Although the piece relates specfically to Ethiopia, it
raises many point of general and common interest to
Africanists.
HGM


x-listed from ethioforum@ethiolist.com


_Journal of Democracy_ 9.4 (1998) 55-61;

                   Oldspeak vs. Newspeak
                      Richard Joseph

Is Ethiopia Democratic?  A global intellectual project is
under way today as scholars grapple with the mixed nature of
many political systems formerly considered to be making a
"transition to democracy." By "thinking wishfully," as Adam
Przeworski put it, scholars had projected onto the initial
processes of regime transformation their hopes for more
democratic outcomes.[1] Eventually, models that presumed a
linear trajectory toward democracy began to appear less
applicable, and new approaches to understanding the complex
interplay of political power, institutions, and social
forces in the contemporary context had to be devised.

Paul Henze, who brings to the study of post-Mengistu
Ethiopia a great store of knowledge, had an opportunity to
contribute to this important project. Despite its
fascinating history and impressive civilization, Ethiopia is
one of the poorest countries on earth. It has also been
devastated by war that, unlike elsewhere on the African
continent, has been waged with massed troops, tanks, and
modern warplanes. Since the replacement of the Derg (a
council of soldiers who in 1974 seized power from Emperor
Haile Selassie and installed military rule) by the Ethiopian
People's Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) in 1991,
Ethiopia has experienced renewed economic development,
received generous international assistance, and regained
international respect as a bastion of security lodged
between a war-torn Sudan and a Somalia in fragments.

A balanced assessment of the travails, dilemmas, failures,
and achievements of EPRDF rule would have been of immense
value to scholars and policy makers.  For reasons best known
to himself, however, Henze has chosen not to provide such an
assessment of the complex forces at work in post-Mengistu
Ethiopia.  Instead, he has assumed the task of defending the
regime as a sterling builder of democracy, berating its
opponents and critics at every turn for being misguided,
misinformed, and malicious. This one-sided exercise has
relevance beyond Ethiopia and even Africa. Other countries
claiming to be democratic have been criticized for human
rights abuses, unfair elections, and rule by a militarily
dominant minority. Seldom, however, have such charges been
dismissed in so sweeping a manner by a respected scholar.

I had looked forward to writing a commentary on Henze's
essay before reading it. But I had not anticipated being
confronted with such a stark demonstration of how the idea
of democracy can be distorted and turned into a shield for
what are at best semi-authoritarian practices. My task has
thus become the unpleasant one of identifying the threat
that such a treatment represents, not just to struggling
democratic movements worldwide, but also to the most
essential element of our work as scholars and analysts, our
reliance on anguage.

              Democracy as "Protective Sophism"

As early as February 1992, the editors of Africa Demos noted
that democratic transitions in Africa were being "coopted or
derailed in several countries."[2] As a result, a quality of
democracy index (qdi) was produced and published, along with
a list of indicators. The editors added a cautionary note:
"The democratic movement in Africa risks giving birth to
democracies that are facades behind which monopolistic and
repressive practices continue to flourish. It was never the
intention of Africa Demos to lend credibility to such
deceptions."[3]

Six years later, Africa is becoming not the "workshop of
democracy" predicted by Richard Sklar, but a workshop of
"democracy as deception." So blatant is Henze's essay in
this regard that it prompted me to reread George Orwell's
Nineteen Eighty-Four. In the novel, the Ministry of Truth
systematically encourages Winston, the protagonist, to
abandon Oldspeak and learn "to grasp the beauty of the
destruction of words."[4] By acquiring Newspeak, Winston
would learn that the past can be altered. In the end,
"everything faded into mist. The past was erased, the
erasure was forgotten, the lie became truth."[5] Eventually,
Winston would even come to accept "that democracy was
impossible and that the Party was the guardian of
democracy."[6] I then revisited W. Arthur Lewis's small 1965
classic, Politics in West Africa. In his unflinching
portrayal of the undermining of Africa's postcolonial
constitutional democracies, Lewis emphasizes the distortion
of language:  "Nearly every leader now calls himself a
socialist, or an African socialist, even Houphou=EBt-Boigny
[of C=F4te d'Ivoire]."[7] Lewis also criticizes political
scientists who, "in the sacred name of 'charisma,'
'modernization,' and 'national unity,' call upon us to
admire any demagogue who, aided by a loud voice and a bunch
of hooligans, captures the state and suppresses his
rivals."[8]

