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1. "Kuehn, John Dr CIV USA TRADOC" <email@example.com> 2. "Horky, Roger Karl" <firstname.lastname@example.org> 3. Tony Zbaraschuk <email@example.com> -----Message from: "Kuehn, John Dr CIV USA TRADOC" <firstname.lastname@example.org>----- Ed Drea's masterful _Japan's Imperial Army_ provides all the answers you need on this score. I cannot recommend it too highly for anyone really interested in understanding the IJA. A re-screening of the young Christian Bale in Spielberg's _Empire of the Sun_ also does a good job of "visualizing" the Japanese Army's approach to logistics. Vr, john John T. Kuehn, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Military History Curriculum Developer Department of Military History U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS "Kuehn, John Dr CIV USA TRADOC" <email@example.com> -----Message from: "Horky, Roger Karl" <firstname.lastname@example.org>----- Regarding the question about the supply of Japanese troops in China during the late 1930s.... The traditional narrative is that neither Japan nor the part of China Japan occupied was particularly well blessed with the sorts of resources needed to sustain a modern industrialized war--so the short answer to the question is that local supply was insufficient. The long answer is that this datum is the key to the entire Pacific War. To make up the shortfall, the Japanese began casting covetous eyes on the tin, oil, rubber, and other resources available in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies (modern-day Malaysia and Indonesia). Both were apparently ripe for the plucking; both were European colonies whose metropoles were distracted by the war in Europe. The problem for Japan was that the Philippines, an American responsibility, lay between Japan and the resources of Malaya and the NEI, and that the USA was NOT distracted. Any move south could be countered by the Americans, who had made it very clear that they disapproved of the China action. Thus the Japanese came up with the idea of neutralizing the American threat to their conquest of Malaya and the NEI by attacking the Philippines and Pearl Harbor at the same time they initiated their push south for the resources. Roger Horky PhD Student and Teaching Assistant History Department Texas A&M University College Station TX "Horky, Roger Karl" <email@example.com> -----Message from: Tony Zbaraschuk <firstname.lastname@example.org>----- > Wyatt Reader wrote: One final question and I do appreciate > all the replies given on this topic. Since it is reported the > Japanese had as many as 7 million troops ahores in Asia and > China, was there supply based entirely then, upon local > resources ? If so, or not, how was such a large overseas > force sustained ? Several things to note here. One, China was a fairly well-developed agricultural zone, so local food supplies would go a long way towards supporting troops in place (e.g. the "rice offensives" of the 1940s which were basically large-scale raids devoted to collecting the Chinese rice harvest for Japanese use). Two, China is _very close_ to Japan. One freighter going between (say) Nagasaki and Tsingtao or Dairen could make several round trips in the same time it would take to sail to Rabaul or Tarawa or Singapore, so you could support more troops with the same shipping tonnage. It's _really_ important to remember the comment in Alanbrooke's diaries that _nobody_ who hadn't wrestled with shipping allocations could ever understand just how important the availability of ships was as a limiting factor on everything the Allies did -- and that applies in spades to Japan's maritime empire, with huge distances and far fewer ships than Britain and the US. > What I'm really getting towards here is the lack of planning > for an invasion of the US directly with Hawaii as the > stepping stone, given the distances involved and proximity of > China to Japan. There was a certain amount of civilian panic after Pearl Harbor, but (frankly) the idea of Japan making any sort of a landing on the continental US, much less a landing of a size not to be defeated in short order by the relatively large forces in the continental US and movable to any theater of operations by rail, borders on fantasy. > Natural geography seems to play a large role in the overall > military decision making. Oh, my, hugely and all-importantly and totally so. Tony Z Tony Zbaraschuk <email@example.com> ----- For subscription help, go to: http://www.h-net.org/lists/help/ To change your subscription settings, go to http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=h-war -----