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H-DIPLO ROUNDTABLE

Joel Blatt, ed., _The French Defeat of 1940: Reassessments_ (Providence
and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1998).

Roundtable Editor: Sally Marks

Reviewers:  Paul de Quenoy, Samuel Goodfellow, Sean Kennedy, Eugenia C.
Kiesling

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Review by Sean Kennedy
University of New Brunswick
skennedy@unb.ca

This stimulating and valuable collection of essays deals with the
catastrophic French defeat of 1940 from virtually every conceivable angle.
The contributors provide diverse perspectives on the talents and
shortcomings of the Third Republic's military leaders, their relationship
with the politicians, and the manifold troubles, some of them
self-inflicted, that the French experienced in dealing with the Americans,
British and Soviets. This review will concentrate upon the essays dealing
with domestic politics and public opinion. In this realm, of course, many
scholars have posited a close connection between the upheavals of the
1930s, the disaster of 1940, and the advent of the Vichy regime. However,
as William Keylor notes, such a causal relationship is not self-evident.
The pre-1914 Republic was also characterized by polarization, yet the
regime survived the German onslaught and eventually triumphed. Conversely,
errors in military strategy and a lack of allies might well suffice to
explain the Nazi victory a generation later. The contributors to The
French Defeat of 1940 are far from unanimous on these matters, but they
all have enlightening things to say, and collectively demonstrate how
sophisticated the scholarship on this disaster has become.

In some respects, Omer Bartov's essay "Martyr's Vengeance"  sounds a
familiar note in its emphasis upon the long-term roots of the French
collapse, but his approach and sources are innovative.  In contrast to
their eastern neighbors, he argues, the French were never able to reach a
consensus on the meanings and implications of the First World War. Whereas
in Germany attitudes towards the experience of 1914-1918 ultimately
converged in a seething nationalist resentment, in France opinions
remained sharply divided, resulting in paralysis. Bartov bases his
conclusions on a wide variety of evidence, ranging from representations of
the Great War experience in contemporary literature to political posters,
memorials, and the films of Jean Renoir.

In responding to Marc Bloch's call for a total history of interwar France
in order to understand the country's subsequent fate, Bartov is surely
right to adopt such a broad perspective. Moreover, he is alert to some of
the paradoxes of Third Republic politics, such as the significance of the
'war-revolution nexus', namely, the widespread belief in right-wing
circles that the leftist Popular Front would lead France into a war from
which a bloody revolution would result. The upshot of this was that for
several years during the 1930s normally bellicose nationalists instead
tended to emphasize the need for conciliation with Germany. On this matter
there was convergence between their views and those of integral pacifists
such as Félicien Challaye, who at first strongly opposed domestic fascism
but also desperately sought to avoid war. But the evolution of French
public opinion between 1938 and 1940 was not as straightforward as Bartov
implies. As William Irvine demonstrates, by the summer of 1939 the
situation had changed. The Popular Front had been sundered, the
war-revolution nexus was far less of an issue, and the Daladier government
enjoyed considerable support even as it adopted a firmer line in dealing
with Hitler.  Though a distaste for war with Germany was still evident
among elements of the political class, many pacifists had a sense of being
marginalized, and the public seemed committed to defending France.

If, as Irvine concludes, in the summer of 1939 "France was morally and
materially ready to confront Nazi Germany" (95), then attention must turn
to the drôle de guerre. Did the rediscovered national consensus prove too
fragile to sustain the political and diplomatic shocks of 1939-40? The
essays by Elisabeth du Rèau and John Cairns underscore the intractability
of the problems faced by prime minister Édouard Daladier - not the least
of which was his rivalry with his finance minister and eventual successor,
Paul Reynaud. Du Réau sees Daladier as wanting to galvanize the French
people and working to cooperate effectively with Britain, but falling
short when it came to creating a sufficient sense of urgency.  In his
speeches he denied that the objective of the Anglo-French coalition was
the overthrow of Nazism; instead he asserted that the goal was "to put an
end to a system of international relations founded on brute force." (108)
Such an approach satisfied elements of the right and far right, who did
not wish the French war effort to involve a crusade for democracy, but it
arguably left many centrist and centre-left politicians less motivated
than could have been the case. Du Réau also notes Daladier's failure to
secure the cooperation of the significant element of the Socialist party
which was willing to support the war effort. Despite these shortcomings,
though, she does not think that the last governments of the Republic were
without their merits. "The right picture", she concludes, "is in
half-tones." (124)

Cairns elegantly details the crisis which removed Daladier from his post
after nearly two years in office. As does du Réau, he notes that Daladier
had supported a French intervention in the Russo- Finnish war partly to
bolster general morale, but also, it seems, in response to anticommunist
critics such as Pierre-Étienne Flandin.  Flandin and others had questioned
why, since the Nazis and the Soviets were now linked by their August 1939
pact, France did not strike at the USSR. But instead of being able to
engage in an action which would mollify domestic critics while avoiding
the major battle with the Germans on the Western front, in March 1940
Daladier was faced with a Finnish defeat and a sharp rebuke, leading to
his downfall. Anglo-French relations had been strained to boot. The
British, with reason, expressed doubts over the wisdom of engaging the
Soviets, though Cairns also points out that they did not understand the
French domestic situation very well. Finally, the crisis led to the
formation of Reynaud's government, which did not enjoy a broad base of
support.

