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---------------------------------------------------------------------- H-DIPLO-ROUNDTABLE Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser, eds,_ The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years_ (Cambridge: German Historical Institute, Washington, D. C., and Cambridge University Press, 1998) Roundtable Editor: William Keylor Reviewers: Robert Hanks, William Irvine, Gordon Martel, David Stevenson -------------------------------------------------------------------- THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES: AN INTER-ALLIED INCIDENT Review by Robert K. Hanks, <email@example.com> University of Toronto [Because of the limited nature of Eudora 3.0 software, I have used the following method for citations. In-text references to the Versailles collection are indicated by page numbers in square brackets; references to other sources may be found in the Endnotes. Also, in order to avoid problems with e-mail transmission, I have also omitted foreign accents.] The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 remains the most controversial and misunderstood peace in the history of international relations. This collection of essays by a group of distinguished scholars represents an effort to reassess the Treaty of Versailles after seventy-five years. The results of their findings represent an impressive vindication of traditional historical research methods over trendier structuralist and post-modern intellectual trends. The twenty-six articles contained herein continue the complex, ongoing debate on the meaning and significance of Versailles. By no means has a final judgment been achieved: by focusing mainly on the treaty with Germany rather than the Peace Conference as whole, the collection does not tell us enough about the colonial settlements, the roles played by Italy and Japan, the bitter inter-Allied naval disputes, or most importantly, the impact which the demise of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires had on the international system. No comprehensive explanation of the inter-war period should overlook these topics. Nevertheless, this volume will be essential reading for scholars of international relations, and must be included on the shelves of every respectable library. The collection's twenty-six contributions fall into several overlapping themes. These include: disputes amongst the victors, planning for the peace, the impact of the home fronts, the strengths and weaknesses of Wilsonianism, the financial fallout, German reactions to the peace, the effect on Poland and the Soviet Union, and the evolution of the ongoing historiographical debate. As no review can do justice to so much, I have decided out of necessity to limit my discussion to several pieces germane to my own research on Georges Clemenceau and the nexus of inter-allied domestic and foreign policies. [N. 1] In my opinion, the most important consequence of the Paris Peace Conference was the rapid peacetime collapse of the western coalition. The following review is accordingly divided into four parts: one section each on France, Great Britain and the United States, and then some brief concluding comments. It is my hope that readers will take the length of this review as an indication of the quality and complexity of the contributions which it addresses. I The Versailles collection includes contributions from three distinguished historians of French foreign policy: David Stevenson, Georges-Henri Soutou and Steven Schuker. Each of these articles provides a distinct perspective on the problems confronting French policy-making in this period. Stevenson's chapter outlines the historiography of the debate on French war aims and traces the origins of the French bargaining position on the eve of the Paris Peace Conference. In contrast to Pierre Renouvin's early argument that French war aims were moderate and tentative, Stevenson sides substantially with Georges-Henri Soutou's earlier massive study of European war aims. [N. 2] Except for a brief hiatus in planning during the German offensives in 1918, there was powerful continuity of war aims between the positions taken by the French governments in 1917 and Clemenceau's position in 1919. [103, 107] Although France was surprised by the sudden German collapse in the fall of 1918, Clemenceau and his advisors took and retained the lead in the subsequent negotiations. [106, 95] Their position during the Peace Conference consisted of a two-tiered model based on the maintenance of inter-allied unity and the creation of economic, military and territorial guarantees against Germany. [96-97] While Stevenson notes that these two positions were potentially contradictory, he nevertheless challenges Jacques Bainville's oft-cited criticism that the peace was "trop douce pour ce qu'il y a de dur." A long-term peace, Stevenson argues, required a mixture of repression and conciliation. The peace produced French security by crippling Germany's military power - the critical failure only came later with the abandonment of the disarmament clauses in 1934. [108-09] Like Stevenson, Soutou also praises the French performance at the Treaty of Versailles, reversing the usual judgment that Clemenceau won the war and lost the peace. As noted above, he stresses the continuity of French war aims, noting the similarity between Clemenceau's diplomatic position and the plans formulated in 1916, although in this essay he places greater emphasis than Stevenson on the interest shown by the Briand and Painleve governments in a compromise peace in 1917. [168-70] In contrast to Stevenson's two-tiered model, Soutou proposes a three-tiered model consisting of: the maintenance of the western alliance; an aggressive stand on security guarantees, particularly toward annexation of the Saar and the creation of a Rhenish buffer state, and lastly, secret overtures toward Germany.  Clemenceau's main failure, Soutou writes, was to put too much faith in the Allies. In particular, he should have refused to accept any limit on the French military occupation of the Rhine until the alliance treaties had been ratified in London and Washington. Nevertheless, Clemenceau's achievement was misunderstood by both the French left and right. In spite of its faults, the treaty was flexible and offered the possibility of a post-war restoration of order. "It took a Hitler to destroy the Treaty."  In contrast to Stevenson and Soutou, Stephen Schuker places greater emphasis on the actual inter-Allied bargaining process over the Rhineland and the Anglo-American Guarantee Treaties to France at the Conference. Marked by characteristically thorough research and peppered with incisive observations, this rich and original essay is accessible to the general reader while remaining considerable value to the specialist. In particular, Schuker is to be commended for his creative synthesis of the diaries of those two intriguing characters, Colonel House, and the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Henry Wilson. Given his emphasis on the hard fought bargaining melee, it is not surprising that Schuker is also sympathetic to that redoubtable old duelist, Georges Clemenceau, whom he gives credit for having seized the right moment to secure relatively advantageous terms for France.  