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H-Diplo Article Reviews
http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/
No. 391
Published on 21 March 2013
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H-Diplo Article Review Editors:  Thomas Maddux and Diane N. Labrosse
Web and Production Editor: George Fujii

Commissioned for H-Diplo by Diane Labrosse
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Simon Stevens.  "'From the Viewpoint of a Southern Governor':  The Carter
Administration and Apartheid, 1977-81."  Diplomatic History 36:5 (November
2012):  843-880.  DOI:  10.1111/j.1467-7709.2012.01067.x.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2012.01067.x

URL:  http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/AR391.pdf
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Review by Andy DeRoche, Front Range Community College

Featuring a groundbreaking roundtable on Connie Field's documentary about
the global anti-apartheid movement,1 an excellent article by Eric Morgan
on Arthur Ashe and his role in the fight for justice in South Africa, and
Simon Steven's fascinating examination of the Carter administration's
policy toward Pretoria, the November 2012 issue of Diplomatic History
offered a tasty treat for scholars of U.S./Africa relations, just in time
for the holidays. The piece by Stevens, under review here, provides an
insightful re-assessment of the moderate anti-apartheid approach
championed by PresidentJimmy Carter and Andrew Young, a former civil
rights leader and US congressman who served as Carter's ambassador to the
United Nations from 1977 to 1979. With this outstanding article, Stevens,
a doctoral candidate in Columbia University's international and global
history program with two degrees from Cambridge, earned a spot on the
roster of promising young historians working on African affairs. In
addition to its thought-provoking lengthy text, "From the Viewpoint"
included four illuminating photos (three of Young).

Stevens opens by reviewing previous works on the Carter administration's
policy toward South Africa, and concludes that most of them are either too
positive or too negative, or that they place too much emphasis on either
race or national security. In his view, which is quite convincing, the
more accurate interpretation is a combination of these earlier versions
that is ultimately more "complex" (845). President Carter and UN
Ambassador Young shared "a strong commitment to racial equality in South
Africa" which resulted  from their backgrounds, and was quite different
from  the views of their predecessors or successors. At the same time,
though, they did not believe that this policy of gradually seeking racial
equality in South Africa would "conflict with Cold War concerns" (845).
Stevens pointed out that Carter and Young received considerable support
from not only Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Vice President Walter
Mondale, but also from National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.
Indeed, this revisionist analysis of Brzezinski's influence on
U.S.-African relations is one of Stevens' more important contributions.

For the most part, this stimulating essay holds up very well to close
scrutiny, in part because it is based on solid archival research and a
very impressive and careful mining of published and on-line primary
materials. The most important sources, not surprisingly, are the
documents produced by various Carter administration officials and housed
at the Carter Library in Atlanta or in internet collections such as the
Declassified Documents Reference System or the Digital National Security
Archives.2 Other useful sources for Stevens' argument are  interviews by
other scholars with former diplomats such as Steve Low (Ambassador to
Zambia), William Edmondson (Ambassador to South Africa), and Donald
McHenry (Young's assistant and then his successor at the UN) which are
available online in the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection.3 Stevens
deserves credit for his careful and revealing use of Congressional
hearings and State Department publications. Some of his sources
demonstrated a creative willingness to think outside the box, such as his
use of Young's appearance on the Colbert Report television program on 22
January 2008 and his 1977 Playboy interview. Finally, on the plus side in
terms of research, Stevens drew insightfully from both published primary
African sources such as the writings of Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere
and Sechaba, the official journal of the African National Congress, and an
interview of South African diplomat Pik Botha by Sue Onslow, as well as
secondary African sources such as articles by the esteemed South African
scholars Jackie Grobler and Martha van Wyk.

The only mild criticism this reviewer can offer of Stevens' research is
that he did not include African voices from the archives. It is  mildly
surprising that even though he obviously looked carefully at the materials
in the Carter Library, he did not include any of the documents in Atlanta
that are related to the 1977 and 1978 White House visits by Nyerere or
Kenneth Kaunda, the long-time president of Zambia. Even more surprising
is the fact that Stevens did not consult the rich archives in South
Africa, or in Frontline nations such as Zambia. It seems likely, however,
given his  thorough research in secondary and on-line sources and U.S.
archives, that Stevens simply has not yet undertaken a southern African
research safari. This reviewer, who admittedly did not conduct any
research in Africa until five years after completing his Ph.D
dissertation, can certainly sympathize. When Stevens does venture to
African archives, it will make his already sound scholarship that much
better.

