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H-DIPLO ROUNDTABLE

Joel Blatt, ed., _The French Defeat of 1940: Reassessments_ (Providence
and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1998).

Roundtable Editor: Sally Marks

Reviewers:  Paul de Quenoy, Samuel Goodfellow, Sean Kennedy, Eugenia C.
Kiesling

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Review by Paul du Quenoy
Georgetown University
pdq@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu

Joel Blatt has presented a stimulating collection of essays delving into a
subject of which twentieth century scholars have never tired, France's
complete military and political collapse in just five weeks in the late
spring of 1940.  While Blatt's volume includes contributions from many
noteworthy scholars on a variety of engaging topics, the arrangement of
the different chapters is not always the most logical.  For that reason
this review will study the articles in a somewhat different, and hopefully
more cogent, order from that in which they appear in published form.

In examining the various factors behind France's defeat in 1940, it is
difficult to avoid the first scholarly study of the subject, Marc Bloch's
_Strange Defeat_.  Most chapters in Blatt's volume refer directly or at
least allude to Bloch's account, one which is all the more poignant in
light of the author's personal participation in the campaign of 1940 and
his tragic fate as a resistance fighter captured and shot by the Germans
in 1944.  In the second chapter Carole Fink presents an interesting study
of Bloch's life during the phony war, detailing his growing pessimism with
the war effort and increasingly irritable disposition.  For Fink, this
period in Bloch's life was an important factor in the development of
_Strange Defeat's_ far-reaching indictment of French government and
society in the interwar period.

Fink's article makes an interesting point of departure, for most of the
rest of the contributions accentuate one factor or another as critical to
understanding the decline of France's ability to defend itself and its
ultimate doom in 1940.  This is particularly true for the book's first
chapter, Nicole Jordan's study of the French military's strategic flaws in
the 1940 campaign.  The essence of her argument is that the domination of
French strategic thinking by the older generation of officers who had cut
their teeth in the First World War was the primary cause of the defeat.
For Jordan most of the responsibility rests with the French Commander in
Chief, General Maurice Gamelin, and his idea of a "continuous front"
defined by defensive fortifications in eastern France and projected mobile
operations in the Low Countries.

While Jordan makes a number of very solid points with regard to Gamelin's
conduct of the war in its early days (especially his refusal either to use
modern communications technology or to move his command post to the front
lines), there are nevertheless some problems with her analysis.  First,
her emphasis on strategic flaws rests on the premise that the French army
was "not hopelessly outclassed in material terms" (29).  This point is
often brought up with regard to the number and quality of French tanks,
but is misleading.  Although France actually outnumbered Germany in the
number of battle-ready tanks at its disposal in 1940, the French general
staff's failure to organize them into armored divisions placed serious
limitations on their efficacy in battle.  This was, of course, a strategic
flaw, but it was neither a new factor in 1939-1940, nor was it solely
Gamelin's idea.  The use of tanks as a defensive weapon fell into step
with the generally defensive nature of French military policy all through
the interwar period, and it is difficult to argue that the military in
general, or Gamelin in particular, were wholly responsible for it.

In another category, it is made evident by Jordan's colleagues in other
chapters of the book (discussed below in greater detail) that France's
weakness in combat aircraft in 1940 was a rather acute problem.
Secondly, the author's reading of Bloch suggests that Gamelin's later
efforts at self-vindication were a pure example of scapegoating, since, in
her view, Bloch's treatment dismisses any serious criticism of French
political and social life in the 1930s as a cause behind the defeat.
This reading is interesting, considering that Bloch does actually focus on
a number of domestic social and political problems as leading factors in
the defeat, a fact correctly noted by Fink's study of Bloch in 1939-1940.

Study of some of these domestic problems are well represented in the book.
Omer Bartov's study of French social and cultural history in the interwar
period (Chapter III) is very appropriate in laying out the contours of
literary movements, popular pacifism, and the national and local cultures
of mourning and memory.  Bartov's treatment is one of rare distinction in
that it includes many overlooked nuances in the relation of these
movements to political life, though its one possible shortcoming is that
it forgoes direct reflection on how cultural attitudes and values played
out in the defeat.

William Irvine (Chapter IV) presents a provocative reassessment of what
would benefit Bartov's article.  His examination of interwar politics
focuses heavily on the last two years before the outbreak of war and
offers the well-argued view that Daladier's turn away from Popular Front
socialism re-enlisted the center and right (even elements of the extreme
right at that) into a national consensus that supported war.
Convincingly, Irvine has found an interesting body of evidence showing
some very unusual suspects lining up with the Third Republic against Nazi
Germany, including even people like Colonel de la Rocque, Jacques Doriot,
and Raymond Brasillach.  Irvine's study suggests that the militant left
also became willing to cooperate with a government that was clearly
growing in its willingness to stand up to Hitler by military means.
Though he acknowledges that these developments fell short of the union
sacree of 1914, his article is definitely one of the more provocative
"reassessments" included in the volume.

