H-Net Book Review
Published by H-Diplo@h-net.msu.edu (April 2001)

Patrick Salmon. _Scandinavia and the Great Powers
1890-1940_. London: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
xix + 421 pp. Tables, maps, notes, bibliography, and
index. £45, ISBN 0-521-41161-0.

Reviewed for H-Diplo by Rasmus Mariager
(mariager@hum.ku.dk), Department of History,
University of Copenhagen.

The length of time that has elapsed since the British
historian Patrick Salmon published Scandinavia and the
Great Powers 1890-1940 in the autumn of 1997 does
nothing to detract from the relevance of this
commentary on what is, after all, one of the main
contributions to our understanding of Scandinavia's
position in international politics in the period. The
book is a complex study. It analyses the
interrelationships between the Scandinavian countries,
as well as their relationships to the great powers. It
also analyses the relationships of the great powers to
Scandinavia, including conflicts and coincidences of
interest. The great powers are defined as the group of
reference powers who were important to the
Scandinavian countries, i.e. Great Britain,
Prussia/Germany and Russia/the Soviet Union, while the
Scandinavian countries are defined as Denmark, Norway,
Sweden and Finland. Iceland does not play a major role
in the study.

By way of introduction, the author modestly explains
that he reads neither Finnish nor Russian and that the
linguistic foundation of the book is, therefore,
somewhat unbalanced. This does not seem to be a major
loss, however, because the book is based on unusually
extensive reading and bears witness to impressive
research into not just Scandinavian but also British,
German and Russian/Soviet history. The author has also
reviewed a vast amount of archive material on foreign
policy and trade policy in Denmark, Norway, Sweden,
Germany and, especially, in Great Britain.

Why this subject? And why this particular (and long)
period? Salmon answers that during this period the
Scandinavian countries became increasingly important
pieces in the political, economic and military rivalry
between the great powers, a fate they shared with, for
example, the Balkans. Technological and military
progress as well as increasing trade were important
aspects of this process and studies of the period
highlight two fundamental aspects: the significance of
foreign trade and technological-military progress for
international political relationships, i.e. that these
relationships can serve as a means with which to
classify material prosperity as well as a means to
examine political influence. Another important reason
for the long time span is that the study does not
restrict itself to periods of crisis. An analysis that
looks at periods of conflict as well as periods of
stability provides a structured approach to the
interrelationships between the states and shows
clearly that while the small states were deeply
interested in the great powers throughout the period,
the great powers were also highly interested in the
small states during periods of conflict. But - and
this is significant - the study also shows that, apart
from periods of high tension, Scandinavia gradually
assumed greater importance in the eyes of the great
powers during the half century from 1890 to 1940.

On the theoretical level, Salmon's book is based on
Michael Handel's perception that "while the weak
states are frequently more vulnerable than the great
powers, they are not helpless" (1). The basic premise
of the book is that the Scandinavian countries were
not just passive elements in bigger political games
but that they were capable, to a certain degree, of
promoting their own interests in the international
political arena. During World War Two, Denmark, Norway
and Finland were, however, militarily involved in the
conflicts. Sweden was the only exception. The idea
that small states were able to influence the policies
of the great powers seems well-founded, not just with
reference to Salmon's own study but also for the
period after 1945. More recent Danish studies have
shown how Denmark has, on occasion, been able to
influence NATO policy to suit Danish interests - and
at the very least create separate policies for
Denmark.  Norway also succeeded, albeit to a lesser
extent than Denmark, in influencing NATO policies in
the early years of the alliance, e.g. on the question
of stationing allied planes in 1952/53.

The book's analysis is political, economic and
military. Specifically, it studies "the changing place
of Scandinavia in the political, economic and
strategic calculations of policy makers in Britain,
Germany and Russia ... It also focuses, however, on
the Nordic states themselves." If we ignore the book's
political science framework, the study is to a certain
extent reminiscent of the historical works of the
German 'Fischer' school; i.e. studies of the recent
past, in which political, trade and military analyses
are combined and then set in a continental (even
global) context.

