exupery's
memorable criterion.  "An armoured division should move against the enemy
like water.  It should bear lightly against the enemy's wall of defense
and advance only at the point where it meets no resistance."[3] Yet, as
Earl Ziemke, a well-regarded historian of the battles on the Eastern Front
has concluded, on occasion Guderian's "judgment was less than
impeccable."[4] He sometimes tended toward recklessness, could be
insulting in approach, and played footsy with the Nazi inner circle.
General Walter Warlimont of the General Staff noted after the war that
Guderian "politically sought a closer association with the Party than was
customary among the officers" (p. 176) and shrank from becoming involved
in any resistance activities against Hitler.  The salient question, then,
is how well does Macksey handle the ambiguity of such situations in his
revised edition?

Macksey's original biography of Guderian was solid, conventional work that
relied primarily upon Guderian's own writings, but also utilized the
post-war evaluations of Guderian by many individuals, including Sir Basil
Liddell Hart.  Macksey, a onetime British tank officer who saw action in
Western Europe in 1944-45, is at his best when he details Guderian's
astonishing, driving development and use of Germany's Panzer forces.  He
also dispenses at least passing coverage to nearly all the major events
and issues of Guderian's life.  However, unless an author simply wants to
sell a few additional books, the production of a revised edition of a
well-accepted biography should presume the author has acquired new
material that either buttresses previously weak assertions or changes some
conclusions.  Macksey says three developments caused him to revise the
biography.  First, new information mined from Ultra intelligence
intercepts is now available and has changed how we view leadership
decisions in the war.  Second, Macksey feels the need to assess the impact
of what he labels the Liddell Hart "saga" (p. xi).  Macksey alleges
Liddell Hart brought ruin to his own scholarly reputation by overzealous
self-promotion of the notion that he had a tremendous impact upon
Guderian's thinking about armored warfare.  Third, Macksey has been able
to talk with surviving members of Guderian's family and associates of
General Erich Fellgiebel, who was in charge of the Wehrmacht's
communications at the time of the Hitler assassination attempt on 20 July
1944.[5] The family had information that clarified Guderian's previously
cloudy role on that day.  Thus, Macksey concluded another edition was
merited.  Macksey's revised biography of Guderian continues to be solid
work because it adds context and critical analysis to Guderian's own
autobiography, _Panzer Leader_, which appeared in English in 1952.[6]
Although Macksey, on the whole, is rather gentle in his treatment of
Guderian, this biography is not hagiographic to the same degree as his
study of Albert Kesselring.[7] Nevertheless, several unresolved issues and
caveats are worthy of mention.

First, there is the matter of the gift from Hitler to Guderian. Macksey
opts not to delve into the possible elements of corruption and avarice
that surrounded the huge gift of money that Guderian received from Hitler
in 1942 to enable him to purchase the Deipenhof estate.[8] Not all of the
military elite received such gifts; Rommel, for example, neither received
nor accepted anything, despite his status as one of the _Prominenten_.
With gift commitment in hand, Guderian toured the Warthegau area with the
Gauleiter's staff and found the estate he wanted, at which time the Polish
owners were evicted.  Probably out of embarrassment, Guderian says very
little about the gift in _Panzer Leader_.  Nor does Guderian mention that
originally he had selected a much larger estate, but this request was
denied as excessive and a bad precedent, given that individuals more
prominent than Guderian also were to receive estates. Similarly, Guderian
does not mention specifically that in September 1939 his family had
repossessed the family's ancestral estate at Gross-Klonia in the
Warthegau.  Nor does he disclose that he successfully petitioned to avoid
paying the usual German tax on the Deipenhof gift, or that he was one of
more than one hundred notables in the Reich receiving sizeable
_Sonderzahlungen_ (special payments) each month from the _Fuehrer_.  In
Guderian's case, he received 2,000 _Reichsmark_ per month in addition to
his regular salary. Macksey skates over or chooses not to write about
nearly all of these uncomfortable details even though Gerd Uebershaer and
Winfried Vogel's valuable study of Hitler's largely confidential gifts
(including Guderian's) was published in 1999.

