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From: Mike Yared <firstname.lastname@example.org> Subject: TOC: Military Review March-April 2010 Date: March 4, 2010 8:32:06 PM EST To: H-WAR H-WAR <email@example.com> http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/repository/MilitaryReview_201004300001-MD.xml?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed:+MilitaryReviewAnnouncements+(Military+Review+Announcements)&utm_content=Yahoo!+Mail 2 Unleashing Design: Planning and the Art of Battle CommandBrigadier General (P) Edward C. Cardon, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Steve Leonard, U.S. ArmyWith the publication of the most recent edition of Field Manual (FM) 5-0, The Operations Process, our doctrine is on the cusp of the most significant change in planning methodology in more than a generation. 13 Field Manual 5-0: Exercising Command and Control in an Eraof Persistent ConflictColonel Clinton J. Ancker, III, U.S. Army, Retired, and Lieutenant Colonel Michael Flynn, U.S. Army, RetiredFM 5-0 represents a significant evolution in Army doctrine for focusing on complex environments. 20 NetWar: Winning in the Cyberelectromagnetic Dimension of"Full Spectrum Operations"Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, U.S. Army, RetiredMilitary power today has a cyberelectromagnetic dimension. Just as other complex mission dimensions have their own logic and principles, so has this one. 33 The Maneuver Company in Afghanistan: EstablishingCounterinsurgency Priorities at the District LevelColonel Michael R. Fenzel, U.S. ArmyThe rural population in Afghanistan has rejected most large-scale reforms attempted by a central government. Now is the time to move to district level priorities. 45 Political Capital and Personal Interest: Understanding theEconomy of Power in Defeated CountriesLieutenant Colonel Erik Claessen, Jr., Belgian ArmyStability operations are an enigma. Success requires understanding the economy of power during an insurgency. 54 Interagency Command and Control at the Operational Level:A Challenge in Stability OperationsKevin D. Stringer, Ph.D.Success in stability operations requires interagency command structures and a more effective interagency culture. 63 Social Media and the ArmyChondra PerrySocial media tools that encourage interaction and quickly establish communication. The Army should embrace this revolution. 68 In Defense of After Action Reviews: The Art and Science ofSmall Unit CopingMajor Ronald J. Whalen, U.S. ArmyThe Army has two distinct interventions to help Soldiers exposed to combat trauma—the “after action review” and psychological debriefings. This bifurcated approach to unit-level coping is false and counterproductive. 77 The Quiet Enemy: Defeating Corruption and Organized CrimeBrock DahlThe military is the best resource for combating illicit activities that undermine counterinsurgency efforts. 86 Investing in Stability: The Need for Intelligence Preparation for EconomicOperationsJames E. Shircliffe, Jr.In operations other than war, force is a necessary but not a sufficient instrument for mission success. A comprehensive approach to the local population’s concerns and quality of life is vital to obtaining the political gains necessary to end an insurgency. 93 Language and Culture Training: Separate Paths?Jeff R. Watson, Ph.D.Each branch of the U.S. military has created special centers to promote intercultural effectiveness. Language proficiency must become a necessary component of such training. 98 The Marshall Approach: The Battle Command Training Program and21st-century Leader DevelopmentColonel Richard M. Cabrey, U.S. Army; Colonel Mark E. McKnight, U.S. Army; and Lieutenant Colonel David S. Cannon, U.S. ArmyWhere do you find the opportunity in today’s high tempo environment to build on existing education and develop an appreciation for the complexities of leadership at the next level of command and beyond? The Battle Command Training Program. 102 Design: How, Not WhyMajor Xander Bullock, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Vitor, U.S. ArmyCentral to the debate over design is the integration of its philosophy and capability into military command and control practices and Army culture. INSIGHTS:109 Lessons Learned from VietnamWilliam L. Stearman, Ph.D.Lessons learned from our Vietnam experience can help the Army in Afghanistan. However, the lessons may not be as obvious as people think. 117 Efficacy or Justice? Overturning the BanLieutenant Colonel Allen Bishop, U.S. Army, RetiredInstead of crunching the numbers and doing “measures of effectiveness,” we ought to be talking about justice. Mike Yaredmike_yared@hotmail.com ----- For subscription help, go to: http://www.h-net.org/lists/help/ To change your subscription settings, go to http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=h-war -----