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Here are excerpts from an unofficial "think piece" that may stimulate some discussion (written before the start of this latest conflict). LtCol. Phillip Ridderhof USMC 1. Shock in Modern Warfare. The operational plan for attacking Iraq has recently been described as employing "shock and awe." This term is derived from Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance by Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade (National Defense University Press, 1996). This short report will examine the greater phenomenon of shock in conflict. 2. Shock. There is no specific military definition of shock. The American Heritage Dictionary (3rd edition) defines shock as "...something that jars the mind or emotions as if with a violent, unexpected blow; the disturbance of function, equilibrium, or mental faculties caused by such a blow ...." Applied in a military or conflict context, shock results in the paralysis of the enemy-rather than having his combat power physically destroyed, he is unable to use it due to a collapse of will, confusion and/or degradation of his command and control capabilities. Shock is characterized by the following: * Surprise. Suddenness is a key element of shock due to the emphasis on psychological effects. If an enemy expects a blow and is generally able to predict the impact it will have on his forces, he may not be able to prevent the physical effects, but he will be better mentally prepared to deal with the them. It is the unexpected nature of a blow that will result in shock, as opposed to attrition or weakening of will. U.S. military power is known to be overwhelming. The U.S. has demonstrated its ability to disable communications networks, sensors, and power grids, and to find and destroy a large amount of fixed, and to a lesser degree, mobile military targets. Future adversaries will expect that their military forces will be greatly attritted and that their command and control infrastructure will be severely disrupted. Thus, those actions will not be a surprise and will not necessarily induce the psychological elements of shock that are desired. That is not to say that those attacks will not have great positive effects for the furtherance of our campaign, but they may not have as debilitating an impact as intended. * Helplessness. Physical destruction accomplished in a shock action is done to rapidly induce a sense of helplessness in the enemy: communications are severed so that the enemy cannot pass information; key combat units are destroyed outright to demonstrate the dominance of friendly forces. Isolation and group panic are two competing elements that must be considered in any plan that intends to shock the enemy. While cutting enemy forces off from each other assists in producing a sense of isolation in the individual units, thus promoting helplessness, this same isolation may mean that shock in one unit may not transmit to other units. Historically, the true fruits of shock have been realized when units out of contact and relatively unaffected physically by the conflict become aware of the disasters befalling around them; these units fall apart without any real effort. An effective shock action actually directly and physically influences only a small proportion of the enemy's forces-the overall collapse is caused by the indirect psychological effect on the rest of the force. If an attack is too effective in cutting the enemy into isolated elements, and he is mentally prepared for this eventuality, then the ability to paralyze and collapse his whole system may actually be reduced. * Perishable. While the length of time will vary, shock will wear off as the enemy adapts to the situation. The only way to prevent this diminishment is to continue employing new actions that further shock the enemy. It is important to discriminate between those actions that create new shocks and those actions that capitalize on the initial shock by further attriting, or weakening the enemy. The former maintains the element of surprise and while the latter will have desired effects, the enemy, to some degree, will be mentally fortifying himself to withstand these blows. An offensive that focuses on capitalizing on the initial shock action will reap rewards, but these returns will diminish over time. However, an offensive that continues to apply actions that further shock the enemy will cause a substantial cascading effect on the enemy's will to resist. Any course of action that seeks to shock the enemy will only be effective for a limited amount of time. The challenge is to continually reinvent the approach in order to produce the persistent surprise that will maintain the paralysis induced by the initial shock. The alternative is to ensure friendly forces have the capabilities to rapidly capitalize on the initial conditions of shock in order to achieve campaign goals-forces to occupy key objectives, firepower to attrit/destroy enemy forces that resist, etc.-before the effects of the shock wear off and the enemy adapts and is able to effectively counter succeeding actions. Enemy counters will most likely include resorting to asymmetric measures: a failed conventional defense will mutate into more effective guerilla warfare if friendly forces are not prepared either to physically control enemy forces as they surrender or to control the ensuing chaos as civil order crumbles. 3. Conclusion. U.S. forces should always strive to achieve shock in its operations, but it should be realistic in assessing its ability to do so. Plans must take into account the possibility that systemic shock will not be induced on the enemy. The U.S. must also realize that its warfighting concepts are well known to our adversaries and thus its ability, over the long term, to produce surprise, will diminish. Shock is a two-way street; U.S. forces may also be susceptible to shock. * Increasing reliance on "information superiority" means that if it is not attained, U.S. forces will be surprised, and may suffer from shock. If friendly forces expect chaos, and are mentally prepared to operate within it, then they will be resistant to the shock effects of battlefield surprise. * Increasing connectivity means that not only will more elements be able to view the positive aspects of battle, they will also see more of the negative. Panic may actually be able to travel more quickly throughout the force due to a superior technological network. (Major Robert Bateman USA develops this idea more fully in his essay "Pandora's Box" in the book Digital War). * Emphasis on stand-off precision fires threatens to make U.S. forces less mentally prepared for close combat. If forces do not feel competent in close combat situations, with their emphasis on organic line of sight small arms and interpersonal violence, then they may suffer from shock when these situations are thrust upon them. An aggressive and well-trained force that is prepared for battle at any range will counter this type of shock, and will likely turn the tables on the enemy. Phillip J Ridderhof
 Humanities & Social Sciences Online 
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