Claude Meyer.  China or Japan: Which Will Lead Asia?  New York
Columbia University Press, 2011.  xxi + 195 pp.  $35.00 (cloth), ISBN
978-0-231-70286-7; ISBN 978-0-231-80069-3.

Reviewed by Andrew Oros (Washington College)
Published on H-Diplo (August, 2012)
Commissioned by Seth Offenbach

Will Either China or Japan Lead Asia?

Claude Meyer (senior fellow, GEM-Sciences Po, Paris) has produced a
very readable, short volume that succinctly sets out the strengths
and weaknesses of Asia's two economic giants, China and Japan--which
together comprise 77 percent of economic output in East Asia and 15
percent of world GDP and are the world's second and third largest
economies, respectively (p. 35). By contrast, India, Asia's third
"giant," contributes less than 3 percent of world GDP, and is the
world's twentieth largest economy (p. 3). What is particularly
refreshing and useful about the volume is that both countries are
discussed in depth and in direct comparison to each other. A number
of recent works engage with the question of Sino-Japanese relations
from different perspectives (historical, economic, security), but I
am not aware of another book that systemically reviews the parallels
and contrasts in Japanese and Chinese economic development
strategies, regional policies, and challenges for the future.[1] More
frequently, China specialists present China's policies, Japan
specialists, Japan's; international relations specialists present
different aspects of the relationship between the two states; and
Asian regionalists discuss regional policies as a whole. _China or
Japan: Which Will Lead Asia? _represents a useful departure from that
pattern.

The payoffs of Meyer's approach are many. For one, it allows Meyer to
show similarities in the economic policies followed by both states in
their high growth phase--in both cases, he argues, the high growth
was a result of four factors: "savings, education, the government,
and private enterprise" (p. 20)--and also where they differ, such as
in China's openness to foreign direct investment (pp. 16, 42) and,
obviously, their different political systems. Since Japan is ahead of
China in the stage of its economic development, elucidating these
parallels allows one to consider ways that China may face similar
challenges to Japan at a parallel stage of economic development--such
as pressures to address environmental pollution, new and diverse
demands from a more active civil society, or calls by trading
partners to revalue its currency. Meyer also systemically explores
the key challenges both states face for future economic growth,
allowing him ultimately to address the question set out in the title
of his volume.

In five chapters plus a short introduction, Meyer provides a concise
history of relations between the two states (1,400 years in five
pages--take that, Ming Wan or Richard Bush!), a summary of the
policies that led to the "economic miracles" of both states, an
analysis of the challenges both states face looking forward
(especially on the question of economic growth), an analysis of both
states' contributions to Asian regionalism, and a broader conclusion
that engages directly with the question posed in the title--_China or
Japan: Which Will Lead Asia?_ The volume was translated from the
original French by Adrian Shaw, who deserves credit for a very smooth
and readable translation; only the frequent mentions of France (and
infrequent mentions of the United States--discussed below) expose the
book as not of native English-speaking origin.

It is a pleasure to read a book these days that takes Japan
seriously--remember, the third largest economy in the world, the one
that's not bailing out much of Europe (that would be Germany)?
Everyone these days seems to know that the U.S. economy is the
world's largest, and that China is nipping at the heels of the United
States as number two--but number three? Meyer usefully and succinctly
sets out Japan's economic strengths, particularly in the areas of
finance, manufacturing, technology, and "soft power" (media, fashion,
food, and overall image). At a time when Japan is rarely in the news,
and when it is the news seems to be bad (nuclear disasters, political
turmoil, largest budget deficit in the Organization of Economic
Co-operation and Development [OECD], its aging society, the security
threat from North Korea or China), it is encouraging to read some
positive reporting about Japan today. The collection of facts Meyer
presents is illuminating and a useful corrective to the negative
thrust of most mass media reporting on Japan. For example, in the
area of finance: "The Tokyo bond market is three times the size of
all emerging Asia's bond markets put together and its stock market
capitalization is twice that of China and Hong Kong combined" (p.
91). In terms of technology, Japan accounts for 22 percent of patents
filed in the United States (p. 116) and 34 percent of the world total
(versus China's 4.4 percent--p. 121), and five of the top ten
companies in the world by number of patents are Japanese (p. 116).
Moreover, looking forward, "Japan accounts for about 20 percent of
the world's R&D expenditure despite having only 2 percent of its
population" (p. 118). Who knew that Japanese industry utilizes
350,000 industrial robots, 45 percent of the world's total (p. 46)?
Meyer puts great emphasis on Japan's technological lead over
China--too much, in my view--which he argues makes Japan still the
economic leader of Asia today, and likely for the next fifteen years
or so (p. 146).

The book also provides a varied and illuminating compendium of facts
about China's economy, including the astonishing contrasts to just
thirty years ago, or even ten years ago. In terms of comparisons of
Japan and China, this fact is especially striking: "[China] has
overtaken Japan to become the world's second-largest industrial
power, accounting for 12 percent of global value-added; yet as
recently as 2000, China's industrial sector was only a third the size
of Japan's" (p. 36). Statistics on China's domestic savings rate,
energy dependence, pollution levels, investments in infrastructure,
_et cetera_ are not new, but are useful to have collected in one
short volume, and to read thoughtfully arranged. Overall, however,
readers are presented with a very optimistic view of China's future,
with almost no direct engagement with (or citation of) those who
forecast hard times in China's near future--despite Meyer's chapter 2
title, "Mighty But Vulnerable." Meyer quickly though directly
dismisses common concerns about China's future declining labor force
size due to the "one-child" policy (p. 44), its lack of a universal
social safety net and the potential costs of creating one (pp. 43-44;
56), the bad debt in its financial system (p. 57), and the viability
of one-party rule into the future (p. 63). He marshals the oft-cited
Goldman Sachs report of 2007 to report that Chinese GDP will equal
that of the United States by 2030, perhaps even 2027 (p. 114),
dismissing the effect of the 2008 global recession and other new
developments in the world economy and China's own domestic arena.[2]