The study gets down to work right away in the first
chapter, entitled "The end of isolation: Scandinavia
and the modern world," in which Salmon accounts for
the increasing interest of the great powers in
Scandinavia from the last decade of the 19th century
and well up into the 20th. The title suggests that the
Scandinavian countries had been isolated from
international politics before this period. The
question is whether historians interested in previous
periods would agree with this analysis. At any rate,
this is not the impression derived from Jörg Philipp
Lengeler's German dissertation "Das Ringen um die Ruhe
Nordens," about British policy towards Northern Europe
and Denmark in the early the 18th century.  But the
book has to start somewhere and Salmon's choice of
starting date seems in many ways to be well founded.
He shows, convincingly, how Prussia achieved
increasing (political) economic influence, if not
dominance in Scandinavia up to World War I. One of the
interesting points is that the rivalry between the
German and British states was not formal as it often
consisted of private companies competing for market
share. Nevertheless, British authorities did get
involved and did try to promote the interests of
British companies. But competition was fierce and the
British lost ground. Whether it was because of fierce
German competition or whether the American continent,
parts of which belonged to the British Empire, was
simply more important to London, is not fully
explained. But the fact that the British strategy was
defensive is clear. The author also shows how both
Denmark and Sweden feared increasing German influence.
If Germany got its way, the question was - seen
through Danish eyes - whether or not the Danish
economy and industry would be completely subordinated
to Germany's. And what about the language, Salmon
asks? Would Denmark just be a vassal state? At the
same time, he points out that even though the
Scandinavians' national pride and economic interests
meant they were irritated and angered by Germany's
political and economic power, they also admired much
of what Germany stood for (p. 49).

The question of Scandinavian fascination with the
Germans and the British in the first half of the 20th
century is a subject not properly illustrated by
Danish research. Even though the Danes were probably
closer to the Germans in terms of language, lifestyle,
customs, etc., the question is whether sections of the
political and intellectual elite were more fascinated
by the British, their political system, technological
progress, etc. The fact that Great Britain had been
Denmark's potential protector since the middle of the
previous century certainly influenced the view held of
Britain by many Danes. The question is, in other
words, whether the relationship to Great Britain was
measured by a different yardstick than the
relationship to Germany. Having said that, it also has
to be asked whether or not the author is being
somewhat bold by not distinguishing between various
social and political groups in Denmark and Sweden. As
far as Denmark is concerned, it is well known that the
Social Democrats were more or less a clone of the
German sister party between the wars. But what about
the right-wing parties? Were they also German-oriented
in their politics? And what about the army and the
navy? Should the navy's British orientation not be
pointed out, at least? And what was the position of
the diplomatic corps? In Danish diplomatic circles
there was a 'German course', a 'German school' and
'the Germany experts'. The fact that this
political/diplomatic orientation towards Germany was
based more on fear than admiration is clear enough.

The main thrust of Salmon's book is not about cultural
links and psychological identification, but he does
mention the question himself and also returns to the
subject in chapter 8, in which the British cultural
institution, the British Council, is brought into the
picture (especially pp. 295-305). In the 1930s, Great
Britain waged a propaganda offensive in Scandinavia,
but, in Salmon's interpretation, the British Council
could "do little to counteract the growing impression
of British weakness in the face of the international
challenge of the totalitarian states" (p. 298). This
assessment may be correct and it is commendable that
Salmon addresses the question of cultural propaganda.
However, he does not seem able to document its impact
properly. It is a problem Salmon shares with most
cultural propaganda researchers.