Vicki Caron's study (Chapter VI) of French refugee policy in 1939-1940 is
an interesting representation of how interwar ambivalence prevented the
government from constructing any cohesive refugee policy, especially with
regard to refugees from Nazism.  Many political dissidents and "Greater
Reich" Jews were placed under suspicion and even detained early in the
war.  Those who were released from internment camps (where conditions were
quite horrible) often only gained their freedom by submitting to coerced
enlistment in the French Foreign Legion.  More tragic still, many of these
refugees were re-interned after the German breakthrough in May 1940, and
several thousand of them faced the unpleasantness of being turned over to
the Nazi regime which they had fled in the first place.  Interestingly,
this policy was devised by the loyal republican Interior Minister Georges
Mandel, himself of Jewish extraction.  Caron's presentation of these
events as haphazard, if ironic, consequences of the confusion caused by
military disaster holds very true.  By implication it suggests that the
more malevolent tendencies of Vichy were not lying dormant within existing
institutions and simply waiting for the right moment to make their
appearance.  Caron's concluding suggestion that a more effective means of
organizing refugees - and anecdotal evidence does point to their personal
enthusiasm for combat - to fight the Germans might have made a difference
in the outcome of the war is, however, somewhat less convincing.

Most of the rest of the volume deals with the various challenges,
opportunities, and failures in France's foreign relations before the war
and how these various problems impacted the defeat.  Franco-British
relations are especially well represented.  Three chapters are devoted to
them, all of which bring forward new and interesting assessments of 1940.
Elisabeth du Reau's work on Edouard Daladier's role in the first months of
the war (Chapter V) is particularly provocative in that it suggests both a
greater amount of domestic efficiency within France and more cohesiveness
in Franco-British cooperation than many depictions.

Indeed, du Reau characterizes Daladier's ministry as highly pragmatic,
focusing on the prime minister's strict definition of French foreign
policy in terms of national security as opposed to peace at any price.
The appointment of the efficient technocrat Raoul Dautry to head the
Ministry of Armaments in September 1939 is offered as another example of
pragmatic preparation for war.  So, too, is Daladier's determination to
expand the conflict on Germany's periphery, a strategy that helped
precipitate his downfall in March 1940.

It is at this point that du Reau's analysis moves into cross-Channel
relations.  Another aspect of what the author believes to be Daladier's
pragmatism is demonstrated by the early and understudied economic
cooperation between the allies in 1939-1940, which included a pronounced
role for the young and not yet famous Jean Monnet.  In the author's view
the depth and seriousness of this cooperation exceeded the economic ties
of the First World War and helped stimulate both limited American
assistance in 1939-1940 (particularly in sales of sophisticated combat
aircraft to France) and the early galvanization of American military
production. While du Reau acknowledges that this did little to help France
in 1940, her wider conclusion that "the foundations of transatlantic
cooperation had been laid down in 1938-1940" (122) is somewhat overstated,
as is the implication that the foundations of rosy Franco-British
relations were also laid down in that period.  France categorically
refused to accede to Churchill's offer of comprehensive political union in
1940 and de Gaulle's wartime relationships with both Churchill and
Franklin Roosevelt were tortured and often quite bitter.  In subsequent
years de Gaulle's France excluded Britain from the Common Market for a
decade, withdrew its armed forces from NATO's integrated command structure
at the height of the Cold War, and has kept up spirited economic tensions
with the English-speaking world that are still with us today.

John C. Cairns (Chapter X) and Martin S. Alexander's (Chapter XI)
contributions dwell on the military aspect of cross-channel cooperation
and reach the conclusion that the relationship was much more tense than is
traditionally thought.  Both authors bring out a substantial amount of
mutual mistrust, demonstrating with authority that the British feared
"dove" tendencies in the French leadership, while the French, especially
the military command, were often under the impression that they were to
bear the brunt of the fighting and casualties once war flared.
Alexander's article brings out the latter point in impressive detail.
Indeed, British reluctance to engage in joint military planning, commit
more than two RAF squadrons to the continent, and even carry out the
rescue operation at Dunkirk all seemed to reinforce the French
leadership's impression that their allies were willing to "fight on land
to the last Frenchman" (303).  Cairns chapter complements this analysis
with an assessment of some of the personal tensions, focused mainly around
British perceptions of French complacency and French perceptions of
British overconfidence.