At some point during my graduate school days a professor astutely advised
us that it would be much more helpful when we critiqued books if we
commented on the strengths and weaknesses of the book that was written
instead of wishing for the one that was not written. With that in mind I
will now turn from my brief criticism regarding the research which Stevens
did not undertake to comment on the many strengths and few weaknesses of
the work that he did complete. "From the Viewpoint" makes numerous
compelling points about the context and background of U.S.-African
relations in the late 1970s, such as analyzing the importance of Carter's
youth and years as Georgia governor on his later presidential policies,
and similarly summarizing the significance of Young's work in both the
civil rights movement and in Congress. Stevens supplies an excellent
synopsis of Vance's objections to Henry Kissinger's approach to Africa in
general, as well as Brzezinski's related desire for better relations with
Nigeria specifically. This essay also provides a convincing argument  that
the Carter administration was motivated by its belief that seeking a
peaceful end to apartheid would help keep Cuban and Soviet influence out
of southern Africa and was thus in the strategic interests of the U.S.,
officials such as Carter and Young therefore saw no fundamental
contradiction between moral and strategic goals. (849-851)

As Stevens clearly explains, both Carter and Young believed that the
United States could provide outside pressure which would facilitate the
overthrow of apartheid, similar to the role played by the U.S. Supreme
Court during the African-American civil rights movement. Key to this
approach, in their view, was how they applied the pressure: "Their
experiences gave both men a deep sympathy for the position of the white
South Africans and a determination to promote change through cooperation
with them, rather than confrontation" (857). The president and his
ambassador to the UN felt that in order to help the whites in Pretoria
enact the necessary changes to their racist system, it was necessary to
give them a way to save face. During a  March 1977 National Security
Council meeting, Carter and Young agreed that Washington should not drive
Pretoria into a corner, and should instead attempt to develop a "correct"
policy without being too tough (860).

Stevens' explanation for why top Carter administration officials preferred
such a moderate and gradual approach is  relatively thorough and
convincing. In addition to emphasizing the background of Carter and Young
and strategic concerns for preventing Communist intervention, he also
points out that there were economic factors, a desire for South African
cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation, and a hope for help in the major
diplomatic initiatives to end the war in Rhodesia and foster freedom in
Namibia. The one significant factor which Stevens fails to adequately
consider is the importance of domestic political priorities. With the
Carter administration pushing Congress to first repeal the 1971 Byrd
amendment which had allowed renewal of chrome imports from Rhodesia into
the United States,  and then maintaining these sanctions against Rhodesia,
and then making a new treaty with Panama an even higher priority, there
simply was no realistic way it could also ask for tough sanctions against
South Africa. While it might be argued quite convincingly that Carter was
not good at prioritizing and that he surely bit off more than he could
chew, Stevens fails to consider this aspect.

In one of the stronger sections of this fine essay, Stevens details how
Young and Vance drafted a revealing document entitled "A New Approach to
Relations with South Africa," and then submitted it to Carter through
Brzezinski on 1 April 1977. The policy plan proposed a balanced approach
that would make clear to Pretoria the need to move rapidly away from
apartheid, but at the same time not push the South African white minority
regime into a "position of greater intransigence" (861). He then discusses
efforts by Young during a May 1977 visit to remain moderate, as well as
Carter's attempt to temper Mondale's criticism of the Pretoria regime as
he got ready to meet President John Vorster in Vienna. In spite of trying
not to be offensive, however, the reaction in Pretoria to this diplomacy
was "hostile" (865). This in turn prompted the Carter administration to
begin discussing the implementation of small but significant measures
against apartheid during the summer of 1977. At that point it  decided to
hold off, which Stevens convincingly attributes to their desire for South
African support for the Rhodesian proposals.