Scandinavia in European diplomacy up to World War I is
the subject of the second chapter. The British
historian A.J.P. Taylor called the years from the turn
of the century until 1904 "the epoch in which an
Anglo-Russian conflict seemed the most likely outcome
of international relations" (2). This, of course,
placed the Scandinavian countries in a difficult
position, especially after the German chancellor
Caprivi's 1893 statement that Denmark, in the event of
a confrontation between Great Britain/France and
Germany, would naturally find itself on the side of
Germany's enemy. Salmon unravels the political games
and intrigues that surrounded alliances and power
struggles between the major European powers. His
analysis covers not just the European context but also
the Moroccan crisis, the Russo-Japanese war, etc. One
of Salmon's points is that the international crisis
and the Björkö Agreement can only be properly
understood if the Scandinavian implications are
considered, especially the problems associated with
conflicts in the Scandinavian union and Norway's
independence, as well as German-Russian worries about
Denmark's geo-strategic position as keeper of the
Baltic Sea.
Regarding the question of the great powers' reactions
to the Scandinavian crisis in the first decade of the
20th century, Salmon places great emphasis on the fact
that the British lost influence in Northern Europe
from 1905 to 1908 on the political, military and
economic levels. The possibility of a German-Russian
alliance in the Baltic Sea was not excluded by the
British-Russian entente of 1907. The North Sea and
Baltic Sea negotiations also minimized British
influence in the Baltic. Added to this were, as
previously mentioned, Britain's commitments elsewhere
in the world. This point of view clashes with, among
others, Walther Hubatsch's opposite view (p. 81).

The chapter is followed up by an exciting but quite
complicated analysis of the Scandinavian countries'
positions in the strategic deliberations of the great
European powers in the event of a future great war.
The presentation contains analyses of the internal
rivalry inside the armed forces in the individual
major powers - and between the countries. The central
point is, of course, the unification of Germany in
1871, which threatened Great Britain's position in
international politics. The chapter also covers the
military and economic rivalry between the major
powers, including preparations for economic warfare.

Chapter four, about Scandinavia during World War I,
corroborates two of Salmon's main themes: firstly,
that Scandinavia slowly but surely played an
increasing role in European power politics during the
period studied, and secondly, that the Scandinavian
countries, despite a period of high international
tension, were capable of, if nothing else, then at
least turning the situation to their own advantage.
The small Northern European states succeeded in
keeping out of the military conflict during the war.
Salmon also documents how differently the Scandinavian
countries experienced the war. Under German pressure,
Denmark mined the Great Belt but tried to be as
even-handed as possible after that. Norway suffered
harsh treatment at the hands of the British, despite
the British naval attaché in Scandinavia
characterising Norway as the most anglophile country
in the region. Norway was the object of massive
British-German political-economic competition, which
saw Great Britain instigate a trade embargo against
Norway while Germany placed great demands on Norwegian
shipping. Sweden, which on the face of it operated a
pro-German neutrality policy, was exposed to quite
severe economic pressure from Great Britain. When
Sweden later balanced its neutrality policy cf. the
trade agreement with the allies in May 1918, it was,
however, confronted with yet another problem, i.e. the
German victory over Russia. The fact that Germany was
to lose the war in the end led to the formation of
Finland as the fourth independent state in Scandinavia
in 1917.

Instead of just looking at the great powers' policies
towards the Scandinavian countries, Salmon also
studies the countries' domestic policies, and their
significance for the individual countries' positions
during the war. Unsurprisingly, one of Salmon's points
is that Denmark, Norway and Sweden had to react to and
adapt to external circumstances to a great extent
during World War One. That Danish decision makers -
via H.N. Andersen - sought to mediate between Germany
and Great Britain and Sweden's Wallenberg turned to
Great Britain in August 1914, were exceptions (pp.
118-123). But cunning adaptation and reaction to
external circumstances (including the ability to
profit economically from the war) was also a method of
safeguarding Scandinavian interests - which brings us
back to one of Salmon theses - the fact that
Scandinavia's neutrality and military non-interference
was, on the whole, in the interests of the warring
nations does not disturb the picture.

Chapters 5 and 6 (pp. 169-205 and 206-273) are written
with some gusto and depict and analyse Scandinavia's
foreign policy positions and relationships to the
great powers until the end of 1930s. The presentations
are convincing. Salmon shows how the great powers'
interests in Scandinavia intensified in 1920 with the
instability in the Baltic area (the formation of
Finland, Estonia and Latvia) and the Soviet Union's
pressure on the Baltic region. Great Britain now
withdrew its fleet from the eastern Baltic but also
continued its stabilising policy in the region, as
London looked with increasing scepticism at the
Communist Soviet Union's influence, not just on the
Baltic states, but also on Finland. Thus, Salmon
depicts and analyses the North European balance of
power between the Soviets on the one hand and Great
Britain on the other hand. Seen from a British
perspective, the situation was not made any easier by
local Communist parties sprouting up in the
Scandinavian countries, most strongly in Norway and
Finland. He also correctly points out the strong roots
of the Social Democratic parties in the Scandinavian
societies.