It is unusual--and ultimately odd--to read a book about the future
leadership of Asia that mentions the United States only in passing,
and that defines the "Asia-Pacific" as East Asia plus "Australasia
and Oceania" (p. 80) rather than a region that includes states such
as the United States, Canada, Mexico, Chile, and the other states of
APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). Perhaps this provides a
window to European views of the "Asia-Pacific"--that they really
don't see the United States as a part of the Asia-Pacific--but at a
time when the United States trades considerably more with Asia than
with Europe, and discussions in Washington DC are all about "the
pivot" to Asia (now often referred to as "the rebalance" after
outcries from various quarters about the implications of the word
"pivot"--not the least from Europeans), this framing is jarring and
ultimately flawed.

Meyer concludes his book in the final two pages with a brief
discussion of China's future challenge to U.S. global hegemony, but
never systemically considers the challenge China poses to U.S.
regional hegemony in East Asia. The reality of power dynamics in East
Asia today, however, is that it is not about China and Japan as the
two great powers of Asia, but about the United States, China, and
Japan as the three great powers of Asia. The United States is an
Asian power--the country that possesses the predominant naval force
in the region, is the among the top three trading partners to nearly
every state in the region, and enjoys the sort of "soft power" that
Meyer ascribes to Japan in spades.

I agree with Meyer that China and Japan comprise a special class of
states in Asia, with economies, military capabilities, and political
and business relationships in the region that dwarf even strong
"middle power" states such as India, South Korea, Indonesia, and
Australia. But considering regional dynamics in the recent past,
present, and looking out twenty years without systematically
factoring in the United States misses a central facet of the regional
picture. Meyer envisions a medium-term future (until 2030) where "we
will see supremacy in Asia shared between the two countries [China
and Japan] in an unstable and often conflictual configuration" (p.
145). In fact, however, power is shared among three states--the
China, Japan, and the United States.

Apart from the systematic omission of the United States, I find the
framing of the conclusion of the book also to be flawed: It is not
that there are "three" scenarios for possible future relations
between China and Japan, but rather four. Meyer's three
scenarios--"Japan's unlikely acceptance of future Chinese hegemony,
conflict between enemy rivals, or cooperation between partners with
complementary assets" (p. 144)--ignores the presently existing
scenario which I see as most likely to continue into the future:
simultaneous cooperation with and balancing against China ("hedging"
in the international relations literature). In Meyer's framing, this
would be a combination of his second and third scenarios--but,
really, it is a distinct strategy/scenario. However, Japan's hedge
against China is only possible with the support of its American
ally--both rhetorically and, more importantly, in terms of the
60-plus-year U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the U.S. promise that it
will come to Japan's military aid if territory administered by Japan
is attacked (which, to be fair, Meyer mentions briefly in his prior
discussion of Japan, pp. 105-108).

Although it pains a Japan specialist such as myself to write this, it
is virtually impossible to imagine Japan leading Asia in the
future--unless circumstances in the region and world depart
dramatically from the scenarios most imagine (such as a break-up of
China in some sort of civil war, a dramatic new technology that
emerges, or some other such cataclysmic event, regionally or
globally). Thus, the conceit of the title of this book threatens to
put off potential readers. This is a shame, because this book
deserves a wide readership. We need more comparative work that
seriously considers both China and Japan together in a discussion of
Asian regionalism.

In sum, read this book! The general reader will find much of
interest, and will appreciate the accessible writing style--but the
book also will offer new perspectives even to specialists on China,
Japan, or the Asian region as a whole given the wide range of
interesting facts and parallels between the two states that Meyer
presents in his truly comparative framework. The book also would be a
useful text for advanced undergraduate students in courses on China,
Japan, or the international relations of East Asia; I plan to assign
it to my own students. Overall, the book as a whole is an enjoyable
and thought-provoking read despite a conclusion that I find somewhat
misses the mark.

Notes

[1]. For examples of works about Sino-Japanese relations, see:
Richard C. Bush, _The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security
Relations_ (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010); James
Reilly, _Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in
China's Japan Policy_ (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011);
Ming Wan, _Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and
Transformation_ (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); and
Daqing Yang, Jie Liu, Hiroshi Mitani, and Andrew Gordon, eds.,
_Toward a History Beyond Borders: Contentious Issues in Sino-Japanese
Relations_ (Cambridge, MA: Harvard East Asia Center, 2012). In
addition, the following works analyze Sino-Japanese relations as part
of a larger framework: Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun, and Wang Jisi,
eds., _Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-U.S.
Relations_ (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2010);
and Bill Emmott, _Rivals: How the Power Struggle between China, India
and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade_ (New York: Harcourt, Inc.,
2008).

[2]. Goldman Sachs, "The N-11: More Than An Acronym," _Global
Economics Paper_, 153 (March 2007).

Citation: Andrew Oros. Review of Meyer, Claude, _China or Japan:
Which Will Lead Asia?_. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. August, 2012.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=36215

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Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
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