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H-DIPLO ROUNDTABLE REVIEW

Tony Smith.  _Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the
Making of American Foreign Policy_.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2000. x + 224 pp. bibliographical references and index. $35.00 (cloth),
ISBN 0674002946.

Review Editor: Gerald Horne

Reviewers: Robert Dean, Andrew DeRoche, Mark Lawrence, Elizabeth McKillen
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Review by Andy DeRoche
<FR_ANDREWD@cccs.cccoes.edu>

Tony Smith, a professor of political science at Tufts University, has made
a major contribution to the study of international relations with his book
_Foreign Attachments_. Although a significant portion of the book deals
with the recent past and even speculates about the future, it contains a
substantial discussion of the history of U.S. foreign relations. These
sections need to be taken seriously by diplomatic historians. Smith raises
some fascinating questions about the role of ethnic groups in making
foreign policy. He backs up his views with a number of specific examples.
On occasion, however, he goes too far. Most importantly, he criticizes the
work of Alexander DeConde too harshly and lets Woodrow Wilson off the hook
too easily.

Smith's introduction is interesting and thought-provoking. In one of his
more compelling points, he concedes that ethnic groups should have a voice
in the policymaking process; however, he argues that ethnics also need to
live up to their responsibilities as national citizens and members of a
greater community. I think he has a point, and I commend him for his
courage in taking this position. It will probably draw considerable fire.
In further refining this point, Smith identifies three notions of how
multiculturalism could influence U.S. foreign policy. First, greater
ethnic participation could end traditional Euro-American dominance.
Second, allowing wider participation could infuse new ideas into the
process. Third, ethnic groups might take the lead in determining U.S.
policy towards their particular homeland.

Smith concludes that the first two scenarios would be beneficial overall,
and he points to the example of African-American influence on policy
towards South Africa as embodied by Randall Robinson. But, he judges the
third example as unacceptable. He objects to the notion of American
foreign policy being divided up among ethnic groups, and contends that the
greater community must always be consulted and the common good must always
be considered. Here again, Smith voices an opinion that has considerable
merit, and for which he will perhaps be vilified. Although I agree with
the validity of the questions he raises in his introduction and respect
him for doing so, I would like to criticize some aspects of his argument.
In particular, the way he uses evidence in his introduction is at times
troubling. Essentially, he subjects evidence from ethnic groups to much
tougher scrutiny than evidence from Euro-Americans. In a sense, the tone
of his analysis repeats a historical problem faced by minority groups in
this country. Even after finally getting to the table, often times they
are not given the benefit of the doubt like the "old boys" might be.

For example, Smith cites the case of a group of Latino organizations who
wanted to serve as a "bridge community" in U.S. policymaking towards the
Western Hemisphere. In their document that they distributed before the
1997 Summit of the Americas in Miami, they pronounced that it was
"appropriate for U.S. Latinos to help shape our policies within this
hemisphere." (Smith, 10)

When analyzing their potential role, Smith makes a quantum leap far beyond
anything advocated in their document. He points to the danger of a
"dominant" role by Latinos. He also warns that they should not surrender
their right to help make policy towards regions outside of the hemisphere.
While these would be valid concerns, the fact is that they did not say
anything about dominating policy in this hemisphere or ignoring the other
hemisphere. His evidence and his analysis do not jibe, and this may be a
case of unfairly scrutinizing ethnic evidence.

On the other hand, at other points in his introduction Smith uses evidence
from Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington and U.S. Senator Charles Mathias.
In these instances he uses the evidence without any analysis or second
thoughts. The tone is one of deference to Harvard professors and Senators,
almost as if these sources are above reproach. In a book about ethnicity
and foreign policy, especially one that argues for greater
multiculturalism, this is rather ironic.

My most serious criticism of Smith's introduction involves his treatment
of Alexander DeConde, specifically DeConde's _Ethnicity, Race, and
American Foreign Policy: A History_. Smith decries the argument that
modern day influence by ethnic groups such as Cubans is nothing new, and
actually fair when one considers the historical dominance by
Anglo-Americans. He concludes that this is a very dangerous line of
reasoning that could open the door for disaster in U.S. foreign policy. He
identifies DeConde's book as the primary work responsible for this
dangerous viewpoint.

I protest on several levels. For one thing, I believe there is
considerable merit to DeConde's argument about Anglo-American influence
being historically dominant. I will return to this later. More
importantly, this is another example of Smith's objectionable use of
evidence. DeConde never argued that ethnic groups should dominate future
policymaking towards their homelands. Furthermore, to blame his book for
the lobbying activities of Cubans or Armenians is attributing far more
influence to his work than it deserves. Few books -- _The Jungle_ and
_Silent Spring_ come to mind -- truly influence the public discourse to
the extent Smith implied. No offense intended towards DeConde or his work,
but I suspect he would be thrilled if it had as much influence as Smith
suggests. In a sense, Smith sets up DeConde as a straw man.