Second, Macksey tends to underplay Guderian's impulsive, sometimes
reckless nature, which on several occasions almost resulted in his being
captured by the enemy.  John Erickson, for example, notes that Guderian
narrowly avoided capture by the Soviets on the third day of Barbarossa.[9]
Guderian was wont to make quick, instinctive decisions on limited data. To
his credit, he usually was correct, and Macksey underscores these
instances.  However, these lightning choices sometimes blew up in his face
and when they did, Guderian could not resist attempts to place the blame
on others.  On occasion, he would gild the factual lily in order to
convince his superiors of the necessity of his precipitate course of
action. Multiple superior officers repetitively heard from Guderian that
it was already too late to reverse an action that Guderian had taken. This
occasional recklessness extended to the political realm, where Guderian
carelessly became enmeshed in _Freikorps_ machinations in Latvia in 1919,
nearly ending his promising career.  Macksey notes that this activity put
him "under a distinct cloud" (p. 33), but does not connect this cloud to a
more general pattern of behavior. Indeed, he argues the opposite, that
this episode drove Guderian away from politics. This is a judgment
difficult to support. Guderian continued to dabble in politics, but became
more astute in how he did so.

Third, Macksey does not give sufficient weight to Guderian's long-term
sympathies for Adolf Hitler as a person and the National Socialists as a
movement.  Guderian's endorsement of the cause of the _Freikorps_ in 1919
was followed by his occasional attendance at Nazi Party meetings after
Hitler took power; numerous personal meetings and dinners with Hitler;
and, his insertion of flattering prose about Hitler in his _Achtung!
Panzer_ in 1937.[10] He ignored or repressed the reality of the
_Kristallnacht_, the development of the concentration camp system and the
Holocaust, as well as the sordid behavior of some elements of the
_Wehrmacht_ in the East, beginning in Poland.  He showed little interest
in protecting Polish and Soviet prisoners of war and citizens, or
protesting their treatment; and was inattentive to the depredations of the
_Einsatzgruppen_ on the Eastern Front.  Guderian consistently refused to
do more than listen to the anti-Hitler resistance, which fit with his
servile radio broadcast and issuance of written orders after becoming
Chief of Staff of the OKH in July 1944, in which he demanded a National
Socialist officer corps and told General Staff officers they should
"exhibit the thoughts of the _Fuehrer_" (p. 190);  his "half hearted"
encouragement of attempts to begin peace negotiations; and, his early
1950s leadership of a group of former German military leaders and Nazis
who sought to rearm and reunify Germany.[11] Taken together, these actions
paint a less flattering picture.  However, Macksey views this portrait
rather benignly, or ignores its flaws, despite many new developments such
as the _Historikerstreit_, and works such as Heer and Naumann's seminal
exploration of _Wehrmacht_ atrocities on the Eastern Front, published as
early as 1995.  Macksey does touch at least indirectly on most of these
topics.  Nevertheless, he seems reluctant to follow their trail
inductively to reach a general summary conclusion.  The judgment of others
has been more piercing.  R. T. Paget's searing comment about the German
officer corps that, "like the Pharisees, they passed upon the other side
of the road," applies, with certainty, to Guderian's behavior.[12] Yet,
except when he observes that _Schneller Heinz_ had "fissures" in his
character (p. 217), Macksey finds circumstantial reasons to grant Guderian
a moral pass. One can agree with Macksey that many others, including some
Allied leaders, failed similar character tests, without absolving
Guderian.

Fourth, Macksey does not exhibit any skepticism over Guderian's assertion
that he advocated a Mediterranean Strategy after the fall of France (p.
136).  A viable strategic option for Germany in the summer of 1940 was to
move south and drive Britain out of the Mediterranean region (and perhaps
away from the Middle East oilfields as well) by capturing Gibraltar,
Malta, most of the North African coastline and Suez.  Arguably, such a
strategy might have driven Britain from the war or resulted in the fall of
the Churchill government, in which case a government conducive to peace
negotiations might have resulted.  In summer 1940, it seems unlikely that
the United States would have intervened in such a struggle. Further, this
strategy would have deferred a conflict with the Soviet Union and enabled
Germany to fight a one front war, if this likely battle of autocracies
were to occur.  Regardless, it was, at the very least, a course of action
that would have changed the war dramatically.  Even so, when Guderian
mentions his advocacy of this approach, Macksey does not pursue the
notion.  Perhaps he agrees implicitly with Downing, who noted, "whether
Guderian really did see things so clearly in 1940 is, of course, open to
doubt."[13]