Democratic struggles worldwide are conducted simultaneously
on the terrain of thought and action. If the former is lost,
there is little hope for the latter. For this reason,
Henze's treatise must, and will be, vigorously challenged.
The Nigerian scholar Adigun Agbaje has emphasized "the
increasing trend of autocrats appropriating the language and
symbols of democracy to frustrate democratization and deepen
authoritarian rule."[9] Similarly, Celestin Monga advances
the term "protective sophism" to refer to the reduction of
concepts like "national integration" to slogans used to
justify practices by which elite groups pursue their own
interests while balkanizing their countries along ethnic
lines.[10]

Fortunately, most commentaries, reports, and analyses
dealing with Ethiopia since 1991 are still written in
Oldspeak. Marina Ottaway informs us that, after seizing
power, the Tigre Popular Liberation Front (TPLF) "was
politically weak because Tigreans made up only 10 percent of
the population."  The TPLF remedied this problem by forming
"new ethnically based parties" in the regions and by
"transforming Ethiopia into a federation of ethnic states."
Consequently, "all the regions are governed by EPRDF
affiliates,"  and the much-trumpeted policy of
decentralization "has not been accompanied by an increase in
political participation." The regime, she tells us, has
conducted "three supposedly multiparty elections" in which
"political participation has narrowed rather than widened."
Finally, the centerpiece of EPRDF governance, "the
transformation of Ethiopia into a federation of ethnic
states . . . was never open to discussion."[11]

Numerous reports by independent organizations, as well as
the U.S. Department of State's annual human rights reports,
are all written in Oldspeak. In a 1998 review, Human Rights
Watch summarized the essentials of EPRDF rule as follows: By
sponsoring 16 parties, "each based on the dominant ethnic
groups in the various regions," the regime "ensured a
quasi-monopoly of power by the EPRDF and its allied or
satellite parties." The elections have been boycotted by
major opposition groups "charging, with validity, that the
vote was not fair." The government "routinely cracks down on
dissenting journalists" while it "detains thousands of
suspected militants of separatist groups . . .  without
charges and subjects many to ill-treatment and torture."[12]

According to Orwell, "the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow
the range of thought."[13] Even the known past could be
altered. Weaving through Henze's references to "democratic
processes," "democratic procedures," and "a free and open
society," the reader will have a difficult time getting
clear answers to a central question: How did the TPLF,
resting on a minority ethnic base, succeed through the
umbrella EPRDF in establishing control over all of Ethiopia
and imposing its policies and governing structures while
conducting a supposedly democratic transition?

Henze's account of the various stages of the Ethiopian
transition deliberately blurs rather than clarifies the
EPRDF's political engineering, reducing it to a morality
play in which good guys are pitted against bad guys. The
EPRDF, he assures us, has fostered an "open political and
press debate" and has sought to establish a "more open,
tolerant, humane, and prosperous society." The EPRDF was
"idealistic" and "well-intentioned" about democratization;
if anything, it could be criticized for being "naive in
expecting that critics would know how to be responsible."
Opposition politicians, however, have displayed "pervasive
rejectionism" and pursued actions designed to precipitate
"punitive actions by the authorities." They have boycotted
elections mainly "to avoid exposing their lack of support
among the electorate."

Contrary to the myriad reports of international monitors and
observers, Henze states that the EPRDF's "dramatic
experiments in governance" have been comparatively
peaceful," and marvels that its "leaders have resorted so
seldom and so briefly to repressive actions." Instead of
conducting the "responsible public debate" desired by the
government, however, opposition publications "continue to
spread misinformation." Henze finds a way to attribute most
of the EPRDF's shortcomings to the misconduct of the
opposition. Even the EPRDF's tendency to give priority to
its own programs is presented as a consequence of "the
opposition's refusal to participate in the political
process." In short, the actions of a battle-hardened group
of militant leaders, who are well-grounded ideologically and
disciplined organizationally, are excused by Henze according
to the familiar formula used by children caught misbehaving:
"Tommy made us do it."[14]

