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I have been following the debate surrounding Gary Bruce's review of Andrew Port's book with great interest. I very much agree with Mary Fulbrook that we need "reasoned and well-researched arguments rooted in sources." However, it should be said that the conclusions that historians draw regarding the relationship between society and state under Communism seem to depend a good deal upon the sorts of sources they use, chronological scope, and the kinds of questions asked. Those studies that use sources that illuminate history from below tend to emphasize the normality of life under Communism and the ability of the socialist system to mobilize the support of the populace. By contrast, sources that focus on the Stasi, SED and other centers of power tend to convey to a much greater degree the repressive nature of the system. The logical way out of this conundrum is to use as many different types of sources as are available. Stasi files reveal things about power relations that other sources do not. As Reinhard Buthmann has shown, cooperation with the secret police greatly magnified the power of managers over their underlings. In my work, I discuss cases of industrial scientists who appeared to possess a considerable degree of professional autonomy (or so enterprise documents would lead one to believe), but who are revealed in Stasi files to have been fighting a losing battle against the repressive machinations of the Stasi. It is also the case that any study that omits the Honecker era is bound to emphasize the degree of autonomy and dynamism of GDR society a good deal more than one that includes the years 1971-1989. Documents from the 1950's convey a grassroots enthusiasm with socialism and a sincere desire among Communists to convert non-socialists to their ideology. In the pre-Berlin Wall era, the SED had to rely more on persuasion than on coercion because its population could leave for West Germany. After 1961, the use of direct coercion increased. SED and Stasi control over society increased exponentially in the Honecker era. Opportunism and careerism were on the rise, and the conversation with non-socialists all but disappeared. The choice of subject also has a tremendous impact on the results. Attempts to put utopian aspects of the socialist program into practice genuinely resonated with the public in some cases. It's fine to study these cases. However, let's not just look for socialism where we would like to find it, but in other places as well. I have found that the SED thought of technology as central to socialism, and tried to use enthusiasm for technology to mobilize society. Too little attention has been paid to this aspect of socialism because it seems so alien to us, and because technocratic thinking had a detrimental impact on society in various ways. (For example, the SED's pro-high-tech bias led them to neglect consumer industry in favor of high-tech industry.) Am I arguing that all scholars must approach GDR society in the same way? Absolutely not. There is room in our field both for scholars more interested in the participation of the population in the building of socialism and for scholars more interested in the repressive aspects of the system. However, in recent years the scales seem to have tipped more in the direction of studies that cherry-pick attractive aspects of socialism. What is needed is a more balanced, more comprehensive view of the GDR. Now I would like to turn to Mary Fulbrook's argument that it is contradictory to accept findings that demonstrate the popularity of Nazi rule in Germany, while rejecting or criticizing such findings for the GDR. First, the popularity of Nazi rule has been questioned by some. Robert Gellately, for example, is not without his critics (the most serious of whom are as dedicated to empirical evidence as he is). Second, GDR history is a far more immature field than is the history of Nazi Germany. In the vastness of the GDR archives, what is important is still very much contested. My own perception is that evidence of repression is being downplayed. Third, the meaning of popularity of the Nazi and GDR regimes is very different. It should be clear to all that German supporters of the Nazi regime were accomplices to unspeakable crimes. By contrast, support for GDR-style socialism appears to many to be very understandable and possibly praiseworthy. If only a few were hurt by the SED regime, leaving the majority of the population to live their lives in tranquility, what does that mean? The GDR is in no way comparable to Nazi Germany. The system of repression worked in an entirely different way, using psychological insight and pervasive surveillance to maintain conformity. Modern, i.e., generally non-violent, means were employed. However, the GDR was a dictatorship, comparable, perhaps, to Franco's Spain or Pinochet's Chile. (After an initial phase of violent repression, these dictatorships settled into a phase in which order could be maintained with little overt violence.) I for one would not want to downplay persecution of small minorities under either of those regimes, or in the GDR. In the GDR, the SED and the Stasi gave paramount attention to controlling elites. Those further down the hierarchy risked having their lives taken away from them only if they engaged in oppositional activities. Did the average East German flee into domestic niches or "sex and alcohol" (as one East German friend once told me)? Were the masses content to live without freedom? These questions are very disquieting because they are relevant to all modern societies, including our own. My own perception is that there was a very strong undercurrent of discontent in the GDR that does not always come out in the documents. An intense comparison of different kinds of sources could tease it out. Moreover, whatever the day-to-day behavior of average East Germans, the oppression of elites did have an impact down below. Professional life was transformed by security regulations, de-professionalization due to overproduction of university graduates, and decay of factories. Port's book is a valuable contribution, but now we have to push off to new shores. Dolores L. Augustine St. John's University, Queens, NY
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