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H-DIPLO ROUNDTABLE

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, _The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese
Relations, 2 vols, Volume 1, _Between War and Peace, 1696-1985_, Volume 2,
_Neither War Nor Peace, 1985-1998 (Berkeley, California: International and
Area Studies Publication, University of California at Berkeley, 1998).

Hiroshi Kimura, _Distant Neighbours, 2 vols, Volume 1, _Japanese-Russian
Relations under Brezhnev and Andropov_, Volume 2, _Japanese-Russian
Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin_ (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe,
2000).

Roundtable Editor: Thomas Maddux

Reviewers: Tsuneo Akaha, Tuomas Forsberg, Peggy Meyer, Alexei Zagorsky

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Commentary by Peggy Meyer

Simon Fraser University

Why has there been so little change in Russia's relations with Japan
during the past decade and a half in comparison with the far more dramatic
changes in Russia's relations with other countries? Gorbachev acquiesced
in the dismantlement of the socialist regimes in East Europe, the
reunification of Germany, the end of the Communist Party's dominance of
the Soviet system, and the dissolution of the USSR. He actively promoted
the reduction of tensions with the United States, the normalization of
relations with China, and the establishment of formal diplomatic ties with
the Republic of Korea. But when it came to Japan, Mikhail Gorbachev was
unable and perhaps even unwilling to make the compromises needed to break
the territorial logjam that prevented the signing of a peace treaty and
the normalization of bilateral relations.

When Boris Yeltsin became president of a newly independent Russia and
reoriented its foreign policy in a pro-Western direction, it was widely
anticipated that he would move quickly to normalize relations with Japan.
Instead, Yeltsin's radical pro market domestic economic reforms soon
provoked strong domestic opposition which spilled over into the foreign
policy arena. Relations with Japan became a focal point for Yeltsin's
critics. Yeltsin announced a last minute cancellation of his planned
September 1992 visit to Tokyo. Russia's foreign policy became less pro
Western and more Eurasian in focus. Relations with China radically
improved, but the anticipated breakthrough in ties with Japan failed to
materialize.

To what extent was this lack of movement attributable to failure first by
Gorbachev then by Yeltsin to understand the potential benefits of
improving relations with Japan and to support the concessions needed for
compromise? To what extent were they constrained by domestic politics?

Did Japanese policy makers understand and react appropriately to the
significant changes that were taking place first in the USSR and then in
Russia and to the opportunities and challenges they presented? Did they
show a realistic appreciation of the intentions of policy makers in Moscow
and the constraints under which they were operating? Was Japanese
intransigence to blame for the lack of progress in relations with Russia?

These are only a few of the questions that are addressed in two,
monumental two-volume studies of relations between Russia and Japan. The
authors of both these works are highly qualified to address this subject.
Hiroshi Kimura, professor at the International Research Center for
Japanese Studies in Kyoto, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, professor of history at
the University of California at Santa Barbara, are Japanese, fluent in
Russian and English, who have spent a life time studying Russia and its
relations with Japan.

Hiroshi Kimura, author of _Distant Neighbors_ is known to have close
relations with Japanese policy makers. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, author of _The
Northern Territories Dispute_ and _Russo-Japanese Relations_ has been a
critic of Japan's policy toward Russia. Not surprisingly, their works
reflect these differences.

Hasegawa argues that "neither Japan nor Russia has an absolutely
incontestable legal claim to the disputed islands". He provides evidence
suggesting that Kunashiri and Etorofu historically were considered part of
the Kurile islands whose ownership Tokyo renounced in the 1951 San
Francisco Peace Treaty. However, the USSR refused to sign the Treaty
which, therefore, did not specify to which country they were being
transferred. The 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration determined that
the Habomais and Shikotan would be returned to Japan after the conclusion
of a peace treaty. Sovereignty over the two larger islands, Kunashiri and
Etorofu, will have to be decided by negotiations, not by law.(Hasegawa,
II, pp. 525-528) Kimura stresses that Kunashiri and Etorofu as well as the
Habomais and Shikotan are Japan's inherent territories.(Kimura, I, p. 59)
Both Hasegawa and Kimura support Tokyo's goal of seeking the return of all
four disputed islands. However, there are differences between them
regarding how best to attain that objective. Hasegawa does not ignore
barriers to compromise on the Russian side. But he places more emphasis
than Kimura on obstacles in Japan. Hasegawa acknowledges that Tokyo's
policy toward Russia evolved in response to changes in Moscow and to
international pressure. However, he argues that Tokyo's policy did not
change radically and rapidly enough to persuade Gorbachev or Yeltsin that
compromise was possible.

