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Report: German Studies Association 2002 Session Nr. 59a, Liberalism, Bismarck, and Gender Moderator: Harry Ritter, Western Washington University "Kaiserin Friedrich - Deutschlands liberale Alternative zu Otto von Bismarck? or: The Life of an Uncommon Woman in Imperial Germany" Michael Epkenhans, Otto-von-Bismarck-Stiftung "German Liberals, the Well-Ordered Public, and the Patriarchal Nation, 1860-1920" Geoff Eley, University of Michigan "Kulturkampf und Geschlechterkampf: Liberalism, Anti-Catholicism and Misogyny in the nineteenth Century" Michael Gross, East Carolina University Commentator: Harry Ritter, Western Washington University The session was well-attended despite being moved at the last minute from Saturday morning to Friday afternoon. Dr. Epkenhans's paper was a review of current research on the relationship between the Kaiserin Friedrich and Bismarck, situated in a summary of German liberalism's shortcomings in the 1870s and 1880s. The Kaiserin wanted an English-style parliamentary monarchy in Germany, but she had no real power or popularity, and had much less influence over her husband than used to be thought. Her husband wanted constitutional monarchy but no more than that, and the Kaiserin exaggerated the nature of his liberalism after he died. Few liberals of the Kulturkampf generation really wanted the English-style government of parties that the Kaiserin imagined. Like Friedrich III, many were satisfied, at least for the time being, with a regime that upheld the rule of law and defended the constitution as a binding agreement between the king and the people. Going further, to a government of prime ministers, parties, and parliamentary majorities, would risk loss of control. Unable to out-fox Bismarck, Kulturkampf-generation liberal leaders imagined the White Revolutionary as an instrument of historical reason to build the power-state they would some day inherit to fine-tune their utopia of social order, fiscal responsibility, and passive and active citizenship. Overall, Epkenhans seemed to agree with Karina Urbach's characterization of Lord Odo Russell's view: "a transfer of political values [from England to Germany] was not possible. He learnt to accept that a German Liberal had after all few things in common with a British one, and that not even Crown Prince Friedrich would be capable of changing the tide and liberalizing Germany because of the fear of enemies--whether real or imagined." Michael Gross's paper analyzed one aspect of this real or imagined anxiety: misogyny. Gross argued that the Kulturkampf's emotional intensity can be largely explained by the liberal imagination's conflation of hostility to women and anti-Catholicism. Both Catholicism and women's emergence in the public sphere seemed to threaten liberalism, at the precise moment of its imagined triumph in the early 1870s. Gross suggested that mistrust of women was even more fundamental to liberals' sense of threatened achievement than religion, arguing that the "chest-thumping" language of liberal spokesmen provides plenty of evidence. Appeals to "manliness" were ubiquitous in liberal discourse, but the opposite side of such rhetoric was an idiom of a feminized Catholicism. The language of Johann Bluntschli--pitting the emotionalism of women and Romanism against virile reason--was an exaggerated but not unrepresentative case. Liberalism for Bluntschli was "a young man, who...steps forward into life fully aware of his strength and self-confidence." In contrast, the Catholic Church used "her feminine wiles to exploit man to her advantage." "At the center of liberal anti-Catholicism," Gross claimed, "was not religion but biology." "...from the perspective of the gendered discourse of Catholicism and liberalism," he asserted, the conflict between liberals and the Catholic Church takes on the dimensions of a more fundamental contest between men and women for access to the public." Catholicism had become a venue for women's special emergence outside the home in the mid-19th-century, with the growth of new female religious congregations, the emergence of women as teachers, nurses, welfare workers and so on, so the connection was not hard to make. "At the level of social-sexual ideology," Gross argued, "the incessant invocation of masculinity in the face of Catholicism served to define the public space as exclusively male." Seen from this angle, he concluded, "the Kulturkampf was a complex attempt during a period of dramatic pressures for change to preserve the distinction between gender specific public and private spaces. Exploring the Kulturkampf as a contest between men and women for access to the public allows for a different evaluation of the origins and meaning of liberal anti-Catholicism." There was considerable overlap between the Gross and Eley papers. Both saw the Kulturkampf as a defining moment in the history of liberal behavior, even though it eventually failed. Like Gross, Geoff Eley wanted to understand the "triumph and tribulations of an extremely self-confident and ambitious liberalism," particularly the "gendered dimensions of German liberalism." His paper brought wide reading in the literature of German