Now, some of what Henze says about political developments in
Ethiopia since 1991 may well be true, but how will the
reader distinguish the factual wheat from the rhetorical
chaff? Is the EPRDF as benign and well-intentioned, and the
opposition as uniformly mischievous and obtuse, as he
portrays them? More generally, has Henze provided a useful
framework for understanding governance in post-Mengistu
Ethiopia? From personal experience, I can vouch that he is
not a credible guide to the diverse attitudes of Ethiopian
political groups and the complex interplay between them and
the regime. Henze refers, for example, to meetings that have
taken place in many venues, including Paris and Atlanta, to
facilitate the participation of opposition groups in the
transitional process. All these efforts, he claims, resulted
in "strengthening the pervasive rejectionism" of the
opposition, "who voiced ever more provocative demands on the
government for coop-eration." I direct readers to the brief
report of one of these initiatives, which culminated in
meetings at the Carter Center in February 1994.[15] I can
attest that Henze's account is misleading as far as it
concerns what was revealed about the government and
opposition during that exercise.

             Defending the Democratic Terrain

The struggle for democracy will continue to be conducted on
the terrain of both thought and action. If language is
corrupted, however, thought and action can be paralyzed. In
essence, Henze asks his readers to reject the evidence
produced by several governments, the European Union, as well
as nongovernmental organizations and advocacy groups, that
belies his contention that democracy-building in Ethiopia
since 1991 has "succeeded to a remarkable degree."

In an Africa once again wracked by violence, conflict, and
crisis, the Ethiopian experience cries out for objective
analysis and assessment. In light of Richard Sklar's
reminder that all that is good in politics cannot be defined
as democratic, Ethiopia under EPRDF rule would be an ideal
subject for applying an analytical framework centered on the
reconfiguration of state power in a segmented society and
fissiparous polity.[16] Instead, Henze has decided to adopt
Newspeak as his mode of communication and to dismiss
governmental misconduct with bland phrases such as:
"Injustices have undoubtedly been done. In Ethiopia's
circumstances, these are inevitable."  Notwithstanding the
absence of a genuinely open electoral process, he contrasts
what he believes most Ethiopians and the Ethiopian
electorate really want with the demands of the opposition,
using argumentation curiously reminiscent of former colonial
authorities throughout Africa. I have tried, with
difficulty, to discern some positive value in the appearance
of his essay. Perhaps it will prompt another student of
contemporary Ethiopia to produce the "balance sheet" that
Henze promised. Another would be the jolt that such a
blatant attempt to reduce democracy-building to a
"protective sophism" might deliver to scholars of democracy
who are once again experiencing disenchantment regarding
Africa's democratic prospects.

Of particular relevance in this regard is the long struggle
over democracy-building and military domination in Nigeria.
General Ibrahim Babangida, who ruled from 1985 to 1993, was
a masterful practitioner of "democracy as deception." After
he annulled his last so-called attempt at a democratic
transition in June 1993, I wrote that "only creative artists
could convey the distortions introduced in the name of
democrat-ization" by his regime.[17] The five brutal years
of misrule by his successor, Sani Abacha, were accompanied
by a well-funded international effort to present Abacha's
military dictatorship as a regime seriously engaged in a
democratic transition. Several African leaders, senior
representatives of major corporate groups, and many American
political and church leaders were mobilized to this end.
This campaign enjoyed a certain degree of success despite
the mountain of damning evidence produced by human rights
groups, intrepid journalists, UN specialized agencies, and
the annual human rights reports of the U.S. Department of
State.

Abdoulaye Niandou Souley of Niger contends that "democratic
construction in Africa is now being conducted on the basis
of ambiguities and paradoxes."[18] He emphasizes how much
the timid reactions of Western governments to the violation
of democratic principles in African states have hurt the
democratic movement. These days, virtually any set of
authoritarian practices in Africa is being justified as
democracy-building and then used, according to Souley, to
protect and pry financial assistance from donor countries
and institutions.[19] All contemporary African regimes now
claim either to be democratic, or in transition to
democracy, just as, 20 years ago they all claimed to be
pursuing "development," "nation-building," and "political
integration."[20] Democracy, however, rests on open
deliberation and the free exchange of ideas. This center
must hold. Let the political contestants manipulate language
to glorify themselves and tar their opponents. A free and
informed electorate, when permitted to do so, will punish
them accordingly.  Scholars, however, must rise above this
partisan fray and analyze developments in ways that
strengthen rather than erode the very language they must
use.