The brutal September 1977 murder by authorities of the leading South
African political activist Steve Biko, however, sparked a strong reaction
in Washington. Carter decided to impose several small steps that he had
previously been considering but had decided to postpone in hopes of first
getting assistance regarding Rhodesia. Among these measures included in
the U.S. response to Biko's death were a ban on the sale of 'gray"'
military items to the apartheid regime, the withdrawal of the American
naval attaché from South Africa, and support for a UN mandated? mandatory
arms embargo against Pretoria. Stevens then offers a powerful criticism of
my earlier contention in my 2003 book Andrew Young that the ambassador
advocated comprehensive sanctions after Biko's murder.4 Stevens crafts a
convincing critique, and on this specific point I stand corrected. (873)

While Stevens' reassessment of Young's stance in the sanctions debate of
September 1977 is one of the most important contributions in his essay, it
is  unfortunate that he chose to include an extensive quotation in his
footnotes from Brenda Gayle Plummer's 2005 review of my book.5 He repeats
Plummer's questionable claim that Young "did not support the divestment
campaigns that typified the antiapartheid movement nor did he approve of
economic sanctions against oppressive racial regimes." (Plummer as quoted
by Stevens, 873, note 104) However, in her review Plummer ignores Young's
work in Congress to enact legislation successfully banning U.S. assistance
for Portugal's racist colonial regimes in Angola and Mozambique; ignores
his tireless efforts both as a Congressman and Ambassador to overturn the
Byrd amendment and reinstate sanctions against Rhodesia, which finally
bore fruit in March 1977; ignores his central role in the Carter
administration's strong stance against Senate efforts to reverse the
repeal in 1978 and 1979; and perhaps most significantly ignores Young's
testimony while mayor of Atlanta before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in 1985 in favor of sanctions against South Africa. All of these
examples are  well documented in Andrew Young, but Plummer paid no
attention to them.6 This aspect of her review was unconvincing when she
wrote it in 2005, and it remains unconvincing when Stevens quotes it in
2012. Let me be perfectly clear here. I do not disagree with Stevens'
reassessment of Young's role in the debate over sanctions after Biko's
death in 1977, but rather with his decision to quote at length from
Plummer's review.

After his strong section on September 1977, Stevens provides excellent
discussion of the Carter administration's policy toward South Africa in
1978. He rightly emphasizes that Carter and Young embraced the reformist
approach exemplified by the Sullivan Principles, which advocated working
with American corporations and encouraging them to treat black South
African workers better,rather than advocating immediate divestment by U.S.
companies. In his thought-provoking conclusion, Stevens argues that the
Carter administration attempted to promulgate a complicated policy that
blended a "clear opposition to apartheid" with simultaneous cooperation
with white South African officials. (878-880) While this did to some
degree and in some ways foreshadow the Constructive Engagement later
championed by Ronald Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs Chester Crocker, it also reflected lessons that Carter had learned
in his youth and while governor of Georgia. This essay by Stevens should
be read carefully by anyone interested in Carter's foreign policy or
U.S.-African relations.

Andy DeRoche teaches history at Front Range Community College and
international affairs at the University of Colorado. He currently serves
as an H-Diplo editor for African topics. His major publications include a
study of US/Zimbabwe relations and a biography of Andrew Young. He is
working on a book about Zambia's relations with the United States during
the Kaunda era.


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Notes

1 Reviewed on H-Diplo on 17 January 2013.
http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/AR382.pdf .

2 Declassified Documents Reference System,
http://gdc.gale.com/products/declassified-documents-references-system/#;
Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com

3 Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, http://memory.loc.gov

4 Andrew DeRoche, Andrew Young: Civil Rights Ambassador (Wilmington:
Scholarly Resources, 2003).

5 Brenda Gayle Plummer, "Black Ambassador: Andrew Young Appraised,"
Diplomatic History 29 (June 2005): 565-7.

6 See DeRoche, Andrew Young, 46-47, 51-52, 58-59, 78-79, 110, 131-132,
135-136, 138-139. For an even more thorough discussion of Mayor Young's
1985 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in favor of
sanctions against South Africa see Andrew DeRoche, Black, White, and
Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953-1998 (Trenton: Africa World
Press, 2001), 330-332.

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