Unlike Stevenson and Soutou, however, Schuker is more pessimistic about the outcome of the peace, emphasizing the rapid alienation of France from its former Allies after the American Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles. If there is one lacunae in this essay, perhaps more emphasis should have been placed on the problems arising from Clemenceau's deal in December 1918 with Lloyd George over Mosul and Palestine. All three of these articles demonstrate the very best of traditional diplomatic history. If, however, they have one collective fault, they should have taken greater efforts to integrate the activities of the diplomats with the alliance's military diplomacy. Viewed against the backdrop of the war, all three articles overestimate the degree of French power, influence and skill at the Peace Conference. While French prestige had fallen substantially within the alliance after the failure of the Nivelle offensive in the spring of 1917 and the subsequent mutinies in the French army, it had nevertheless rebounded considerably in 1918 as a result of Petain's military reforms and the energetic leadership of Clemenceau and Foch. As Generalissimo of the Allied armies on the western front, Marshal Foch was the first and probably the last French general in history to preside over a British army group and an American army group. His short reign was hardly unchallenged, and as he well knew, there were limits to his power. For example, when Clemenceau wanted to fire the American commander-in-chief, General Pershing, in the fall of 1918, Foch wisely declined to force the issue. Nevertheless, through his control of transportation facilities, his grip on the inter-allied strategic reserve, and his prestige, he exerted tremendous influence on the alliance. As David French aptly observes in his article on the armistice, British decision-makers were afraid in 1918 that unified command had given France control of the alliance, [74-76] while as I have argued, Clemenceau and Foch launched an aggressive diplomatic offensive against London to ensure that the BEF recieved a sufficient number of drafts. [N. 3] In a telling illustration of how far things had gone, the commander of the British Fourth Army, General Rawlinson, cheekily asked Field-Marshal Haig in August 1918: "Are you commanding the British army or is Marechal Foch?" [N. 4] The British and American armies had in fact become captives of French vulnerability. Once they had been committed to the western front, their choice was starkly simple - defeat, which was politically unacceptable, or a massive military effort, which made them temporary and unwilling house guests in France. As much as Lloyd George wished to de-emphasize the BEF's role of the western front after 1916 in favor of sandier and drier pastures in the Middle East, he could not escape the powerful combination of logic and circumstances which dictated that it would remain the decisive theatre. Once the war had ended, the British and Americans could not get out of France fast enough. In a very real sense, Germany's defeat in 1918 liberated them from unified command under France. Amongst their soldiers, general staffs and governments, there was a marked disinclination to remain on the continent or to prolong the experiment of unified command. Just as Etienne Clementel's plans for a post-war economic union amongst the Allies were rendered moot by the laissez-faire attitudes of Anglo-American business elites, Leon Bourgeois's proposal to create a permanent League of Nations army had as much chance of flying as a lead zeppelin. Viewed in this context, one of Clemenceau's prime objectives was to define a limit to the massive Anglo-American withdrawal. From having pressured the British government to maintain its 60-odd divisions on the western front in the summer of 1918, he was reduced in 1919 to asking that it keep one battalion and a flag on the Rhine.  France was no longer first amongst equals on the western front but a supplicant. This decline in French influence was further compounded by errors and problems which emerged in the course of the Peace Conference. When Clemenceau called in December 1918 for the establishment of a post-war balance of power based on inter-allied unity, he only succeeded in offending the Wilsonian liberals who wished to abolish balance of power politics. As a result of this misstep, and the French delegation's tough approach to bargaining, a considerable degree of resentment against France developed within the other delegations (in spite of Wilsonian professions of brotherly love, it did not take much to provoke WASP-ish Francophobia). To a strong degree, France was confronted by an Anglo-American block in January 1918 and was diplomatically isolated. To compound matters, Clemenceau's quixotic decision to make Paul Dutasta the secretary of the Conference instead of the much more capable Philippe Berthelot ensured a high degree of procedural confusion in its opening weeks (a semblance of order was eventually re-established by the intervention of British Imperial War Cabinet Secretary, Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey). French influence was further diminished by the nearly successful assassination attempt on the 77 year old Clemenceau in February. While this provoked a widespread outpouring of sympathy for the wounded leader, the Tiger's grasp on affairs was much in doubt in March and even April 1919. While I ultimately agree with Soutou's argument that Clemenceau's leadership was more skillful at the Peace Conference than it had been during the war, I believe that more emphasis needs to be given by all three authors to the problems and obstacles which the French were forced to overcome in 1919. That they did so makes their accomplishments all the more impressive. On the important question of French policy toward the Rhineland, there are two main interpretations. To Schuker, the French compromised on the Rhine in order to maintain inter-Allied unity after hard bargaining [297-98], but their decision was pre-determined by the non-cooperation of British occupation authorities, the fear which the threat of left bank economic cooperation provoked amongst French business leaders, and the sharp-eyed skepticism of Andre Tardieu and Paul Tirard, who rejected optimistic reports from military intelligence that the Rhenish separatists were "already won over." [289-90] Siding with the classic study by Jere Clemens King, Schuker writes that no archival evidence has surfaced to link Clemenceau to General Mangin's attempt to conduct a coup on the Rhine.  In contrast to this position, Soutou and Stevenson emphasize the persistence of French ambitions toward their eastern frontier. Not only did the French entertain hopes that they would they would win the Saar plebiscite, but as Robert McCrum and Jacques Bariety have previously argued, [N. 5] the Clemenceau government never definitively gave up its plans to encourage Rhenish separatism. Overt and embarrassing appeals to separatism such as Mangin's were dropped, but French occupation authorities were nevertheless instructed to continue to discretely encourage Franco-German trade and Rhenish autonomy. [101, 177-78] This difference over French policy toward the Rhine remains a debate in progress, contingent upon broad interpretations of Clemenceau's character and the nature of French policy. If a synthesis may be suggested, perhaps we should place less weight on the determination of France's Rhenish ambitions before March 1919, and more on them after Dorten's failed coup. Further, while it is probably right to emphasize the flexible and persistent nature of the Tiger's policies toward the Rhine, it is also important to keep in mind that these were not realistic. The French occupation was self-defeating. In particular, Clemenceau's decision to station Moroccan and African soldiers in Germany would lead to the propaganda-myth of the "Black Horror on the Rhine", and subsequently do much to alienate both German and Anglo-American public opinion. [N. 6] Moving further east, Soutou's argument that there was a secret third level of Franco-German relations is not entirely persuasive. He argues that Clemenceau pursued substantive economic negotiations with the Germans in 1919. A key figure in this argument was Professor Haguenin, a pre-war professor in Berlin and the wartime chief of the French secret service in Switzerland. In March 1919 Haguenin was sent on a mission to Berlin where, Soutou writes, he made a "tacit deal" to modify the elements of the treaty in Germany's favor if they "would accept settlement" of French claims in the Saar and the Rhineland. And Soutou goes on, this is in fact what happened: Clemenceau made concessions to Germany on the questions of the Silesian boundary and agreed in June to respect German sovereignty. Is this claim credible? Stevenson considers the French overtures to Germany in 1919 to be "limited" and "one-sided" initiatives which demonstrated Clemenceau was willing to consider rapprochement with Germany only in "the distant future,"  while Elizabeth Glaser briefly notes in her contribution to the collection that the Germans did not take Haguenin's overtures seriously.  It must also be asked: how much input did Haguenin exert on negotiations in Paris while he was in Berlin? Anthony Lentin comments that Clemenceau's concessions over Poland were primarily due to the intense British pressure.  