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Millersville University
<beepsie@att.net>
I would say that most historians have a concept of truth, we
might call it operational truth, that is revealed by the
process of interrogating witnesses, not usually living
people who can answer back, but the written witness, or the
traditions, or material objects they used, and from this
interrogation arriving at a synthesis of fact and
interpretation. The relative truth of different assemblies
of witnesses is determined by the completeness of the
assembly, the relative reliability of each witness, and the
logic of the act of assembly. In short, operational
historical truth is not unlike a legal inquest, whose
methods it follows closely, and hence the frequent
references to "detective work" in popular literature. What
relationship exists between our operational truth and real
truth is an epistemological question of considerable import,
which every historian should contemplate seriously every so
often, but it is not one that detains most of us for very
long, simply because so many epistemological issues are
unresolved in philosophy.
Historical debate and realignment sometimes come from
disputes about the relative strength or reliability of these
witnesses, and if one looks at historiographical change it
is more often achieved by the deployment of new witnesses
than anything else. Thus, if our truths are overturned, and
most of them probably will be in fifty years, it is more
likely to be from the discovery of new witnesses as from new
concepts of truth or the relative nature even of operational
truth. This is of course especially true in African
history, where we still have much basic spade work to do,
but even in well established fields one is constantly struck
that revisionism is accompanied by new sources and not just
rethinking old ones. There may come a time when historical
debate is primarily about equally well argued and witnessed
interpretations in which the primary difference is point of
view of historians or finer points of epistemology. But I
don't think that is common right now.
Point of view issues are usually about questions posed to
the witnesses, rather than answers received or the methods
used to assemble results. Thus, for example, an African
historian may be more interested in the problems of nation
building in the past than an American historian who is more
interested in the impact of the slave trade. The two need
not be hostile, nor would their results contradict each
other. And each might draw on the other's work. Both could
in fact produce accounts that were operationally true.
Similarly, a woman might ask different questions than a man,
or a person of working class origin different from someone
of middle class origins, and so on. But however point of
view is determined, the basic methods of achieving
operational truth are the same.
The historical method described above is not an invention of
the west, or of recent times. It can be found in virtually
all written traditions of history from China to India to
Africa and Europe, and even in non-literate cultures the
general principles are demonstrated by the use of its
methodology in judicial proceedings when facts about past
events and relationships need to be established. I believe
from my own experience that people using oral tradition also
use it, especially in period of contestation, as a means of
sorting out truth. One can often find the mode of argument
in, for example, inquests in colonial courts where
traditions were admitted in evidence and evaluated by
"traditional"methods.
I would say that where many mainstream historians quarrel
with Afro-centrists is over the incomplete or overly
partisan use of this method, rather than differences of
concepts of truth or disagreements about methods. It is not
a question of nationality, race, or other external factors,
nor either is it an issue of credentials, education and the
like. In fact, the revered Afro-centric historian Yusuf
ben-Jochanon, defending his own amateur status against
professional critics noted that anyone who reads primary
sources should be considered a historian. Ben-Jochanon
might be faulted on this point, but his own view on methods
is crystal clear. This was at the root of Mary Lefkowitz's
critique, which I felt was harsh not because of its
arrogance, but because she herself did not understand all
the evidence (especially that from Nile Valley archaeology
and texts), and because she chose "straw men" to attack in
a shifting array of potential targets. It was unfair to
attack Afro-centrists as a group in the way she did, but the
nature of her attack was right on target. In general, what
I have seen of Afro-centrists is that they agree on the
rules of the game, but think they are playing them better.
I recall noting once when hearing Ivan van Sertima speak,
his biggest complaint was that none of the mainstream
scholars would argue with him, and I think the greatest
respect we pay them is to debate with them, the greatest
disrespect is to say, "well, they have their truth and they
are entitled to it," or to feel sorry for them because they
lack "our" education, technology, etc. In fact, many have
PhDs, and many work as university professors (Asante, van
Sertima, Finch, etc). Others are graduate students who have
access to the whole range of material found in the
university system. They are prepared to debate and want to
win their argument in the court of opinion by scholars, and
those in the general public who understand the historians
concept of operational truth and are prepared to listen to
those who argue with its methods.
The argument of epistemological relativism, I believe, is
most often offered when its proponents perceive that they
have lost the larger battle over operational truth. It
tends to be deployed by "true believers" who are ultimately
not interested in giving up anything, and were not really
debating in any case. It is a second line of defense, along
with physically disrupting meetings by shouting, walking
out, or other diversions.
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