One loose end on this thread is whether Bevin's proposal for Western Union
in 1948 fits into a 'third force' category.

Public statements to which Scott Lucas refers might suggest this but are
hardly a reliable indicator. Three British academics describe Bevin's
speech, of 22 January 1948, as 'so deliberately ambiguous and so lacking
in any concrete proposals as to be open to almost any interpretation, and
hence the almost unanimous chorus of praise with which it was greeted in
the British press, by the American Government and by the European allies'.
Bevin's (and Attlee's) strong reaction to the unexpected adverse attitude
of the Australian government partly reflected apprehension that if it
became known it would reactivate the by then largely toothless Labour
Left.

The British government's messages to the Commonwealth (seeking supporting
aid) are unequivocal that the aim was not a third force eg 'to stem
further encroachment of the Communist tide', would be seen by the Soviet
Union as 'an offensive alliance directed against' it, and, later, without
western union some countries would adopt 'a policy of timorous
neutrality'. In Bevin's terminology, Western Union was 'the sprat to catch
the mackerel' (NATO). I think historians are pretty well agreed that by
the beginning of 1948 'third force' was dead for the British government:
numerous articles by British historians including Raymond Smith who has
been cited discuss British policy towards the Soviet Union specifically in
the time-frame 1945-7.

Garry Woodard
Melbourne University

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