Two chapters are devoted to France's relationship with the United States.
Robert J. Young (Chapter IX) offers a nice study of informed American
opinion on France, based interestingly enough on the editorials, cultural
journalism, literary coverage, and fashion adds of the New York Times.
It is probably not so surprising that educated public opinion in the
United States favored democratic France and condemned Nazi Germany, but
Young's chapter describes these views in more qualitative depth than one
usually finds.  Another important strength is the author's description of
the French government's efforts to solidify American partiality through
voluntary cultural and intellectual tours led by world-renowned figures
like the writer Jean Giraudoux.

William R. Keylor (Chapter VIII) neatly highlights the major points of
contention in the Franco-American political relationship through the
interwar period, especially the controversy surrounding the issue of World
War I debt repayment and popular French fears of American cultural
penetration.  Nevertheless, Keylor argues, the French leadership viewed
the United States, quixotically and without much concrete validation, as
the ultimate bastion of its national security.  This chapter is especially
strong in its assessment of the early months of the war and the ambiguity
of America's view of the new European war.  While part of the French
government's strong identification of America as a source of support
issued from Roosevelt's attempts to lift the Neutrality Act and sell
military hardware, especially much needed combat aircraft, some points of
discouragement generally went ignored.  Many prominent men in American
political life, including veteran ambassador William C.  Bullitt and
senior State Department officials Adolph Berle and Sumner Welles, were
crucially resistant to broad American involvement in the war against
Hitler.  Various French schemes to gain more financial credit in the
United States, including an attempt to sell certain colonies to
Washington, washed out.

More controversial in its conclusions is Michael J. Carley's study
(Chapter VII) of Franco-Soviet relations in the interwar period.
Surveying the initial problems surrounding the establishment of diplomatic
relations and the suspicion that sprung up around them later, Carley
concludes that France's inability to place trust in Stalin was a critical
factor in its defeat.  Had the mutual assistance pact of 1935 been taken
more seriously or had even closer relations been maintained, so the
argument goes, Hitler would have faced an eastern counterweight which
would have deterred his aggression altogether or at least hamstrung his
ability to conduct a successful war in Western Europe.  This argument is
less of a "reassessment" than a resurrection of an older revisionist
argument, which blames Hitler's early successes squarely on the West's
ideologically-driven mistrust of the USSR.

Carley's approach, however, is problematic.  The balance of what we now
know suggests that Stalin was probably even less trustworthy than Cold War
Kremlinologists originally thought.  Indeed, recent studies of the
ideological dimension of Soviet foreign policy have for the most part
vindicated the notion that Stalin was seeking to play off Western powers
for the benefit of the USSR.  The connection between "imperialist" war and
revolution, a link that Carley's analysis explicitly dismisses, was in
fact all too real.  Russia's own revolutionary experiences in 1905 and
1917 were both linked to such wars, and the strategy of "divide and
conquer" was emphasized in Soviet diplomatic thinking with a great deal of
consistency.

As for Stalin's reliability in a crisis, Igor Lukes's detailed archival
work on the Munich Crisis has proved that Stalin pledged military support
to the Czechs three days after they were forced to agree to the Munich
Pact and two days after German troops had already marched into the
Sudetenland.  Carley neither takes this episode into consideration, nor
does he explain why a Soviet pact with France would have been more
reliable.  As for potential Soviet effectiveness as an ally, it is
doubtful that the Red Army would have been any stronger in 1939 than it
was in the disastrous summer months of 1941.  Indeed it would most likely
have performed worse, since a majority of the Soviet officer corps,
especially its leading advocates of military innovation, had just been
imprisoned or eliminated in the purges of 1937-1938.  Their replacements
had been promoted for their loyalty to Stalin rather than their experience
or expertise and had yet to benefit from the small scale, yet important,
operations against Japan in 1939 and Finland in 1939-1940.  To argue that
narrow-minded forces of conservatism caused the collapse of France by not
letting its government trust the weak and fundamentally untrustworthy USSR
does not stand.

Finally, the volume is well rounded out by two concluding chapters, which
offer much needed perspective on the catastrophe of 1940 and its
ramifications for postwar France.  Phillip Bankwitz's reminiscences
(Chapter XII) of his assignment to Jacques Leclerc's Free French 2nd
Armored Division give the reader an impressive first hand account of the
liberation of Paris, the resurrection of French fighting spirit throughout
the liberation campaign, and an interesting sketch of Leclerc's wartime
career. The essay also traces the development of mutual mistrust between
France and the United States in the Cold War, though it ends with the warm
suggestion that these differences were really not as deep as they appeared
to be.  Stanley Hoffmann's overview (Chapter XIII) of the defeat's place
in postwar memory, politics, and intellectual life is also a fascinating
read for those seeking wider meaning in the sad events of 1940.

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