Similarly, Clemenceau's concessions in June may be attributed to the Allied fear that it might be necessary to invade Germany in order to force it to sign the Treaty. Given such high policy influences, can it be maintained that Haguenin was really significant? Did he have the Tiger's ear? In this regard, it is worth noting that in February 1919 that Haguenin had complained to one of Poincare's aides that Clemenceau "ne comprend plus rien; c'est un pauvre vieux cul." [Clemenceau "no longer understands anything; he is a pathetic old arse"]. [N. 7] These are not the words of a man in good standing with the president du conseil. It would clearly be interesting to find out more about Haguenin's little known activities in Switzerland and Germany, but until we do, his mission must best be regarded as only one of the many French missions sent around the world, and not as an essential pillar of policy. [N. 8] Another key figure in Soutou's third tier of secret Franco-German relations was the French Minister of Armaments and Reconstruction, Louis Loucheur, who proposed in July-August 1919 that Franco-German cartels be established as an alternative to the failed plans for post-war economic inter-allied cooperation. However, the amount of political will behind these proposals is open to question. The German government, Soutou writes, was interested, but Loucheur's proposals were shelved because German business did not wish to deal from a position of inferiority. [180-81] In other words, Franco-German cooperation did not proceed beyond the proposal stage. But was Loucheur even in a position to deliver the goods? Here, it is worth noting that Clemenceau's economic ministers, Loucheur, Klotz and Clementel, were under heavy attack from French businessmen in the summer and fall of 1919 for their failure to facilitate imports into France and to formulate a coherent post-war economic policy. Loucheur was also under fire for war profiteering. There was considerable doubt about his political standing. [N. 9] Given his shaky domestic position in 1919, how much weight did he have within Clemenceau's cabinet? The Tiger's pre-war support for Jules Cambon's embassy in Berlin demonstrated that he understood that Franco-German rapprochement could increase France's leverage with Britain, [N. 10] but did he actually have faith in Franco-German reconciliation after 1918? These proposals by Loucheur presage his efforts to forge Franco-German cooperation in the mid to late 1920s, but to France in 1919, military occupation, German disarmament and inter-allied unity were vastly more important. To Clemenceau, the keys to French security were Britain and the United States. In contrast to many off-hand references in the literature which depict Clemenceau as a narrow minded French nationalist, both Soutou and Schuker recognize his unusually broad international experience. Soutou briefly notes that "there is no reason to dispute Clemenceau's liberalism and his deep ideological and sentimental attachment for the democratic way of life in Britain and the United States."  Somewhat surprisingly, he also describes Clemenceau's refusal to dismember Germany as the product of his nineteenth century "Romanticism."  In a somewhat longer character sketch, Schuker argues that Clemenceau "considered perpetuation of an Anglo-American alliance as the primary objective of policy." Relying upon the papers of Colonel House and Clemenceau's friend from Arizona, the miner J. S. Douglas, Schuker argues that Clemenceau favored the American connection over Britain, maintaining that the Tiger's familiarity with English drawing room Francophobia and Lloyd George's "lubricious charm" had taught him to distrust Britain. Instead, Schuker emphasizes, Clemenceau's four years in the United States after theAmerican Civil War and his working partnership with Colonel House. Although Clemenceau was exasperated by the "super-talky talk" of Woodrow Wilson, he still "had confidence in the fundamental good intentions of the Americans." [281-82] In contrast, Stevenson writes that Clemenceau "had no love for the American program, which he considered dangerously vague," and that he decided to follow the British lead when Lloyd George abandoned opposition to Wilson during the armistice talks.  Clemenceau's ties with Britain and the United States were undoubtedly important, but these depictions of his political personality require comment. Was Clemenceau a Romantic? To what extent he share the liberal values of Britain and the United States. Was he closer in spirit to the USA or Britain? The key early intellectual influences on Clemenceau were Positivism and Darwinism, both of which stressed the primacy of science and reason, and hence constituted a reaction against early nineteenth century Romanticism. Whatever illusions Clemenceau suffered from, and whatever mistakes he made, he nevertheless considered himself to be a realist opposed to superstition and utopianism. His anti-clericalism and rigorous defense of private property against collectivism unquestionably marked him as a liberal, but his Radicalism had its roots in secular Jacobinism rather than in Protestant origins of Anglo-American liberalism (i.e. Gladstone's Anglicanism, Wilson's Presbyterianism, Lloyd George's non-conformist heritage). This difference had practical consequences. In a general sense, Clemenceau believed that Anglo-American liberals such as Asquith, Haldane, Grey, Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson were hopelessly ignorant about continental affairs. More specifically, as an heir of the levee en masse and as a continental statesman, he strongly believed in conscription, whereas the Anglo-American liberals considered conscription the very essence of militarism. While Clemenceau was a centrist in a French political spectrum that stretched from monarchism to socialism, he was paradoxically closer in spirit to those American Republicans and British Unionists who advocated conscription and traditional diplomatic methods. Clemenceau was thus not perceived as a liberal by either the British or Americans. In fact, Colonel House likened him to Theodore Roosevelt and variously described him as an able or trustworthy "reactionary." [N. 11] Did Clemenceau favor the United States over Britain? The answer is not so clear cut. It was unquestionably true that Clemenceau's early republican infatuation with the United States had a deep personal impact on his life and shaped his conduct of Franco-American diplomacy. Perhaps the highlight of this relationship was his tour of the USA in late 1922. In spite of Keynesian-inspired propaganda, the aftermath of the Treaty ratification fight, and the rather cool attitude of the Harding administration, this tour was a considerable personal triumph for him, and might well have mitigated France's image as a militaristic power had Poincare not invaded the Ruhr soon thereafter. [N. 12] However, throughout most of Clemenceau's life, Britain was the star which guided his diplomacy. In 1906, the German ambassador to France, Prince Radolin, unflatteringly described him as in 1906 as a man lacking all principles or direction but one: "L'idee fixe de Clemenceau est: 'l'Angleterre'." [N. 13] The British ambassador, Lord Bertie, substantially concurred, reporting to London in 1918 that Clemenceau was "as pro-British as any honest Frenchman can be." [N. 14] To Clemenceau, the Entente with Britain was all-essential. Visiting the BEF headquarters in 1916, he explained to General Haig and Lord Esher that Britain and France "were laying the foundations of a future that was quite obscure now, but which was sure to be brilliant, just as the worker in a Gobelin tapestry, threading from behind the canvas, knows nothing of the picture that he ultimately weaves." [N. 15] As a staunch advocate of the Entente Cordiale, he was deeply irritated by Woodrow Wilson's decision to label the United States as "Associated Power." Clemenceau aired his complaints on this subject before the Supreme War Council in February 1918. Including Italy for the sake of politeness, he argued that France, Britain and Italy retained the right to consult among themselves and to conduct their own foreign policy - they had won the title of Entente with their "blood and money, and it was one that was worth retaining." [N. 16] The roots of Clemenceau's Anglophilia extended to his youth, but were reinforced by his perception of geo-political strategic realities. As a young man, he had shared the Positivist ideal that progress and civilization would be best served by an Anglo-French alliance, and had many English friends stemming back to the 1870s, the most influential of whom to him were the Maxses, a well-connected military family, and H. M. Hyndman, the maverick social-democrat. [N. 