women's history to bear on liberal state-building. In this context, the Kulturkampf was part of a broader "drive for cultural uniformity" undertaken between roughly 1861 and 1879, when liberals were able to shape legality according to a patriarchal sensibility born in the late 18th century and early 19th centuries. The language of politics and identity were strongly gendered in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars onward, when public languages were "hard-wired" around a binary "axis of manliness and domesticity." Following the arguments of Karen Hagemann, Eley thought the "martial determinants of the nationalist founding moment [i.e., the wars of anti-French liberation] preempted more generous and optimistic justifications drawn from either the Enlightenment, the ideals of civil society, [or] the welfarist governmentality of the later eighteenth century...." But he nonetheless believed that as late as the 1860s, amidst debates over what specific sort of legal framework the liberal Rechtsstaat should be, the nature of citizenship--including citizenship for women--was still "up for grabs." Women participated in the public sphere in notable ways, such as patriotic auxiliary work in the 1866 and 1870 wars and the founding of the Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein in 1865. But "just as liberal connections to organized labor became severed...via deliberate and disdainful exclusion" at this point, so in the early 1870s did "anything resembling acceptance of women's political rights." Like Gross, Eley believed that "the Kulturkampf played a vital part in managing and shaping that process of exclusion." The anti-Catholic crusade was part of a "broader offensive to shape the public values of the new state according to a vision of a "well-ordered public and patriarchal nation." Protestant and liberal women were allotted a niche role in this vision as "the bearers of a rational and progressive domesticity." They were to be "the supporting players for the patriarchal citizenry of the new liberalizing state." Thus "the potential claims of German women to even a modified form of civic recognition became contained." Since there was so little liberal advocacy for women's rights in a public as opposed to private sense, it is not surprising that German feminists directed their efforts toward the social sphere rather than toward efforts to win voting and other civil rights. According to Eley, this supports Ann Taylor Allen's "progressivist reading of maternalist feminism in the specifically German context of the later nineteenth century." The commentator thanked the panelists for their stimulating papers. At the same time, he noted that the presenters all tended to follow the traditional path of viewing the German liberal glass as more half-empty than half-full. In contrast, he noted that a number of studies from the 1980s and 1990s--sometimes revolving around such ideas as political culture and civil society rather than liberalism per se--have contributed to a more differentiated and in some cases even sympathetic sense of Central European liberalism's past predicaments and achievements. Still, there is plenty of reason to bewail the blinkered vision of Kulturkampf generation liberals, and the three papers all enriched our understanding of why. Since the Kulturkampf was centered in Prussia, however, he wondered if it would be prudent to explore other German regions and states for possible differences and similarities--especially when it is a question of conflating misogyny and anti-Catholicism. Gross's analysis of the masculinity trope made an especially valuable contribution to knowledge of the way leading liberal minds worked in the 1870s. Still, had the case had been made that misogyny was even more fundamental than religion in the Kulturkampf? Was it not one ingredient among many? Moreover, by leaving unmentioned the genuinely progressivist heritage of the manly trope (i.e., as Enlightenment code language that pitted self-reliant autonomy against supine deference to princely patriarchy), Gross left a partial picture of that tradition of usage. Moreover, why single out the liberals for distrust of women? Wasn't it normal among men (and many women) across ideological, religious, and national boundaries in the 19th century? This question was reiterated in various forms in the vigorous general discussion that ensued, continuing until to end of the session's allotted time. Gross's strong version of the case for the connection between misogyny and anti-Catholicism was a point of special interest. What about Catholic misogyny? Was it qualitatively different from Protestant misogyny? Gross acknowledged that misogyny was widespread across sectarian lines, but stressed that what interested him was the specific political and social uses that liberal Protestants put it to in Prussia. When the session broke up at 4:30 p. m., the moderator could remember few other GSA panels with such a lively and useful interchange of ideas. Harry Ritter Western Washington University For a complete listing of all sessions at the 2002 German Studies Association Conference, please visit <http://www.g-s-a.org>.
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