Fifth, Macksey does not really ask whether the renewed German drive on
Moscow in October 1941 was wise, or if it actually would have ended the
war, if successful.  Instead, he stresses Guderian's insistence that
Moscow be the primary strategic objective and the Generaloberst's
disappointment that his armored group was diverted south to the massive
encirclement battle around Kiev in August and September 1941.  However,
there is room to question Guderian's narrative here.[14] Guderian's
receipt of the coveted Oak Leaves to the Iron Cross on July 17, 1941 and
the subsequent placement of more divisions under his command may have
assuaged his objections to Hitler's plan.  This was the view of Halder and
others, who believed Guderian sold out.  In any case, once the Kiev
encirclement was completed (and it may have netted an astonishing 660,000
Soviet prisoners), the question devolved to one of whether or not it was
still productive for Germany to resume its drive on Moscow. Militating
against such a move was the rapidly approaching Russian winter, and the
need to refit and replace worn and destroyed tanks and equipment.  By
September 15, 1941, more than one half of the tanks available to Army
Group Center in June 1941 were either destroyed or out of commission. Only
25 percent of the tanks in Guderian's renamed Second Panzer Army were
available for battle after Kiev.  Shortages of materiel were rampant.
Exacerbating factors included the inability of the _Wehrmacht_ to replace
the almost 500,000 casualties it had suffered thus far and the reality
that Guderian was twice as far from Moscow as he had been at the end of
July 1941.  Finally, the respite before Moscow had provided the Soviet
Army with the opportunity to prepare its Moscow defenses and to begin
moving more than twenty-five quality divisions from the Far East.  The
Germans still enjoyed an approximate eight to five manpower advantage in
terms of front line troops in the area of Army Group Center, but time was
of the essence.[15] The better part of valor might have been to defer the
Moscow drive until spring 1942 and instead occupy the remainder of Ukraine
and seize the oil-rich Caucasus.

Nonetheless, Guderian continued to be a strong advocate of renewing the
Moscow thrust, which resulted in what has been termed the "sharpest
setback the German Army had suffered since 1918 and a defeat of such
magnitude that it crippled Germany's chances for victory over the Soviet
Union."[16] It does appear that Guderian was persuasive in convincing
Hitler to undertake this risky venture, which hardly would have
constituted such a gamble forty-five days earlier.[17] Indeed, already on
August 4, 1941, Guderian had met with the _Fuehrer_ and told him he
believed the Soviet Army was scraping the bottom of its manpower barrel, a
judgment far off the mark.  Macksey, however, does not choose to
investigate Guderian's culpability for this critical decision and notes
only that the renewed drive on Moscow had "theoretical feasibility" (p.
153), though it constituted a very difficult assignment.  Fugate, however,
lambastes Guderian, asserting that he was an "influence monger," who
"uncorked this bottle of heady wine and served it to his superiors," but
then pointed the finger of blame at others when the operation predictably
failed.[18] Robert Kershaw is on target when he describes the final
assault on Moscow as "more a gamble than a considered operational
plan."[19].

Sixth, Macksey uses the revised edition as a means to land body blows to
the scholarly reputation of Sir Basil Liddell Hart.  He strongly endorses
John Mearsheimer's highly critical evaluation of the importance of Liddell
Hart's contribution to armored, mobile war-making and highlights
Mearsheimer's finding that Liddell Hart supplied Guderian with a passage
to insert in the English language version of _Panzer Leader_; the passage
flatters Liddell Hart and proclaims Guderian's intellectual debt to
him.[20] Doubtless, the self-promoting Liddell Hart was overly insistent
that he be described as a seminal military thinker.  Further, in later
years, he obfuscated or ignored many of his 1930s predictions that were
rendered foolish by events.  Yet, at the end of the day, it also is true
that Liddell Hart influenced Guderian substantially and on many other
occasions Guderian acknowledged this.  For example, in March 1943, when
Guderian assumed the role of Inspector General of Armored Troops, he met
with a large group of senior officers and read to them from an article
authored by Liddell Hart.  Azar Gat provides a useful counterpoint to the
tendency of Macksey and others to degrade Liddell Hart.[21] True, Liddell
Hart's assertions of his influence on Guderian and the course of World War
II in general are substantially overdone.  Even so, the great body of
Liddell Hart's work remains perceptive and valuable.