Hasegawa blames the limited flexibility in Tokyo's policy on what he calls
the "northern territories syndrome": the domination of policy toward
Russia by the Gaimusho's Russian desk and the priority which they attached
to the territorial dispute, leading to the relative neglect of other
aspects of the relationship. He believes that the territorial dispute was
useful for Japan's conservative government. The illusion of a Soviet
threat provided a rationale for Japan's defense buildup and for Japanese
cooperation with the United States, China and the Republic of Korea.
Removal of this perceived threat could unleash a "deluge" of foreign
policy problems.(Hasegawa, II, p. 540, p. 545.)

Kimura by contrast places greater stress on what he perceives as a real
security threat emanating from the USSR. He argues that the main barrier
to improving Soviet-Japanese relations was not the territorial dispute but
the USSR security threat which continued even after Gorbachev's accession
to power. Kimura strongly opposed a territorial concession by Japan. He
was fearful that the USSR would see it as a sign of Japanese lack of
resolve which could undermine Japanese security.(Kimura, I, p. 69)
Instead, he called on Moscow to make a concession as a token of Soviet
good will.

Hasegawa maintains that the prospects for compromise would have been
enhanced if Tokyo had shown more flexibility regarding the territorial
dispute either before 1989 or immediately after the Soviet collapse.
(Hasegawa, II, p. 541). He acknowledges that strong domestic constraints
and Gorbachev's own "intellectual inability to accept compromise" posed a
significant barrier to a territorial settlement during his April 1991
visit to Japan. Still, according to Hasegawa, on other, far more vital
security issues, Gorbachev showed a willingness to change his mind. He
might have done so on the territorial issue as well if Tokyo had shown an
inclination to compromise.(Hasegawa, II, pp. 538-540)

Kimura agrees that compromise was impeded by wide ranging Soviet domestic
opposition and by Gorbachev's own attitude. (Kimura, II, pp. 85-94). But
he also blames misleading messages sent by Japan's Foreign Minister Abe
Shintaro, who met Gorbachev in January 1990, and by Liberal Democratic
Party Secretary General Ozawa in a statement later that year. Whereas
Hasegawa praised signs of flexibility by Abe and Ozawa, (Hasegawa, II, pp.
344-45, 348), Kimura feels that their new initiatives reduced the
incentive for Gorbachev to make a territorial concession. (Kimura, II, pp.
78-79)

Hasegawa believes that the cancellation of Yeltsin's planned September
1992 visit to Japan could have been avoided. He maintains that Japan's
Foreign Ministry underestimated the domestic constraints on Yeltsin and
exaggerated the prospects for a Russian concession. Instead of pushing
Yeltsin so hard to reach a settlement, the Gaimusho should have heeded
warnings that it would be better to treat Yeltsin's visit as only a first
step.(Hasegawa, II, pp. 459-460)

After the cancellation of Yeltsin's planned visit, only limited progress
was made toward resolution of the territorial dispute. Despite the
territorial stalemate, there were signs in the late 1990s that Moscow and
Tokyo were interested in improving their relations. This new interest was
reflected by expanding military ties and growing cooperation in other
areas. Hasegawa and Kimura are in broad agreement that Japan's desire to
improve relations with Russia was sparked by growing concern about an
increasingly powerful China and about instability on the Korean peninsula
and elsewhere in Asia. (Kimura, II, pp. 204-05) (Hasegawa, II, p. 553)
Russia was interested in improving relations with Japan to counterbalance
its closer relations with China and pressure from the West. Another motive
was to seek Japanese cooperation in the development of the Russian Far
East. (Hasegawa, II, pp. 498-499) (Kimura, II, pp. 183, 187, 230)

Tokyo's new interest in improved relations with Moscow was reflected in a
July 1997 speech by then Prime Minister Hashimoto. Hashimoto's speech
stressed developing Russo-Japanese relations based on trust, mutual
interest, and a long-term perspective. Hasegawa claims that Hashimoto's
speech and Russia's positive response reflected growing recognition by
both sides that the northern territories problem was not likely to be
resolved any time soon. (Hasegawa, II, p. 547) Kimura disagrees. He
stresses that the term "from a long-term perspective" was misinterpreted
to signify Tokyo's willingness to postpone a territorial settlement until
some time in the twenty-first century. What Hashimoto meant was the
opposite. He wanted to resolve the territorial dispute by the end of the
twentieth century to enable Russia and Japan to build good relations in
the next century. (Kimura, II, pp. 211-214) My own research suggests that
Tokyo was hoping to take advantage of Yeltsin's presidential victory in
June 1996 and his renewed vigor in early 1997 to press for a territorial
settlement before the end of his term in office.

