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[mailto:email@example.com] Sent: Monday, September 10, 2012 11:54 AM Subject: REPLY: ARTICLE: FP: "A Classified CIA Mea Culpa on Iraq" Bob Mackey correctly notes that Iraqi denial & deception (D&D) on the nuclear issue had a significant impact on IC judgements, even though it's clear that Saddam's D&D efforts were aimed at Iran, not primarily the US and the West. Scholarship has yet to fully unravel this difficult issue, which may never be understood in all details, since it's so complicated and, as the IPP makes clear, the regime was itself confused about who had what, WMD-wise, even at a very high level in the military. In the run-up to OIF, 2002-03, I headed an interagency intelligence task force which looked at the Iraqi military and we, too, were fooled. All evidence seemed to point in the direction of Iraq having WMDs - that's how D&D is supposed to work. And in the Dick Cheney 1% threat doctrine world of 2002-03, that led to only one possible conclusion, even though, with hindsight, much of the evidence cited was incomplete at best. I later was the author/editor of NSA's official study of OIF (2002-04) and although that study remains classified, I can attest that I never saw any evidence of intentional misuse of incomplete intelligence - we really believed Iraq had some sort of WMDs, as did many of Saddam's own generals. The embarrassing part came later ... John R. Schindler Professor, National Security Affairs U.S. Naval War College On Mon, Sep 10, 2012 at 1:19 PM, Steven Wagner <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote: ------------------------ From: Mark Stout [mailto:email@example.com] Sent: Monday, September 10, 2012 8:56 AM Subject: REPLY: ARTICLE: FP: "A Classified CIA Mea Culpa on Iraq" For those not already aware, Dr. Thomas Boghardt, presently at the US Army's Center of Military History and previously the Historian at the International Spy Museum (a position I presently hold), has a book coming out next month on the Zimmermann Telegram. It is entitled "The Zimmermann Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America's Entry into World War I," and it is published by the Naval Institute Press. Mark Stout Washington, DC ________________________________________ From: H-Net Network on Intelligence History and Studies [H-INTEL@H-NET.MSU.EDU] on behalf of Steven Wagner [swag@SHAW.CA] Sent: Sunday, September 09, 2012 12:39 PM To: H-INTEL@H-NET.MSU.EDU Subject: REPLY: ARTICLE: FP: "A Classified CIA Mea Culpa on Iraq" From: "Mark Baillie" <firstname.lastname@example.org> Subject: RE: REPLY: ARTICLE: FP: "A Classified CIA Mea Culpa on Iraq" Sent: Saturday, September 8, 2012 5:16:19 PM I should apologise to the list for raising a hare, on which Professor Jackson is right to cry hurroo, when making the point that it was the US Administration's determination to create the excuse of WMD that caused the invasion of Iraq, not necessarily any major failure of intelligence (where doubters were brushed aside anyway). Without wishing to start a Wilson strand, I accept Professor Jackson must be right about other factors in Wilson's decision to join WWI, although I had understood that Wilson (and many colleagues) wanted to stay out and that it was the German decision, revealed in the Zimmerman telegram, to attack US shipping heading for Britain that tipped it (but perhaps I rely too heavily on Barbara Tuchman as the first historian to study the affair); as it was secret, the torpedoing of the Lusitania had to be the overt reason given. My point on the issue at hand, not properly articulated, was to compare the utter unquestioning trust of the British intercept of that telegram, without corroboration, when the political relationship was not particularly good and Britain would have had all to gain from fabrication. That trust and trustworthiness became the enduring intelligence alliance and my point was that I believe that the dodgy dossier was the first breach of that trust. Although one might argue that the dodgy dossier involved political collusion on both sides (and breaches of trust with both their legislatures and electorates) and was not a direct lie from British intelligence to the US authorities or intelligence services, nonetheless it was a lie provided by Britain that served to hoodwink American citizens (and I am not trying to raise another hare concerning British covert propaganda, but probably not direct lies, in the USA with the collusion of FDR, to get America into WWII - really I am not!). Back to the main topic and a very detailed analysis of the US decisions and intelligence on Iraq that has been brought to my