Macksey leaves us, then, with a somewhat sanitized version of Heinz
Guderian.  Are the omissions and distortions in this version fatal?
Hardly.  This is not a wine that has become sour.  Nevertheless, these
oversights constitute items that should be addressed when and if Macksey
entertains yet another edition of this useful book. Interestingly, the
_Bundeswehr_ was forced to confront many of the same ambiguities in
Guderian's military career when it considered naming an army barracks
after him in the mid-1960s.  Subsequent media attention and public
discussion focused considerable attention on unresolved and embarrassing
aspects of Guderian's career, and the _Bundeswehr_ ultimately abandoned
the naming notion despite his amazing military achievements.  The episode
did underline, however, the extent to which Generaloberst Heinz Guderian
was a complex, nuanced individual who is not so easily described.

Notes:

[1].  David Downing, _The Devil's Virtuosos: German Generals at War,
1940-1945_ (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p. 17.

[2].  F. W. von Mellenthin, _Panzer Battles_, trans. H. Betzler, ed. L.
C. F. Turner (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), p. 258.

[3].  Antoine de Saint Exupery, _Flight to Arras_, trans. Lewis Galantiere
(San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1942), pp. 64-65.

[4]. Earl F. Ziemke, _Stalingrad to Berlin:  The German Defeat in the
East_ (New York: Military Heritage Press, 1968), p. 446.

[5].  Much new information Macksey regarded as definitive was generated by
Karl Heinz von Wildhagen, _Erich Fellgiebel_ (Wennigsen/Hanover:
Selbstverlegen, 1970).

[6].  Heinz Guderian, _Panzer Leader_ (New York: Dutton, 1952).

[7].  Kenneth Macksey, _Kesselring: German Master Strategist of the Second
World War_ (London: Greenhill Press, 1996).

[8].  Gerd R. Ueberschaer and Winfried Vogel, _Dienen und Verdienen:
Hitler's Geschenke und Seine Eliten_ (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Verlag,
1999).  Note that Guderian's Deipenhof was 2,500_ Morgen_ in size.  Since
a _Morgen_ usually was less than one American acre, it seems likely that
Deipenhof was less than 2,500 acres, however, the variable definition of a
_Morgen_ makes it difficult to know.

[9].  John Erickson, _The Road to Stalingrad_ (New York: Harper and Row,
1975).

[10].  Heinz Guderian, _Achtung! Panzer: The Development of Armoured
Forces, Their Tactics and Operational Potential_, trans. Chrisopher Duffy
(London: Arms and Armour, 1995).

[11].  John Wheeler Bennett, _The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in
Politics, 1918-1945_ (New York and London: Penguin, 1967), p. 203.

[12].  R. T. Paget, _Manstein: His Campaigns and His Trial_ (London:
Collins, 1957), p. 2.

[13].  Downing, p. 54.  The "doability" of the Mediterranean option is
subject to question in light of the attitudes displayed by Franco and
Mussolini.

[14].  Bryan I. Fugate, _Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the
Eastern Front, 1941_ (Novato: Presidio Press, 1984).

[15].  These and other valuable data may be found in Freiburg
Militaergeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes.  _Der Angriff auf die
Sowjetunion_ (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Verlag, 1983, 1991), pp. 657-58.

[16].  Fugate, pp. 277-78.

[17].  R. H. S. Stolfi, _Hitler's Panzers East: World War II
Reinterpreted_ (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).  Stolfi
asserts that the probability of Germany defeating the Soviet Union already
in fall 1941 was well above 90 percent if it had continued toward Moscow
and not been sidetracked south.  There are, of course, other views on
this.

[18].  Fugate, pp. 311, 289.

[19].  Robert J. Kershaw, _War without Garlands:  Operation Barbarossa,
1941/42_ (New York: Sarpedon, 2000).  Kershaw points out OKW's "inability
to recognize the extent to which German fighting power has actually eroded
by September" (p. 241).

[20].  John J. Mearsheimer, _Liddell Hart and the Weight of History_
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Guderian, _Panzer Leader_,
p. 20.

[21].  Azar Gat, _British Armour Theory and the Rise of the Panzer Arm:
Revising the Revisionists_ (New York and Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan,
2000).

        Copyright (c) 2003 by H-Net, all rights reserved. H-Net permits
        the redistribution and reprinting of this work for nonprofit,
        educational purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the
        author, web location, date of publication, originating list, and
        H-Net: Humanities & Social Sciences Online. For other uses
        contact the Reviews editorial staff: hbooks@mail.h-net.msu.edu.

Humanities & Social
Sciences Online

Copyright © 1995-2006 - Contact Us
RSS | Validate: XHTML | CSS