Christopher McKnight Nichols.  "Rethinking Randolph Bourne's
Trans-National America:  How World War I Created an Isolationist Antiwar
Pluralism."  Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 8.2 (April
2009), 217-57.

URL:  http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/AR248.pdf

Review by Ross A. Kennedy, Illinois State University

-------------------------------
H-Diplo Article Reviews
http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/
No. 248
Published on 19 November 2009
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H-Diplo Article Review Editor: Diane N. Labrosse
Web and Production Editor: George Fujii
Assistant Web and Production Editor:  John Vurpillat
Commissioned for H-Diplo by Diane Labrosse
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Randolph Bourne was one of the most interesting and significant antiwar
intellectuals to emerge in the United States during World War I. In this
article written for the Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era,
Christopher McKnight Nichols provides a fresh interpretation of Bourne's
wartime writings, arguing that Bourne's concept of a "trans-national
America" was an expression of "radical and idealistic isolationist
thought, guided by his developing vision for peaceful cultural
international engagement and an expansive domestic pluralism." (219,
222) For Nichols, Bourne was a unique thinker whose idea of
transnationalism "illuminates an important moment in the intellectual
history of isolationism." (222)

Bourne laid out much of his thinking about transnationalism in an
article he wrote for the July 1916 issue of Atlantic Monthly. Composed
at a time when he felt increasingly alienated from the pro-war drift of
opinion then gaining momentum among liberal intellectuals,
"Trans-National America" applauded what Bourne saw as the cosmopolitan
character of American society. He rejected the idea of a "melting pot"
producing some kind of new nationality out of America's various ethnic
groups, arguing, according to Nichols, that such a nationalism was
"conceptually and practically bankrupt," as well as jingoistic and
anti-democratic. (231) Instead, Americans should recognize the reality
of their persistent ethno-cultural pluralism and consciously work to
encourage "an eclectic cosmopolitanism" among the nation's diverse
groups; what was needed was not any sort of "coerced assimilation" or
"ethnic particularism" but an effort, led by young intellectuals, to
promote an "intense cross-fertilization of cultures." (236, 242)

Bourne's argument for transnationalism was directly connected with his
belief in American exceptionalism, which in turn underlay his view of
America's proper role in the world. As a nation composed of immigrants,
the United States was uniquely positioned to forge a transnational
culture that could serve as a counter-example to the rival nationalisms
that Bourne believed had led to the war. America's traditional aloofness
from Europe's militarized international political system, indeed, had
allowed a transnational sensibility to begin to emerge within American
culture. Involvement in the war or in any type of binding
political-military commitments abroad (like those proposed by the League
to Enforce Peace) would cut short this development, spur the very type
of belligerent cultural uniformity Bourne deplored, and rob the world of
the transnational model it needed to have in order to move toward a more
peaceful international system. The task of the United States, then, was
to stay out of the war, or any war outside the hemisphere for that
matter, maintain a strict neutrality, develop its own transnationalism,
and promote cultural internationalism through participation in a "League
of Neutrals" of the non-belligerent states. (243) "Only America," Bourne
argued, "by reason of the unique liberty of opportunity and traditional
isolation for which she seems to stand, can lead in this cosmopolitan
enterprise." (236-237)

Nichols' overview of Bourne's "blend of exceptionalism,
transnationalism, and the isolationist tradition" sheds light on much of
Bourne's approach to international affairs. His article especially gives
readers a richer understanding of why Bourne opposed American entry into
World War I and rejected American involvement in any international
organization aiming to uphold peace through military force. At the same
time, though, Nichols presents relatively little analysis of Bourne's
other foreign policy positions. To be sure, he does briefly note that
Bourne "came to agree generally" with other "antiwar internationalists"
who called for an end to the war on the basis of the Stockholm Plan: "no
forcible annexations; no punitive indemnities; and self-determination
for all nationalities." (247) But Nichols plays down the importance of
this stance, suggesting that what really mattered to Bourne in 1917 and
1918 was to do what he could to combat the bellicose nationalism he saw
around him; "his goal," Nichols states, "was thorough going cosmopolitan
isolationism: to block the United States from future wars, not just to
find immediate peace." (247)

One wonders, though, how Bourne's transnationalism related to his
preferred war aims. How did Bourne reconcile his call for
transnationalism with his support for self-determination for all
nationalities? Did he endorse the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, a multi-ethnic state that arguably seemed to have elements of
the transnational culture Bourne wanted to promote? How did Bourne
perceive the consequences of the Stockholm Plan for Europe's balance of
power and, more specifically, for Germany's ability to dominate Central
and Eastern Europe? Did Bourne see German gains in the war as compatible
with his goal of generating "an expansive transnational culture" in
international affairs? (242) Or did he simply not pay any attention to
such issues? These questions all seem relevant to an examination of
Bourne's transnational thought, but Nichols does not address them.

Still, this is a thoughtful and well-written article. As Nichols
observes, Bourne's ideas are certainly relevant today, particularly to
those searching for the "internationalist and noninterventionist options
available to the United States in a troubled, violent world." (256)
Nichols' article is an excellent introduction to the complexity of
Bourne's wartime views, and anyone interested in Bourne, American
isolationism, or progressive internationalism should read it.

Ross A. Kennedy received his Ph.D. from the University of California at
Berkeley. He has taught at the Johns Hopkins University-Nanjing
University Center for Chinese and American Studies and is an associate
professor of history at Illinois State University. He is the author of
The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and America's Strategy
for Peace and Security (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2009).
Professor Kennedy is currently working on a book analyzing U.S. national
security strategy from 1921 to 1941.


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