17] During the stressful months of 1918, Clemenceau's feisty attitude, combined with his anti-socialist and anti-German credentials, earned him the sincere admiration of many British Unionists. Because of his insistence on the western front, and his constant visits to the trenches, Clemenceau was also the favorite politician of the senior British generals on the western front. His anti-Wilsonian reputation made him the foremost champion of the so-called "old diplomacy." The normally Francophobic Field-Marshal Haig, for instance, confided to his wife in October 1918: "I am going to meet M. Clemenceau at Cambrai today. I shall tell him that America ought not to be allowed to play so prominent [a] part in making peace since she has yet done little to bring it about." [N. 18] Bertie went even further. In retirement in the spring of 1919, ailing and clearly desperate, he exclaimed: "The 'great' man of the Conference is not Wilson but Clemenceau who is a wonder & may save us at the same time as France." [N. 19] With a high degree of sympathy from British Unionists and American Republicans, it was Clemenceau's misfortune that he had to deal instead with the Liberal Lloyd George, whom he considered superficial and untrustworthy politician rather than a statesman, and the Democrat Wilson, whom he considered self-righteous. As he was widely reported to have said: "What can a mere French Minister do when associated with Lloyd George who thinks he is Napoleon and Woodrow Wilson who thinks he is Jesus Christ." [N. 20] From his perspective, it was an unenviable position. Throughout 1917-1919, he maneuvered back and forth between Britain and the United States. For example, he joined forces with the British in an effort to amalgamate American battalions in French and British divisions, but he joined forces with the Americans in his insistence on the primacy of the western front against Lloyd George. Influenced by his pro-conscription mind-set and the dire need to reinforce the western front, Clemenceau was particularly incensed by his belief that there were far too many loopholes in British manpower policy in the summer of 1918. Entering the Peace Conference, Clemenceau was not thrilled with either of his principal allies, but he believed that he could handle the troublesome Lloyd George. As he quipped to family friend Leo Maxse: : "Mr. Lloyd George annoys me less when I see him than when I don't see him." [N. 21] Clearly, he hoped that the process of inter-Allied dialogue could be used to contain Lloyd George. To this end, he hoped that the United States's presence could help keep the wily Welshman in line. As he explained to Colonel House in 1922, he had supported Wilson's attendance at the Peace Conference because he had hoped the President would offset Lloyd George's hostile attitude toward France. [N. 22] As it turned out, his relations with Wilson were far from amicable during most of the Peace Conference, but his relations with Lloyd George were even worse. At one low point in the spring of 1919, Wilson had to intervene to prevent Clemenceau and Lloyd George from getting into a fight, while in the fall of 1919 Clemenceau was overheard to exclaim: "L'Angleterre est la desillusion de ma vie !!" [N. 23] After much hard bargaining, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson were able to forge the series of compromises that made up the Treaty of Versailles, but their package of compromises lacked sufficient support outside of the conference chamber. Wilsonians throughout the world considered the Treaty to be a betrayal, while in the United States, the Republicans placed domestic politics and bipartisanship ahead of their professed admiration for Clemenceau and France. After the first vote against the Treaty in the United States, he was forced to fall back on his old formula of Anglo-French cooperation. As he informed an Anglo-French conference in London in December 1919, "[t]he most important thing . . . was that France and England should be in absolute agreement on all big questions." [N. 24] In short, there were many fluctuations in the relationship between the Big Three during the war and the Paris Peace Conference. In spite of his extensive familiarity with both the United States and Britain, and the importance which he placed upon the preservation of inter-Allied unity for the maintenance of French security, Clemenceau did not succeed in establishing a stable working relationship with either country. It was simply too difficult to forge a consensus on foreign policy amongst the many competing political parties and factions in France, Britain and the United States. II The dynamics of coalition warfare ensured that internal politics were more important than ever in the arena of foreign affairs. This was especially true in the period of the Khaki Election. In his contribution to the collection, Erik Goldstein notes that "...the war front and the home front became inextricably linked in the minds and emotions of the British people... ."  The Lloyd George government's attitude toward the home front passed through three phases. From November 1918 to the election in January, it pandered to popular Germanophobia. Subsequently, from January 1919 to mid-April, Lloyd George was constrained at the Peace Conference by the bellicose attitude of the Northcliffe press and his backbenchers, who forced him to take a strong stand on the questions of German war guilt and reparations. At the same time, Goldstein notes, he was also worried by a string of opposition victories in by-elections and by the direction the peace which was taking. Finally, after a show-down with conservative forces in Parliament in mid-April 1919, Lloyd George secured his domestic support and was finally able to follow his instincts to push for a more moderate peace with Germany. As a result of these domestic influences, Britain's position during the peace negotiations took a confusing and convoluted course. [164-65] Goldstein's essay provides a sound overview of British internal politics, although some attention might have paid to the impact of the widespread demobilization riots in the British army in late 1918 and early 1919, [N. 25] and more could have been said about press baron Lord Northcliffe, whose strong stand against Germany was fueled in part by Lloyd George's refusal to make him a member of the official British peace delegation. Yet the key question to my mind is what impact did Lloyd George's domestic problems have on his standing in the eyes of the Allies. As is well known, his coalition government during the war was frequently paralyzed by debates over military strategy - specifically, his plans to emphasize eastern military operations were stymied by an informal but powerful combination of the monarchy, Unionist politicians and generals who stressed the primacy of the western front. [N. 25] In addition, because there had not been an election since 1911, Lloyd George presided over an old and tired parliament, while his own personal prestige was clouded by the lingering consequences of his involvement in the shady Marconi Scandal. [N. 27] As a result of these factors, liberals such as Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House believed that the British cabinet were a lot of unrepresentative imperialists (they were actually representative imperialists), while the French Military Attache in London, General de la Panouse, reported to Clemenceau that widespread internal political dissatisfaction in Britain robbed Lloyd George of the parliamentary and diplomatic influence normally enjoyed by a British Prime Minister. [N. 28] Lloyd George's electoral prospects seemed so poor that when the question of a British election arose in August 1918, French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon advised the British embassy in Paris against an election. Not only was Pichon personally aghast at the prospect that women would recieve the vote, but he believed that an British election was too great a gamble to take. [N. 29] What he did not say was that the French government was probably happy to take advantage of a relatively weak British Prime Minister. In fact, according to Lord Derby, Lloyd George invited Foch and Clemenceau to London for a meeting of the Supreme War Council in early December 1918 in order to take advantage of their popularity in the British election. [N. 30] Perhaps Foch's proposal during this visit to create a Rhenish buffer state was meant to be part of an informal quid pro quo for the