By simply echoing the EPRDF's claims and denials, and adding
his own obfuscations, Henze has done a disservice to the
Ethiopian government, its people, and the community of
scholars and policy analysts. Since the fall of Mengistu's
brutal regime, Ethiopia has experienced renewal and recovery
in many areas. For the most part, however, the methods used
have not been democratic, although they have been so
proclaimed to satisfy the rock-bottom standards that the
donor community applies to "post-conflict" states in Africa.
Had Henze used Oldspeak, he could have provided us with many
important insights and a deeper understanding of a complex
project that has involved state-building along ethnic lines,
"directed democracy," and socio-economic development. But he
did not, and so this important subject still awaits a sober,
dispassionate, and nonpartisan analysis.

                     Notes

1. Adam Przeworski, "Democratization Revisited," Items 51
(March 1997): 6-11.

2. Africa Demos 2 (February 1992): 9.

3. Africa Demos 2 (August 1992): 8-9. According to
Przeworski, "the 'democratization' crowd has a new catchword
=2E.. 'quality of democracy.'" See his "Democratization
Revisited," Items 51 (March 1997): 9. Had the institutional
resources been available to implement the qdi five years
earlier, students of Africa would have been far ahead of the
"crowd."  Moreover, we might have helped limit the
increasingly arbitrary nature of contemporary assessments of
democracy-building.

4. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1949), 52.

5. Ibid., 75.

6. Ibid., 36.

7. W. Arthur Lewis, Politics in West Africa (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1965), 38.

8. Ibid., 89.

9. "Africa Demos: An Evaluation Essay," in Richard Joseph,
ed., African Democratic Perspectives: Evaluative Essays on
Africa Demos (Cambridge, Mass.:  African State and Democracy
Program, 1997), 15.

10. Celestin Monga, "La societe civile africaine est-elle
civilisee?" in D.C.  Bach, ed., Regionalisation,
mondialisation et fragmentation en Afrique subsaharienne
(Paris: editions Karthala, 1998), 108-109.

11. Marina Ottaway, "Africa's 'New Leaders': African
Solution or African Problem?" Current History 97 (May 1998):
210-11.

12. "Clinton Administration Policy and Human Rights in
Africa," Human Rights Watch Report 10 (March 1998): 10.

13. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, 53.

14. Henze's tendency to mystify rather than clarify is seen
in his discussion of the "tensions" and "crisis" between
Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998. A reader unaware that this
conflict actually deteriorated into fighting, bombing, and
strafing between the armies of these two countries would
never guess as much from his account.

15. "Carter Center Convenes Ethiopian Opposition Groups,"
Africa Demos 3 (September 1994): 14-15.

16. See my discussion in "Africa, 1990-1997: From Abertura
to Closure,"  Journal of Democracy 9 (April 1998): 3-17.
Also relevant are John W.  Harbeson, "Rethinking Democratic
Transitions: Lessons from Eastern and Southern Africa";
Goran Hyden, "Governance and the Reconstitution of Political
Order"; and Donald Rothchild, "Ethnic Insecurity, Peace
Agreements and State-Building," (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
Rienner, 1998).

17. Richard Joseph, "Africa's Diehard Autocracies," Africa
Demos 3 (July-August 1993): 1.

18. Abdoulaye Niandou Souley, "Paradoxes et ambiguites de la
democratisation,"  in Daniel C. Bach, ed., Regionalisation,
mondialisation et fragmentation en Afrique subsaharienne,
99. See also Crawford Young, " The Third Wave of
Contradictions," in State, Conflict, and Democracy in
Africa, 15-38.=20

19. Ibid., 98-99.

20. In retrospect, an important task performed by Africa
Demos during the first half of the 1990s was to reveal the
manipulations of language by authoritarian regimes; this was
often accomplished by simply publishing the remonstrations
of their representatives. There is an urgent need for that
exercise to be resumed in some manner, as the distortions
have steadily increased.

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