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1. firstname.lastname@example.org 2. email@example.com 3. RollinsPC@aol.com -----Message from: firstname.lastname@example.org----- Just a comment from one participant in this discussion- I think that this is exactly the kind of give&take that serves everyone well in trying to examine a particular facet of History. There have been numerous contributions from different points of view, some of which I found very helpful and thought provoking. Of course, no super precise final analysis of the situation is likely to be possible, even different people in the NVA and VC leadership positions may have had differing ideas on what the expectations were for the Khe Sanh fight. However, there is little question that Giap hoped for support to the Tet offensive in the form of uprisings and a collapse of the ARVN that would tremendously advance the situation for Hanoi in one way or another. Certainly the fall of Khe Sanh would have been a great triumph for the NVA on the one hand, and certainly Khe Sanh's position was a hindrance to the free passage of forces into the South. How those two factors and others figured in Giap's thinking could only be determined, as some have inferred, by examination of Giap's writings, or a very direct interview. (Given his present advanced age, even what he might recall in such an interview would be subject to some question.) One bottom line is that the ability of the US forces to hold Khe Sanh and the tremendous losses inflicted on the NVA in that battle certainly were positive things from the viewpoint of the US and RVN. R J Del Vecchio email@example.com -----Message from: firstname.lastname@example.org----- The element discussed for the third stage to guerrilla war, as its conclusion, is exactly what the Communist counted upon for its 'political' victory in the S. Vietnam war. Anti-war protests and protestors, the anti-war political bipartisan opposition in the US Congress, gave both voice and division to US politics and policy. From these historical facts, US policy with Tet, turned away from any continued US support for S. Vietnam, by 1968. Johnson announced he would not seek re-election and the Democratic Party split wide open. The division remained thru much of the last 30 years to America's 20th Century and even today has effects upon possible Demo Party unifications outcomes, with possible re-splits. It demonstrated an instability in the coalition politics of American life. This brake on US policies can still be seen in various events. Wyatt Reader email@example.com -----Message from: RollinsPC@aol.com----- Khe Sanh was no Dien Bien Phu Those interested in this topic should view TELEVISION'S VIETNAM: THE IMPACT OF MEDIA (1986), available for purchase from aim.org (click on "aim store"). One third of this documentary is devoted to Khe Sanh, introducing interviews with "participants" from those on the front line to White House advisors. The battle is examined within the context of other major media stories from the Tet offensive of 1968. The same DVD has a lecture by me and various articles and reviews pertinent to the subject. It also carries an hour critique of the PBS series on Vietnam. These programs were quite controversial, but praised by John Corry of the New York Times. Peter Rollins _www.petercrollins.com_ (http://www.petercrollins.com) RollinsPC@aol.com ----- For subscription help, go to: http://www.h-net.org/lists/help/ To change your subscription settings, go to http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=h-war -----