attention: Pfiffner, James P. & Phythian, Mark, eds. (2008): Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives (UK: Manchester University Press), pp. 213-232, Chapter Twelve, Decision Making, Intelligence, and the Iraq War, by Professor James P. Pfiffner Mark Baillie PhD Candidate King's College, London, War Studies Dept. KCL Email: email@example.com ________________________________________ From: H-Net Network on Intelligence History and Studies [H-INTEL@H-NET.MSU.EDU] on behalf of Steven Wagner [swag@SHAW.CA] Sent: 08 September 2012 22:35 To: H-INTEL@H-NET.MSU.EDU Subject: REPLY: ARTICLE: FP: "A Classified CIA Mea Culpa on Iraq" From: Peter Jackson [mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org] Sent: Saturday, September 08, 2012 10:08 AM Subject: Re: REPLY: ARTICLE: FP: "A Classified CIA Mea Culpa on Iraq" I agree that the most egregious errors in the intelligence process when it came to Iraq were at the levels of collection and decision (and in particular the decision to go public with assessments that were more qualified than they were made to appear). But I am puzzled by the assertion that the Zimmerman Telegramme was an important cause of US entry into the First World War. It was much more a pretext than a cause. Nor was Woodrow Wilson particularly anti-British. Indeed his final plan for a League of Nations was influenced heavily by British conceptions. Peter Jackson John Anderson Professor of International History HaSS University of Strathclyde Glasgow G1 1QX UK On 08/09/2012 16:48, "Steven Wagner" <swag@SHAW.CA<mailto:swag@SHAW.CA>> wrote: From: "Mark Baillie" <email@example.com<mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org>> Subject: RE: ARTICLE: FP: "A Classified CIA Mea Culpa on Iraq" Sent: Saturday, September 8, 2012 8:54:47 AM To be fair, this shows that Iraq did indeed hide nuclear, chemical and biological material or equipment in the 90s, destroyed in secret anything detected and behaved in a manner as to arouse great suspicion among inspectors. The intelligence 'errors' were questions of interpretation and a severe lack of agents in place (compounded by the fact that even many senior Iraqis did not know what was actually going on). On the other hand, it is arguably more important that the US Administration's determination to believe in the WMD programme was justified publicly on the basis of Blair's 'dodgy dossier', which was almost immediately shown to be a fabrication (and the intelligence fabricator Curveball, Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi), quoted by Secretary of State Colin Powell to the UN as a justification for invasion. This compares ironically with the Zimmerman telegram, a real signal interception provided by British intelligence, that made the pacifist, isolationist, anti-British President Wilson enter WWI. Mark Baillie PhD Candidate King's College, London, War Studies Dept. KCL Email: email@example.com<mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org> Mob: 07785 990 390 Skype: MarkBaillie1 (direct to mobile, free) ________________________________________ From: H-Net Network on Intelligence History and Studies [H-INTEL@H-NET.MSU.EDU<mailto:H-INTEL@H-NET.MSU.EDU>] on behalf of Steven Wagner [swag@SHAW.CA<mailto:swag@SHAW.CA>] Sent: 08 September 2012 14:45 To: H-INTEL@H-NET.MSU.EDU<mailto:H-INTEL@H-NET.MSU.EDU> Subject: ARTICLE: FP: "A Classified CIA Mea Culpa on Iraq" From: "Arno H.P. Reuser" <email@example.com<mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org>> Subject: FP: "A Classified CIA Mea Culpa on Iraq" Sent: Saturday, September 8, 2012 2:43:27 AM "In this exclusive from the National Security Archive, a secret agency report on its WMD failures is published for the first time. BY TOM BLANTON | SEPTEMBER 5, 2012 This remarkable CIA mea culpa, just declassified this summer and published here for the first time, describes the U.S. intelligence failure on Iraq's non-existent weapons of mass destruction as the consequence of "analytic liabilities" and predispositions that kept analysts from seeing the issue "through an Iraqi prism." The key findings presented in the first page-and-a-half (the only part most policymakers would read) are released almost in full, while the body of the document looks more like Swiss cheese from the many redactions of codewords, sources, and intelligence reports that remain classified even today, seven years after the Iraq" http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/a_classified_CIA_mea_culpa_ <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/a_classified_CIA_mea_culpa _on_iraq%20> on_iraq%20 -- Arno H.P. 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