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I extend my gratitude to Bill Stearman and my friend Günter Bischof for taking the time and trouble to review my article in the _Journal of Cold War Studies_ ["Flashpoint Austria: The Communist Inspired Strikes of 1950," Journal of Cold War Studies 9.3 (Summer 2007)]. These distinguished men have proven yet again that two experienced and knowledgeable scholars can examine the same body of evidence and come away with different conclusions. I was interested to read that Mr. Bischof does not think the article furthered the "interesting debate" surrounding the 1950 communist-inspired strikes, but he ends his lengthy review by assuring readers that the historical controversy over the strikes seems to have "run its course, unbeknownst to Mr Williams". In the article, I did suggest that a reliable understanding of Soviet motivation regarding the strikes will come only after the most important Soviet archives become available to the international academic community. In his review, Mr. Bischof assures us that the Soviet archives are already open, and he refers to the work of some persistent and imaginative Austrian scholars who have, indeed, contributed greatly to our access to heretofore closed Soviet archives. Unfortunately, these same scholars are quick, in their most recent writings, to point out that what are perhaps the most important and potentially revealing documents pertaining to the Soviet occupation, including Stalin's personal files and the files of the Soviet Element to the Allied Commission, are far from available. Alas ... In my article, I sought to take a first step, as it were, to explain why the Soviet Union refrained from supporting the strikes to a greater extent than they did - and they were very helpful to the Austrian communists in a wide variety of ways. Austrian policemen in the countryside, trained observers, for example, sent communications to Vienna in which they cited the license numbers of Soviet military vehicles that were transporting communist demonstrators to Vienna. Soviet authorities obstructed provincial Austrian policemen from moving to Vienna to reinforce the police protecting the Chancellery, despite direct orders from police headquarters to do so. These are but two examples of Soviet support for the strikes and demonstrations. Copies of these communications and observations are readily available in the Austrian national archives. I did not intend for the article to provide a complete or final explanation; quite the contrary. Mr. Bischof must have missed footnote 17 in the article, in which I referred to the important new documentation that has been emerging from the Russian archives, and I indicated that these documents would allow for a much fuller analysis of Soviet policy. In future articles, I plan to draw on this documentation. I have written, for example, a review of Wolfgang Mueller's excellent, important new book, a review which will be appearing in the summer 2008 issue of the Journal of Cold War Studies. I wanted to publish this initial article to highlight how much can be learned from diplomatic reports from Vienna on the subject of the strikes. These reports - which have not been comprehensively covered in the past - tell us a lot, and they provide a solid basis for a more complete investigation using declassified Soviet documents, as these become available. Thanks to H-DIPLO for taking interest in these matters. Bud Williams
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