French having done Lloyd George an election favor. In the event, the French dramatically underestimated the British Prime Minister's domestic popularity. As Goldstein notes, Lloyd George's domestic standing improved in several stages. Yet it was not definitive. The Allied victory on the western front finally ended the debilitating struggle between westerners and easterners, and laid the basis for the sweeping Coalition victory in the Khaki Election. This is turn boosted Lloyd George's personal prestige, but it also made him more dependent on the large pro-Entente, anti-German Unionist block within his government. French bargaining power had seemingly increased. Nicolson and Frances Stevenson observed that the Northcliffe press was following the lead of the propagandists in the French Ministry of War and the French press. [N. 31] However, France's ability to pressure Lloyd George through the bellicose British press was reduced when Lloyd George demolished Northcliffe's position in Parliament in April. Yet even this victory for the British Prime Minister was not decisive, for by this time his byzantine diplomatic maneuvers in Paris had thoroughly exasperated the Allies. If there was one thing that the French and Americans could readily agree upon in the spring of 1919, it was that Lloyd George was personally unreliable. As Clemenceau remarked to House: "I, too, have learned to appreciate the President [Woodrow Wilson], for while he is narrow, yet he travels in the same direction all the time while George travels in every direction, so inconsistent is he from day to day." [N. 32] Some of Lloyd George's inconsistency may be attributable to domestic political influences, but much was attributable to his addiction to intrigue. Rather than looking at domestic influences, Michael Fry's article has constructed a more long range analysis of the evolution of British revisionism. Beginning in 1919, he divides British diplomatic team at the Peace Conference into two overlapping groups- tactical revisionists (Lloyd George, Churchill and Balfour), who pursued British interests, and ideological revisionists (Keynes, Smuts, Barnes, Cecil and later Nicolson). The debate within the British delegation established the ensuing parameters of historical discussion. With the exception of Temperley's collection of essays, which became more critical of the Conference's results as each volume was published, Fry writes that little of worth was added to understanding of Britain's role at the Peace Conference until the publication of archivally based studies by historians such as Goold, Lentin, Sharp, and Goldstein. In spite of their valuable contributions, Fry suggests the debate on the Peace Conference remains rooted in the unsatisfactory contrast between a Wilsonian and a Carthaginian peace. Instead, he proposes that Lloyd George should be evaluated as a pragmatic and skillful statesman who sought to guarantee the security of the British Empire by establishing a self-regulating European equilibrium, not through a balance of power but, borrowing a term from Paul Schroeder, through "a balance of satisfactions." (Presumably Fry means that Lloyd George sought to prevent another world war by maintaining a mild level of dissatisfaction throughout Europe). The key issue, Fry concludes, was not what was wrong with the Treaty itself, but how well Lloyd George and his successors managed the post-war system. [598-601] This evaluation of the peace is similar to the overall position taken by Soutou and Stevenson, but naturally places more emphasis on British leadership. Whatever the faults of the Treaty of Versailles's system, they did not pre-determine the Second World War. Diplomats and strategists in the 1920s and 1930s still possessed significant freedom of action. However, Fry's proposal that Lloyd George attempted to create a "balance of satisfactions" invites debate. When Clemenceau visited Lloyd George in London in 1922, he asked the British Prime Minister why he had opposed France since the armistice, to which Lloyd George reportedly replied that he was merely following "the traditional English foreign policy." [N. 33] Admittedly, this ambiguous phrase can be interpreted a number of ways, but one possible interpretation is that Lloyd George operated within a traditional balance of power model. Such a scheme, indeed, explains his political tactics at home and in Europe. When dealing with his frequently divided cabinet, Lloyd George liked to play a centrist balance of power role, arbitrating between competing factions, and if a suitable faction did not exist, he would facilitate its creation (i.e. encouraging Lord Milner in 1917-18 to oppose the emphasis by Haig and Robertson on the western front). When operating within the alliance on the western front or at the Paris Peace Conference, Lloyd George attempted to arbitrate between competing French and American claims. It was not surprising in the least that he made British acceptance of the Guarantee Treaty to France contingent on American approval. Subsequently, he and his successors attempted to play a balancing role between the competing claims of France and Weimar Germany, not fully understanding that a true European balance required more active and unambiguous British support on behalf of France. To borrow another argument from Paul Schroeder, it seems more probable that Lloyd George was part of that British foreign policy tradition which had traditionally misunderstood the dynamics of central European politics. [N. 34] Nor, it must be said, were the British statesmen and strategists at the Paris Peace Conference as honorable or rational as portrayed by Fry, whose analysis is perhaps shaped by an unconscious Anglophilia. Many examples can be given to support this point. Keynes' revisionism was motivated in part by his love for the German representative Melchior; Balfour was lazy; Henry Wilson was a die-hard Ulsterman and an inveterate schemer; Cecil was prone to snide outbursts of francophobia; Smuts was responsible for racial legislation in South Africa that was shocking even by the standards of the day; Barnes helped to stir up the virulent anti-German fever during the Khaki Election; while Lloyd George infamously used Jew-baiting tactics to discredit French Finance Minister, Lucien Klotz. On a larger strategic level, British revisionism was indeed driven by the threats posed by Bolshevism and Germany, but it was also motivated by imperial commitments which diverted British power away from Europe. After 1919, such commitments in fact were larger than ever. The British Empire made one of the largest land grabs in history at the Paris Peace Conference, and as the massacre at Amritsar in February demonstrated, that imperialism was not wholly benevolent or far-sighted. Just as Czechoslovakia might have been more secure had it contained fewer Sudeten Germans, the British Empire might have been more secure had it curbed its imperial appetite. Whether on the personal or policy level, British behavior not always commendable or enlightened. The glaring contradiction between Britain's professions of altruism and its imperialist claims was aptly noted by the progressive Secretary of State for India, E. S. Montagu. After a discussion of Wilsonian war aims in cabinet on the morning of 20 December 1918, Montagu spelled out his concerns in a bitterly sarcastic memorandum to the Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour: "I write to you because you alone of all my colleagues have given me any reason to hope. The men who are plunging into this situation are of three types. First of all there is the General Staff whose thoughts are always directed from one war to the next, who see in every situation a strategic frontier, who can find good military reasons for the annexation of every territory in the world, who go to one place to protect another, and find that the new place involves going to yet a third place before it is secure. "Next there seems to me the flag-waving type of the honest Briton, typified in our discussion by Sir Walter Long and Mr. Hughes, who want to go to any place because we can and who dare say us nay, and "Good God, Sir, isn't it splendid to be a British subject?" and the rest of it. "And then there is the rounded Lord Curzon, who for historical reasons of which he alone is master, geographical reasons which he has peculiarly studied, finds, reluctantly, much against his will, that it would be dangerous if any country in the world was left to itself, if any