To add insult to injury, DeConde remains essentially an anonymous straw
man. While Huntington's name is mentioned several times in the text,
DeConde is exiled to the endnotes. Only there does Smith name his
antagonist, and only there (page 172, note 10) does he specifically
attempt to refute DeConde's point about the historical dominance of
Anglo-Americans in U.S. foreign policy.

To disprove DeConde's argument, Smith cites the American hostility towards
Great Britain exemplified by the American Revolution, War of 1812, and
Venezuelan Boundary dispute. Obviously these three events all demonstrate
American dislike for the British. However, I do not see them as
particularly relevant in a discussion of the overall thrust of U.S.
foreign policy, especially one that is so concerned with the recent
history and even the future.

In my opinion you must consider more recent examples as well, most
importantly World War I. DeConde's discussion of the First World War is
one of the strong points in his book, and he convincingly demonstrated the
importance of Wilson's love for all things British. Would Smith have us
believe that the Venezuelan boundary dispute is more important than World
War I in the history of U.S. foreign relations?

So far I have only discussed Smith's introduction. Now I would like to
make a few observations about the body of the book, which contains a lot
of excellent material. First, let me give Smith credit for dealing with
Samuel Huntington in a much more balanced fashion in the body (41-45) than
he did in the introduction. Huntington does not come across as an
infallible source of evidence in this section. Second, Smith provides a
fascinating discussion of the emergence of an Armenian-American lobby in
the 1990s. This was something I knew little about, and Smith presents this
case study clearly. Third, Smith describes the rise of African-American
influence during the 1970s and 1980s extremely well.

In a concise and accurate portrayal, Smith traces the line of
African-American influence on U.S. policy towards southern Africa from
Charles Diggs to Andy Young to Randall Robinson. He notes the key examples
of policy towards Zimbabwe during the Jimmy Carter Administration,
specifically the repeal of the Byrd Amendment and the refusal to recognize
the government of Abel Muzorewa (which is often overlooked in assessments
of Carter). He points out that this rise in black influence culminated in
the imposition of sanctions against South Africa in 1986. Smith concludes:
"that black Americans were a significant element determining both the pace
of this process and its democratic outcome seems unquestionable." (63)

Overall, then, Smith does an outstanding job of briefly presenting the
rise of African-American influence on U.S. foreign policy. The only minor
concern I have with Smith's discussion of blacks is his contention that
their rise has caused little dissension. He argues that democratic
innovations sparked by the civil rights movement have not diminished
national unity, pointing to programs such as affirmative action and job
set-asides. While I personally support such programs, I do not think they
are accepted as widely as Smith suggested. There has been a strong
backlash against such programs. His point that blacks have gained
influence without threatening national unity is not completely convincing.

This is related to my final criticism, which is that Smith downplays the
importance of racism in U.S. foreign policy. In attempting to refute
DeConde's point about the pervasive influence of Anglo-Americans, Smith
goes a little too far in the other direction. The key example is Woodrow
Wilson. In _Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy_ DeConde argued
convincingly that Wilson's love for all things English and his contempt
for all other ethnicities was at the heart of his foreign policy.
(DeConde, 78-79)

Smith, on the other hand, tends to treat Wilson with kid gloves when it
comes to racism. Although he characterizes Wilson as a segregationist and
mentions his opposition to hyphenated Americans, he puts more emphasis on
Wilson's pro-ethnic activism. He notes the examples of Czechoslovakia and
Poland, and credits Wilson with supporting independence in both cases.
Those are important examples, but they need to be balanced by
consideration of Wilson's outrageous veto of the Japanese proposal for an
anti-racism clause in the League of Nation's charter, which has been so
well detailed by Paul Gordon Lauren.

More generally, Smith too readily dismisses DeConde's broader point about
Anglo-American influence. The point that ethnic influence need not take
the shape of a lobby, but can actually be seen in the attitude of
insiders, is a very important one. Wilson is one example, but there are
many more who have been very influential in U.S. foreign policy over the
years. Alexander Hamilton and Dean Acheson are two who immediately come to
mind. Acheson influenced the Richard Nixon Administration's policy of
concrete support for Portugal in its colonial wars in southern Africa and
more subtle support for Ian Smith. Acheson, along with senators such as
Harry Byrd and Strom Thurmond, personified the racism of some policymaking
insiders. Tony Smith would probably not disagree with any of this, but I
do think he goes too far in downplaying such considerations.

All in all, Smith's Foreign Attachments is an excellent book. I teach a
course on race, ethnicity, and foreign policy, and would not hesitate to
assign this book to students. However, I would balance it out with the
work of other scholars such as DeConde and Lauren.



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