However, there is one point at which the presentation
in chapter five seem somewhat cursory, and that is the
question of the so-called Greenland conflict. From
1921 to 1933, Denmark and Norway disputed sovereignty
over south-west Greenland. Salmon mentions in brief
(p. 170, 183f, 198) that the conflict took place and
that it was settled by the International Court in the
Hague and he points out the tensions in Norwegian
relationships to Denmark and Great Britain. However,
the conflict is wound up somewhat perfunctorily -
especially in the light of the unhappy consequences of
the conflict for Danish-Norwegian relationships, in
all probability all the way up to the occupation in
1940, but also in the light of the conflict's
long-term nature and the fact that it bears witness to
Danish as well as Norwegian imperialism. The Norwegian
historian Ida Blom approached the question from a
Norwegian point of view in her 1973 thesis.  In
Denmark, Bo Lidegaard has shed some light on the
conflict with his 1996 thesis - a couple of essays
have analysed the question in greater depth and a
Swedish presentation of the conflict also exists.

Chapter seven analyses Great Britain and Germany's
economic links to Scandinavia in the period from 1916
to the mid-1930s. The last two main chapters lead the
reader towards the culmination of the study: the
German attack on Denmark and Norway. Again, the main
emphasis is on German-British competition for
dominance of Scandinavia. Salmon acknowledges German
nazification attempts and he concludes that towards
the end of the 1930s there were "sufficient Nazi
sympathisers in each of the Nordic countries … to form
a core of potential conspirators which might be
activated if German interest turned towards the north"
(p. 287).

The book is rounded off by an epilogue which includes
a retrospective review as well as a brief outline of
the period until the creation of NATO in 1949, when
the countries' paths really diverged. The fact that
the process of placing the countries into some kind of
perspective ceases in 1949, says something about
Salmon's view of what were the most important
foundations underpinning relationships between the
countries. It may only be implicit, but he does
stresses the primacy of security policy. This may be
very reasonable in the light of the Cold War's
military rivalry. However, such a perspective tones
down the significance of external economic relations
and trade-policy for the countries' relationships to
one another, and one of Cold War research's latest
fashion crazes, i.e. the ideological and cultural
side, is overlooked.

In his introduction, Salmon writes that "Small states
hanker after the world as it ought to be; great powers
deal with the world as it is." That is why small
states have a tendency to promote and protect their
own interests via international organisations such as
the League of Nations and the United Nations.
Referring to the ex-Finnish president Paasikivi,
Salmon explains, however, that "small countries would
be imperialist too, if only they were big enough."
(pp. 18-19). The funny thing about the above
quotations is that they turn things on their head in
relation to the method by which we generally consider
the position of small states in international
politics. Normally, it is claimed that the small
states (i.e. us) per se stand for productive and
altruistic policies. Bearing in mind the
militarisation of Denmark's foreign policy after the
end of the Cold War, all the evidence suggests that
Salmon is right. Seen in this way, it is refreshing to
read a presentation of Scandinavia's history, written
by a non-Scandinavian.

In conclusion: Scandinavian and the Great Powers
1890-1940 can only be characterised as a standard in
its field - i.e. the political, economic and military
rivalry between the great powers and the Scandinavian
countries. It is something as rare as a wide-ranging
and sharply formulated synthesis, based on secondary
literature and the author's own archive studies of the
region's position in international politics through
half a century. The thesis that the Scandinavian
countries were capable of influencing the outside
world and, if nothing else, got the best out of the
various high-tension situations is documented. If I am
to point out one weakness in the study, it is the
treatment of the ideological and cultural side. In
this context, Salmon lacks a solid research tradition
as a sparring partner. On the whole, however, Salmon
has supplied us with a study that will probably remain
a standard reference work for years to come.

NOTES

[1]. Handel, _Weak States in the International
System_, London 1981, quoted in Salmon, p. 4.

[2]. Taylor, _The Struggle for Mastery in Europe
1848-1918_, quoted in Salmon, p. 53.

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