country in the world was left to the control of any other country but ourselves and we must go there, as I have heard him say, "for diplomatic, economic, strategic and telegraphic reasons." "So we go on. It is fatal to let the French here. It is appalling to think of ourselves as mandatories there. The idea of the American Fleet in the Mediterranean is unspeakably horrific. And we are going into these negotiations with our mouths full of fine phrases and our brains seething with dark thoughts. "What are you going to do? Is it not our only hope that President Wilson is just as much of a humbug as we all are? Or shall we tell him plainly that our peace is the peace of the victors. "Woe to the vanquished !" It is to be a peace of the old style and we must carry in our minds not international or even Inter-Allied provisions for maintaining peace, but nicely balanced territorial adjustments coupled with resplendent military provision." [N. 35] Lloyd George never resolved this contradiction. As Chanak would soon show in 1922, he had bitten off more than he could chew. The subsequent collapse of his Liberal-Unionist coalition government, combined with his meretricious political reputation and the demise of the British Liberal Party, rendered moot the possibility that he might stay on as the diplomatic steward of Europe. III As a statesman, Woodrow Wilson was torn between Gladstone's enlightened pragmatism and his own great desire to become the prophet of a new era in international relations. The results were paradoxical. Wilsonianism affected every country in Europe, and by extension, made American domestic politics an international concern. Yet while Wilson's tumultuous reception in Europe in December 1918 apparently validated his claim to speak on behalf of humanity, the Democratic defeat in the mid-term elections in November 1918 diminished his mandate to speak on behalf of the American people. Having consistently refused to conduct a bipartisan foreign policy, his project for a League of Nations was ultimately thwarted by Republican opposition in the Senate. Thomas Knock's contribution to the collection examines the Wilson administration's domestic political support during the war and its conduct of the armistice negotiations. As in his previous monograph on Wilsonian war aims and propaganda, [N. 36] the most interesting aspect of Knock's essay is its emphasis upon the influence of American domestic politics on Wilson's foreign policy. Knock argues that the principles of Wilsonianism emerged during the 1915-16 preparedness debate and the rise Wilson's coalition of Democrats and Progressives in 1916. In distinction to the unabashedly pro-Allied "conservative internationalism", which implied a reactionary social-legislative agenda, Wilson's coalition linked domestic social reform with "progressive internationalism." Yet having won the election of 1916, Wilson failed to win over Taft's conservative League to Enforce Peace or to nurture the left-wing coalition which had sustained him. He had no choice but to respond to the Bolshevik challenge, while after entering the war, his administration was swept along by the mood of anti-German hysteria and patriotism. Perhaps most infamously, Socialist leader Eugene Debs was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for having made a speech against American participation in the war. By acquiescing to this suppression of civil liberties, Wilson contributed to the gradual unraveling of his coalition. [115-16] As Knock aptly comments, the congressional elections in November 1918 were more significant than many presidential elections. This is a compelling approach which helps explain Wilson's domestic difficulties in 1918-20. It also raises serious questions about Wilson's leadership *before* he was incapacitated by illness. Link and Chambers have previously argued that Wilson's wartime mobilization of the United States was an impressive accomplishment. However, according to his Republican critics and to many Allied observers in Washington, Wilson had personally little to do with the organization of the American war effort. [N. 37] If, as Knock argues, he also failed to maintain his domestic coalition, how exactly did he spend his time in the White House during the war? Nor did his performance improve substantially at the Peace Conference where he not only failed to restrain the vehemently anti-Entente geo-political views of his chief naval advisor, Admiral Benson, [N. 38] but much to his subsequent embarrassment, he managed to alienate all four of the other official American delegates: House, Bliss, Lansing, White. Ultimately, however, the key failure of Wilsonian foreign policy was the absence of bipartisan support. Unlike Britain and France, the United States never suffered heavy enough losses to force it to form a true coalition wartime government. Manfred F. Boemke's article on Wilson's attitudes toward Germany notwithstanding [603-14], it would appear that at times the Republicans and Socialists were both greater concerns for the American President than the Central Powers. Perhaps it is best to rate Wilson as a first generation wartime leader similar to the ineffective Asquith. While Knock is on solid ground in his exposition of American domestic political influences, his overall view of Wilsonianism is too uncritical. For example, he states that Wilson's "Peace Without Victory" speech in January 1917 was nothing less than "a comprehensive, penetrating critique of European imperialism, militarism, and balance of power politics...".  While it was indeed comprehensive, and while it was a public relations triumph amongst like-minded progressives, this description seems exaggerated. Perhaps evaluations of Wilson's perspicacity as an international statesman lie in the eye of the beholder, but the "Peace without Victory" speech was neither particularly realistic, nor original, nor insightful. (To this reader, Montagu's critique of traditional diplomatic mindsets is a far more incisive analysis). To be sure, Wilson's "Peace Without Victory" is politically significant because it promised American support of some kind for a "just" post-war order, but it did little more than recapitulate stock liberal ideas about international relations (freedom of the sea, Polish independence, denunciations of armaments and entangling alliances, etc...). [N. 39] Neither in this speech, nor in his subsequent public addresses, did he demonstrate any deep understanding of the security dilemmas or political problems which had engulfed the European powers. It would take more than his oracular promulgations to resolve the diplomatic and military stalemate in which Europe found itself during the First World War. [N. 40] Echoing much of the literature surrounding Versailles, Knock accepts the Wilsonian claim that the Fourteen Points were necessary because the Allies had persistently failed "to embrace ideologically progressive war aims." Knock also writes that the Allies entirely failed to comment on the Fourteen Points.  These comments form a relatively small part of his essay, but warrant comment because they represent widespread misconceptions about Allied policy. Lloyd George's war aims speech on 5 January 1918 in fact preceded Wilson's Fourteen Points and preempted many of its liberal themes. The British government had also issued the Balfour Declaration in December 1917, which in spite of all the opprobrium subsequently attached to it, was at least *intended* to portray British foreign policy in an altruistic light. [N. 41] The French case is both more and less clear. Although the French never issued a comprehensive war aims statement which had the same impact as the Fourteen Points, it does not necessarily follow that their propaganda lacked idealism. To the French, the defence of "la patrie" and "civilisation" against the invading "Boche" was inherently idealistic and noble - Wilson's "Peace without Victory" speech had erred in equating the morality of the French and German causes. In any case, as Clemenceau argued after America's entry into the war, the principles of Wilsonianism had originated in eighteenth and nineteenth Europe. [N. 42] Nor did the Fourteen Points pass entirely without French comment. In an attempt to minimize the different Allied war aims, Clemenceau instructed his foreign minister, Pichon, to tell the Chamber of Deputies that the differences between French, British and American war aims existed more in form than substance. [N. 43] This instruction was obviously motivated by the practical need to paper over diplomatic difficulties during the war, but it also reflected Clemenceau's firmly held conviction that Wilson did not possess a monopoly on morality or idealism. William C. Widenor's essay presented a more nuanced and critical perspective on Wilsonianism. Best-known as an analyst of Henry Cabot Lodge, Widenor has elected here to take a walk on the Wilsonian "side of the street."  