Cairns leaves us with a ominous picture on the eve of the German
offensive, characterized by an amalgam of Franco-British animosity and
growing influence on the part of the antiwar lobby.  There was even talk
of Daladier conniving with Pierre Laval to return to power and arrange a
peace treaty. Clearly evident, too, was the visceral anticommunism which
characterized not only domestic politics but had also led to the espousal
of various operations against the Soviets, ranging from the intervention
in Finland to the bombardment of Caucasian oil fields. It is hard not to
see a foreshadowing of the Vichy regime in this ideological evolution
which served to distort France's strategic priorities. The political
infighting of 1940 also had more immediate military consequences, as
General Gamelin found himself fending off Reynaud's efforts to displace
him. Yet when it comes to linking the political struggles of the Phoney
War with the collapse, one is still left asking what sort of influence
Pierre Laval and others who balked at war would have had if the German
offensive had been countered more successfully.  Moreover, even though by
that time a significant element of the French elite preferred to see
Stalin as the primary enemy, it is less clear how their attitudes affected
the performance of the troops in the front line.

Carole Fink's contribution on Marc Bloch during the drôle de guerre
demonstrates the gamut of emotions experienced by an especially acute
front-line observer. Bloch was obviously full of anxiety and critical of
many aspects of France's war effort, sensing many of his countrymen to be
complacent and the French and British leadership to be inadequate. Fink
also makes clear, however, that these moments of gloom alternated with a
stimulation provided by his military responsibilities, and a hope that a
firm defensive line could hold against a German attack.  Obviously, Bloch
was not a typical soldier, but some of his perceptions were no doubt
widely shared even if they remained unarticulated. Evident from Fink's
account is the deleterious effect of the long period of inactivity
following the outbreak of war, something which Bloch personally struggled
to counteract. But even the boredom and the possible self-doubt resulting
from the 'phoney war' did not prevent many French units from fighting hard
after 10 May 1940.

In addition to frustration and hatred of Communism, xenophobia and more
specifically antisemitism are frequently described as prominent features
of the 'mood' of 1939-1940. In her detailed and thoroughly documented
essay, Vicki Caron illustrates how prevalent such sentiments were. The
Nazi-Soviet Pact, she notes, "cast a cloud of suspicion over all
foreigners in France" (140) and led to a wave of internments. Yet Caron
also points out that at all times countervailing attitudes and pressures
were operative. In April 1939, Daladier's government had made it easier
for foreigners to join the regular army. While the prevailing climate
after the Nazi- Soviet Pact and the declaration of war neutralized this,
and thousands of former residents of 'Greater Germany' subsequently found
themselves in squalid detention camps, the government eventually responded
to domestic and foreign criticism on this score. Thousands of internees
were released, and it was decided that foreigners would be used in the war
effort. Sadly, serious problems - including antisemitism on the part of
Foreign Legion and other service commanders - persisted, and the German
attack led to a renewed panic and the launching of another series of
internments by Reynaud's government.

Caron's final verdict is, not surprisingly, critical. She argues that the
French government was clearly not prepared to fully mobilize for war; by
treating the refugees so poorly it had wasted an important opportunity.
She also endorses the views of former refugees who believed that the
internments reflected at best an inability to determine priorities, as
argued by Lion Feuchtwanger, or at worst outright defeatism, as maintained
by Hans Habe. But for Caron it is imperative that distinctions be drawn
between the outlook of the Third Republic and that of Vichy. While
xenophobia was a prominent current before and during the drôle de guerre,
it was always contested; only under Vichy did it fully prevail.

Caron's conclusions with regard to the refugee question might be extended
to a broader generalization about the relationship between the political
and moral crises of the 1930s, the French defeat, and Vichy. While not
wishing to present the various contributors' views as making up a seamless
argument, I believe that as a whole their findings point to several
postulates. The first is the need to trace the various inflections of
political change and public opinion of this period carefully. From the
capitulation at Munich through the recovery of 1939 to the partisan
battles of the drôle de guerre, there were crests and troughs in the
processes of forging a political consensus and galvanizing the people.
Secondly, it may well be that an analysis of domestic developments during
this period tells us more about the roots of the Vichy regime than the
actual defeat of 1940. This is not to say that strains in civil- military
relations or prolonged inaction had no bearing on the outcome of the
Battle of France. Yet in discussing the evolution of the popular mood it
is possibly easier to trace linkages between longer periods, in this
instance the final years of the Third Republic and the opening months of
Vichy. Thirdly, however, the impact of the defeat in and of itself must
not be underestimated. If some of the late Third Republic's political
discourse featured a virulent anti-communism which could be blind to
patriotism, as well as a disturbing xenophobia and antisemitism, the
authoritarian nationalists were only fully legitimized when the army's
collapse seemed to confirm that the regime had long been rotten to the
core.

Ultimately there can be no definitive answer to the question of whether
the defeat could have been avoided. But by incorporating a range of
approaches and interpretations, this book does a superb job of
demonstrating the intricacies of this acutely troubling problem, as well
as the talents of the historians who have studied it.

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