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To: <haynes@MAIL.H-NET.MSU.EDU> Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2005 7:54 AM Subject: Gorsky List Symposium urgent posting from Svetlana FROM: Svetlana Chervonnaya Subject: KI briefing from the Russian side Written: 17 March, 2005, 3.55 pm Moscow time <The point here is that at the time Gorsky wrote this memo Soviet intelligence organization was in flux. To impose on this era the strict separation of KGB from GRU of the high Cold War is anachronistic.> -- At the time Gorsky allegedly wrote the memo currently under discussion (December, 1948) both branches of Soviet intelligence had indeed still been under the organizational umbrellar of the Committee of Information of the Counsel of Ministers of the USSR (hereinafter KI) organized following May 30, 1947 official decision with the expressed purpose of [quote] "upgrading coordination of different intelligence services and concentrating their efforts on major directions". There was one more goal - although not expressed in the official decision: to put both branches of intelligence under the direct control of Stalin's top leadership. To better understand this point - obviously puzzling for a non-native historian - one has to keep in mind that prior to KI, there was a longer 'chain of command' with 1) NKVD-MGB intelligence (First Directorate) directly reporting to NKVD-MGB leadership, which would next report to the country's chief leadership (Stalin including), and 2) Razvedupr-GRU first reporting to the General Staff - that would next report to the People's Commissar of Defense - who would next report to Stalin. (with Razvedupr's reporting chain more direct, it was one the points of creating KI to shorten chain of reporting for MGB intelligence). KI did make this chain more direct. Initially KI was headed by V. Molotov, at that time Deputy Chairman of the Counsel of Ministers of the USSR. Molotov was assigned 3 deputies - one for MGB intelligence(Peter Fedotov), one for military intelligence (Fedor Kuznetsov) and the third (Yakov Malik) for Foreign Ministry's information (Soviet Foreign Ministry had never had its own intelligence division similar to U.S.Department of State's). Another novelty was assigning so called 'chief rezidents' to the main target countries with the manifest goal of ensuring tightening control of the country's leadership over field operations - and direct reporting to country's top leadership (thus in the US such 'chief rezident' would be Ambassador Paniushkin - with his direct links to the Central Party Committee - where he, in fact, came from). However, the integration was meant only at the very top - and was never translated into any encroachments on the 2 services' rigid compartmentalization - and separate operations. It goes without saying that all the hierarchy of the 2 services was preserved - without any cross-over. Neither was there any physical integrations: while foreign intelligence moved out into new premises in Rostokino (former Komintern HQ building), military intelligence stayed back in their Znamenka Str. downtown General HQ building. Both archives stayed behind with each service - tightly closed for any 'neigbor' eye. (NB: even within OGPU-NKVD-MVD-KGB, its foreign intelligence archive had ALWAYS been off-limits to other Directorates with any query taken to OGPU-NKVD-MVD-KGB's top leadership!) Just to finish with KI-period compartmentalization: even today only small part of KI's archive (so called 'regular KI files') rests at AVPR (Russian Foreign Ministry's Archive) with the bulk (so called 'big KI files') still split between SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service) and GRU - reflecting the real life situation at the time of KI existence. Hence, there is no historical basis to interpret the alleged list's December, 1948 dating as suggesting any changes in the established Soviet intelligence information gathering and exchange procedures - which in all operational matters remained as compartmentalized as before or soon afterwards. For a foreign intelligence Moscow middle-level operative like Anatoly Gorsky was in 1948, obtaining real names and operational code names of military 'neigbors' assets would have taken a long and excrutiationg process: First, the decision to query 'sister service' should have originated at the very top of his own service; Then it would have to be approved by Molotov's 'foreign intelligence service' deputy (Fedotov) who would approach the KI head (Molotov) - who would further approach his 'military deputy' (Kuznetsov) - who would in turn put a query through his service's hierarchical line. In case of any positive response, the information would then travel back through same stages - and would be treated as TOP SECRET CREAM. In this connection, there is another thing that should alert any discerning historian to the need of caution: according to A. Vassiliev, he discovered the alleged 'list' in the so called 'general correspondence' file - with a rather broad access within the service (such files can be queried and obtained on a level of division and section's heads). These types of files would not contain such sensitive information as lists and code names of several chains of still vulnerable sources. (same practice exists in CIA and all other similar services) Such lists evidently belong to another - much more restricted - type of file! Additional briefing on 1930s compartmentalization doubts. Compartmentalization breach was, indeed, a very brief - and limited in scope - period in mid-1933-mid 1934 and was restricted to particular circumstances of 'illegal' operations in the U.S. (explaining that situation in detail would take another format) by Valentin Markin. The 'legal' operations (that's operations under diplomatic, Amtorg and TASS coveres) remained as compartmentalized as ever - with different station chiefs (P. Gutzeit for OGPU and Klein-Burzin for the military, to name just a few.) Soonafter V. Markin's sudden death (August 1934?) there was an official decision to once again compartmentalize the 'illegal' operation - resulting in dispatching to the U.S. of Boris Bazarov (aka Shpak, code name NORD) as an 'illegal' OGPU station chief - to overtake the OGPU part of Markin's nascent network. Theproper people on the military line (too many for this format) took over theirs. After 1938 purges military sources would, indeed, be frozen - for the Soviets, with at least some of them continuing as CP USA so called 'informational line' (this term should not be automatically equaled to intelligence work, since it had broader implications). Soonafter 22 June, 1941 Earl Browder put some of the former military sources in contact with Jacob Golos (thus Elizabeth Bentley's implication). It's too complicated a story foe email format! By the way, Hede Gumpertz/Massing group originated not on the Markin's line, but on the OGPU 'legal' Peter Gutzeit's line (it goes without saying that I am fully aware of all her military intelligence associations prior to her work in US). With Bazarov's arrival her small group made a nuclei for future Bazarov - Akhmerov now almost official 'glorious 7' (my own feeling there were more than 7.) Coming back to my first posting, I'd like again to call my esteemed American colleagues to utmost caution in dealing with a manifestly third-hand source - as the discussed list evidently is - and before discussing any particular 'name' implications, first take time to subject this source to the due process of what the Imperial Russian historical school called in French 'source's critique' - e.g.: 1)establishing beyond reasonable doubt the origin of the source, 2) establishing beyond reasonable doubt its authenticity -in this case it takes Vassiliev's producing his original electronic file - and establishing through its 'properties', first, if the original file had ever been amended, and in case not, second, if the hand-written notes correspond to the original electronic file. Until this dull initial work is not completed, I see no further value in any further discussion of this unestablished source in question - in view of all its manifest inconsistencies. As a long-time 'espionage historian' I would be more than happy joining the most interesting discussion and guess game of 'who was - who was not' - and might have contributed into it some of my own -- provided the authenticity of the source were established beyond reasonable doubt. Svetlana Chervonnaya, Ph.D., Hist. Free-lance researcher, writer, translator, TV documentary producer