His survey of the American delegation's memoirs is refreshing. Far from being uniform and overly-idealistic, he aptly notes that "the American approach to the making of the peace in 1919 was more variegated and less overweening than it was at first made to appear."  American opinions varied widely, ranging from the propagandistic Creel and Baker, who sought to defend Wilson at all costs, to Charles Seymour, who was capable of shrewd and honest judgments when he was not defending Colonel House's strained reputation, to Widenor's favorite commentator, Isaiah Bowman, who matter of factly argued that there would always be war and that not too much such be expected from an experiment such as the League of Nations. [559-60] This variety notwithstanding, the overwhelming theme which permeated American reactions to the Paris Peace Conference, Widenor notes, was the influence of American Progressivism. The members of the American delegation to the Peace Conference, to a greater or lesser degree, nearly all believed that American diplomacy was purer, more moral and less self-interested than that of any other nation. [550-51] (One refreshing exception was Seymour, who noted that Wilsonianism asked the United States to give up very little while demanding other nations should give up very much).  This remarkable attitude, Widenor goes on to write, involved considerable self-delusion. The Americans not only collectively forgot their own diplomatic history in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but their wish to extend the Monroe Doctrine's principle of self-determination somehow overlooked this doctrine's claims for "...special privilege and status on the part of the United States...".  In a paradoxical sense, Wilsonianism raised the moral bar so high for other nations that it ultimately became a justification for American isolation from the wicked world rather than the rationale for sustained internationalism. During the debate on treaty ratification, Wilson and his press secretary Tumulty could not resist portraying the Covenant of the League of Nations "in the very isolationist tones to which it was the supposed antithesis...".  While Widenor notes that Wilson and Tumulty were playing to the post-war isolationism, perhaps there was more to this than just tactical maneuvering. From Marshal Foch's perspective, Wilson's internationalism simply provided a rhetorical cover for the American's army's speedy withdrawal from Europe in 1919. Perhaps too, Wilson's failure to submit the Guarantee Treaty to France to the Senate along with the Treaty of Versailles and the League Covenant reflected his reluctance to admit that he had dabbled in traditional power politics. As Widenor suggests, no account of American involvement is complete without some reference to the domestic well-springs of American foreign policy. However, America's moral aversion to Europe and to "old diplomacy" cannot be simply explained by the inner inconsistencies of American Progressivism. A good case in point is General Tasker H. Bliss, the American Permanent Military Representative attached to the Supreme War Council in 1918 and one of the five American delegates to the Peace Conference in 1919. During the war, Bliss was an ardent advocate of inter-Allied cooperation and even advocated the integration of American infantry battalions into French and American units. However, very quickly in November-December 1918, he became passionately disillusioned with the conduct not only of the Allies, but also his own President. Like many other post-1919 critics of the peace, Bliss became more Wilsonian than Wilson. Working secretly in tandem with fellow delegates Henry White and Robert Lansing, he engineered a press leak designed to embarrass Wilson's concession to the Japanese occupation of Shantung. [N. 44] His disgust over this imperialistic deal was exceeded by his rapidly growing hatred for France. In a report filed by British liaison officer, General Spears, Bliss was reported to have said that: "...our present policy as one by which we were pledging ourselves to bolster up forever a decadent race (the French) against the most efficient race in EUROPE (the Germans)." [N. 45] What explains the sudden turn-around of Bliss and many other delegates? Sometimes one suspects that there was something in the water in Paris that made them less tolerant toward the mistakes, weaknesses and even legitimate interests of their wartime Allies. In fact, the Parisian milieu undoubtedly did contribute to inter-Allied tensions. American (and British) delegates arriving in the French capital were confronted with many inconveniences and irritants. These included: a coal shortage, price gouging by French merchants, the great influenza epidemic (nearly everyone fell ill at some point), procedural disorganization at the Conference, streets filled with mutiles de guerre and hundreds of captured cannons on display as war trophies. Added to this were the Anglo-American fear of the French secret service, an often hostile French press, and the looming Bolshevik threat, and it was hardly surprising that many delegates were filled with homesickness and bitterness toward their hosts. Conversely, the French were often far from hospitable, having been aggrieved by Wilson's reluctance to visit the devastated areas, by the introduction of English as an official diplomatic language at the Conference, by the American army's claim that it had won the war, by inflation caused by high-spending foreign delegations, by the rowdy behavior of the many American officers and soldiers on leave in Paris, and by the sense that they were being abandoned. British, French and American delegates also brought with them the heritage of many bitter strategic debates which had marked the conduct of the war. [N. 46] From this perspective, the Paris Peace Conference was not the dawn of a new age of peace, but the last great inter-Allied conference of the war. Consequently, to many delegates, disillusionment with the Peace Conference rivaled that of the trenches. IV The era of the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference was one of great political tension and instability. As the issues raised by these essays make clear, domestic politics, military strategy, and international politics were intricately intertwined. The nation states which were engulfed by the war not only inherited the considerable social, political and psychological tensions of the so-called "Belle Epoque", but they were confronted by crisis after crisis during the war, including both the terrible toll of the trenches and the emergence of the Bolshevik threat. Governments reacted to these challenges with appeals to patriotism and by intensifying their propaganda. Outwardly, a considerable degree of political unity was achieved. Coalition government, Union SacrČe, Burgfrieden - these concepts became political reality. Yet behind the scenes, politicians, generals and diplomats conducted bitter struggles for power and strategic influence. And while the forces of nationalism seemed stronger than ever, the pressures of the war forced a degree of interdependence upon the different nations to an extent previously unimaginable. In the western coalition, the Supreme War Council presided over a myriad of inter-Allied planning agencies; British, French and American leaders formed and re-formed into a kaleidoscopic array of competing factions; Woodrow Wilson temporarily emerged as the hero of the moderate European left all the while arousing the suspicions of the Allied leadership. Entering the Paris Peace Conference, relations amongst the victor powers were characterized by a paradoxical combination of cooperation and conflict - ultimately conflict prevailed. As numerous commentators in this volume have argued, the flaws in the Treaty of Versailles did not pre-determine the Second World War. Yet in an era of many ironies, one of the greatest was that peace proved to be a greater threat to inter-Allied unity than to Germany. ENDNOTES 1. Robert K. Hanks, "International Citizen: Georges Clemenceau and the Anglo-American Relations" (University of Toronto; Ph. D. dissertation, working title). 