At the November 1997 no-neckties summit in Krasnoiarsk, Yeltsin and
Hashimoto pledged to do their utmost to resolve the territorial dispute by
the year 2000. However, this deadline was not met. At a summit in Kawana
the following April, Hashimoto proposed a peace treaty drawing the border
line north of the disputed islands. If Moscow had agreed, it would, in
effect, have recognized Japan's residual sovereignty over all four
islands. In return, Tokyo was willing to allow indefinite Russian
administrative control of the disputed islands, including the Habomais and
Shikotan, after the conclusion of a peace treaty. (Kimura, II, pp.
218-219)

Yeltsin rejected Hashimoto's proposal in November 1998 when Japan's new
Prime Minister, Obuchi Keizo, visited Moscow. The Russian president
suggested that Moscow and Tokyo conclude a peace treaty that did not
include resolution of the territorial dispute which should be decided by a
subsequent treaty. Hasegawa argues that Japanese no longer are afraid that
the Russians may "eat and run" if cooperation is expanded before
resolution of the territorial dispute. Russians no longer suspect that
Japan's efforts to expand economic cooperation are intended to gain
leverage over Russia.(Hasegawa, II, p. 557) Kimura by contrast points to
strong Japanese apprehension that Russians are interested only in
obtaining economic assistance from Japan while intending to defer forever
resolution of the territorial dispute. Yeltsin's November 1998
counterproposal reinforced this Japanese concern.(Kimura, II, pp. 220,
235) Kimura hints that if Yeltsin had not become seriously ill in late
1998, he might have been willing to reach a territorial settlement with
Japan by the year 2000. When Yeltsin proposed at Krasnoairsk that Russia
and Japan conclude a peace treaty by the year 2000, he did not deny that a
peace treaty would include a resolution of the territorial dispute. By the
following November, pressure from Foreign Minister Primakov and Russia's
Foreign Ministry forced an ailing Yeltsin to back down.(Kimura, II, p.
279)

Would Yeltsin have agreed to a territorial compromise if he had not become
ill? It is doubtful in my view. Kimura suggests that Yeltsin was
interested in ensuring his place in history as a "wise leader". (Kimura,
II, p. 212) However, an eminent Russian Japanologist suggested to me that
he could not understand why the Japanese would think that Yeltsin would
ensure his place in history by giving away four islands. Another Russian
specialist on Japan remarked that even when Yeltsin was a lame duck, he
had to be concerned about public opinion. It was important for Yeltsin to
control the choice of his successor to guarantee good treatment of his
family.

Hashimoto's Kawana proposal reflected a serious Japanese misunderstanding
of Russian thinking. Tokyo's suggestion that Russia renounce sovereignty
over the disputed islands in return for administrative control implied
that the disputed islands were important to Russia primarily for their
material and strategic value, not for symbolic reasons. This assumption is
not correct. Certainly, many Russians prize the disputed islands because
of their material and/or strategic value. But they also are important for
symbolic reasons. One prominent Russian former diplomat told me that it
would have been easier for us to accept Russian residual sovereignty over
the disputed islands and Japanese administrative control, than to accept
the offer they made at Kawana.

Tokyo and Moscow still are interested in improving their mutual relations.
But there are barriers to a resolution of the territorial dispute. Each
feels that the other country needs it more than it needs the other.
Therefore, the other side ought to make a concession. Kimura observes that
"the [territorial] issue cannot be resolved unless the Russian side is
prepared to make a concession. In Russo-Japanese relations since the end
of the Cold War, the correlation of forces has been increasingly in
Japan's favor. Japan has almost everything that Russia has to offer and
can do very well without Russia. Conversely, there are many things that
Russia would like to get from Japan." (Kimura, II, p. 110) Kimura suggests
that a territorial concession would bring Russia a number of benefits
including greater access to Japan's vast economic capabilities and its
scientific, technological and management know-how as well as the support
of "the region's dominant power", Japan, for Russia's "full-fledged
membership in the Asia-Pacific community." (Kimura, II, pp. 126-127, p.
211) Kimura stresses that Japan is "in a fortunate position to be able to
choose rather freely, from a long list" of possible future trading
partners and that Russia is only one option.(Kimura, II, p. 244)

The problem is that Russians do not necessarily share Kimura's
perspective. Many Russians believe that growing concern about China will
induce Japan to cooperate with Russia and to support its active
participation in Asia-Pacific affairs with or without a territorial
concession. As far as economic cooperation is concerned, Japan is not
Russia's only prospective or even preferred partner.

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