2. Georges-Henri Soutou, _L'or et sang. Les buts economique de la Premiere Guerre Mondiale_ (Paris, 1989). 3. Robert K. Hanks, "A Paralyzed Alliance: The Anglo-French Manpower Dispute of 1918," Society For Military History, 16 April 1999, Session B, "Allied Grand Strategy in World War I." 4. Tim Travers, _How the War Was Won. Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front 1917-1918_ (London and New York; 1992), p. 130. 5. Robert McCrum, "French Rhineland Policy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919," _Historical Journal_ 21, 1978, pp. 623-48. 6. German propaganda charges against French colonial soldiers were wildly exaggerated. The non-white troops stationed in Germany behaved better than Allied and German white troops. Sally Marks, "Black Watch on the Rhine: A Study in Propaganda, Prejudice and Prurience," _European Studies Review_, 13 (3), July 1983, pp. 297-334. See also: William R. Keylor, " 'How They Advertised France': The French Propaganda Campaign in the United States During the Breakup of the Franco-American Entente, 1918-1923," _Diplomatic History_, 17 (3), Summer 1993, pp. 370-71. For an analysis of the decision-making process that led to the use of colonial troops in Germany, see also: Keith L. Nelson, "The 'Black Horror on the Rhine': Race as a factor in Post-World War I Diplomacy," _Journal of Modern History_, 42 (4), December 1970, pp. 606-27. For German stories during the war about the alleged atrocities and cannabalism of Allied colonial soldiers, see: Modris Eksteins, _The Rites of Spring. The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age_ (Toronto, 1988), p. 235. 7. Poincare recorded this attack on Clemenceau in his diary. Daniel Amson, _Poincare. L'acharne de la politique_ (Paris,1997), p. 294. 8. Haguenin's war time activities are briefly described in the memoirs of: Vera B, Whitehouse, _A Year as a Government Agent_ (New York and London, 1920), p. 65. There is no reference to him on the index of the volumnious record of French propaganda activities complied by Alfred Baudrillart. Cardinal Alfred Baudrillart, _Les carnets secrets du Cardinal Alfred Baudrillart (1914-1918)_. Edited by Paul Christophe (Paris; 1994). 9. Charles A. Selden, "What will be Tiger's course. Speculation in France as to Future career of Premier Clemenceau." _The Globe_ (Toronto), June 30, 1919, pp. 1, 7. Derby to Hankey, 21 October 1919, Lloyd George Papers, F/24/1 (Hankey), House of Lords Records Office, London. 10. John Keiger, "Jules Cambon and Franco-German Detente, 1907-1914," _Historical Journal_, 26 (3), 1983, pp. 641-59. 11. House Diary, 29 November1917, 19 December 1918, House Papers, Sterling Library, Yale University [Hereafter SLYU]. Diary of Edith Benham, 10 February 1919, _The Papers of Woodrow Wilson_ Edited by Arthur Link. (Princeton, 1986), vol. 55, p. 41. 12. Between 200,000 and 250,000 children were taken out of school to cheer on Clemenceau as he drove through Brooklyn. "200,000 children turn out in Brooklyn," _New York World_ , 23 November 1922, p. 1. "Clemenceau feels so sure of success he's a boy again," _New York Times_, 23 November 1922, pp. 1-2. This tour has been explored in greater depth in: Robert K. Hanks, "Personality and Propaganda: Georges Clemenceau's 1922 Tour of the United States," New York State Association of European Historians, 18 September 1999, Session 2D: "Propaganda, Politics and Ideology in France, 1918-1948." 13. Radolin to Bulow, 31 October 1906, no. 7539, _La politique exterieure de l'Allemagne_ (Paris, 1938), tome 30, pp. 77-78. 14. Bertie to Lloyd George, 6 January 1918, FO 800/201, Public Record Office, London. 15. Viscount Brett, _The Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher_. Edited by Maurice Esher (London, 1938), vol. 4, pp. 56-57. 16. Supreme War Council Meeting, 16 March 1918 , 3 pm, Serie, Guerre, vol. 1000, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris. 17. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, _Clemenceau_ (Paris, 1988), pp.197-98, 375-78; Henry Mayers Hyndman, _The Record of an Adventurous Life_ (London, 1911), pp. 314-28; Robert K. Hanks, Georges Clemenceau and England: A Partisan Friendship," Society for French Historical Studies, 19 March 1999, Session 4E: "Intellectuals and Politics in the Third Republic." 18. Field Marshal Haig to Lady Haig, 13 October 1918, Haig Letters, MS. 152. _The Haig Papers From the National Library of Scotland_ (Brighton, Sussex, 1987). 19. Bertie to Spears, 2 March 1919, Spears Papers, SPRS 1/19, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge. 20. Josephus Daniels, _The Wilson Era. Years of War and After 1917-1923_ (Chapel Hill; 1946), p. 396. There are many other variations of this comment. 21. L. J. Maxse. 'Side-lights on the Great War', _National Review_, 76 (Dec. 1920), pp. 556-57. 22. House Diary, 10 June 1922, SLYU. 23. Andre Francois-Poncet, _De Versailles a Potsdam_ (Paris, 1948), p. 65. 24. "Secretary's notes of an Anglo-French conference held at 10, Downing Street... December 13, 1919, at 11:00 a.m", SHA, 6N 72, Chateau de Vincennes, Paris. 25. Andrew Rothstein, _The Soldiers' Strikes of 1919_ (London, 1980). 26. J. A. Thompson and Arthur Meija, Jr., _The Modern British Monarchy_ (New York, 1971); David R. Woodward, _Lloyd George and the Generals_ (London, 1983). 27. G. R. Searle, _Corruption in British Politics, 1895-1930_ (Oxford, 1987). 28. "Situation politique en Angleterre," De La Panouse to Clemenceau, 8 July 1918. No. 3054, 6N 156, Ch’teau de Vincennes, Paris. 29. "Memorandum" 12 August 1918 Unsigned, but by Lawrence Lyon, Lloyd George papers, F/47/7, House of Lords Records Office, London. 30. House Diary, 30 November 1918, SLYU. 31. Harold Nicolson _Peacemaking 1919_ (London, 1933), p. 50; Frances Lloyd George, _The Years That Are Past_ (London, 1967), pp. 150-51. 32. House Diary, 30 May 1918, SLYU. 33. House Diary, 10 June 1922, SLYU. 34. Paul W. Schroeder, "Munich and the British Tradition," _Historical Journal_ 19 (1), 1976, pp. 223-43. 35. E. S. Montagu to Balfour, 20 December 1918, Balfour MSS, 49748, British Library, London. 36. Thomas J. Knock, _To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order_ (New York, 1992). 37. Arthur S. Link and John Whiteclay Chambers II, "Woodrow Wilson as Commander in Chief," _Revue internationale d'histoire militaire_, 69, 1990, pp. 317-75. For typical Allied criticisms of Wilson, see: Spring Rice to Balfour, 5 January 1917, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_. Edited by Stephen Gwynn (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1929), vol. 2, pp. 367-68; Baudrillart, _Les Carnets du Cardinal Alfred Baudrillart, 1914-1918_, p. 901. 38. The collection's index does not make a single reference to Benson. For these, see: Mary Klachko with David F. Trask, _Admiral William Shepherd Benson, first chief of naval operations_ (Annapolis, Md., 1987). 39. Albert Fried (ed.), _A Day of Dedication: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Woodrow Wilson_ (New York, 1965), pp. 281-87. 40. For a compelling analysis of the powerful gridlock which gripped European strategy, diplomacy and public opinion, see: David Stevenson, "The Failure of Peace by Negotiation in 1917," _The Historical Journal_, 34 (1), 1991: pp. 65-86. 41. For the process which led to the Balfour Declaration, see: Jehuda Reinharz, "The Balfour Declaration and its Maker: A Reconsideration," _Journal of Modern History_, 64 (3), September 1992, pp. 455-99. Mark Levene, "The Balfour Delaration: A Case of Mistaken Identity," _English Historical Review_ CVII (422), January 1992, pp. 54-77. 42. "Praise from Clemenceau. French Leader Considers Our Step as a Great Revolution," _New York Times_, 6 April 1917, p. 6. 43. David Stevenson, _French War Aims Against Germany 1914-1919_ (Oxford, 1982), p. 101. 44. Dmitri D. Lazo, "A Question of Loyalty: Robert Lansing and the Treaty of Versailles," _Diplomatic History_ 9 (1), Winter 1985, pp. 35-54. 45. Spears to Wilson, 18 April 1919, L.S.W. 140, HHW2, 14M-14N (Spiers), Wilson Papers, Imperial War Museum, London. 46. These themes are explored in greater detail in: Robert K. Hanks, "Road Rage and Franco-American Military Relations, 1918-1919," The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, 24 June 2000, Session 33: "The Transition from War to Peace." Copyright (c) 2000 by H-Net, all rights reserved. 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