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The statement I have seen in relation to the alleged Israeli threat is a UPI report dated May 12, 1967 that stated "Israel would take limited military action designed to topple the Damascus army regime if Syrian terrorists continue sabotage inside Israel." Note that the report speaks of limited military action which is contingent on Syria's continued support of sabotage operations against Israel, hardly a major threat against Syria. A document located in Israel's archives for May 12 refers to an "answer that will convince the [Syrian] regime that the profit they had gained from the popular liberation war will turn into a loan." In a lengthy post on this list dated March 5, 2004, I argued, based on a wide variety of sources, that Nasser knowingly provoked the Six Day War because he believed the Arabs would win.[1] There remains the question, however, as to whether he received Soviet guarantees to neutralize any potential U.S. interference that could rob the Arabs of victory. Professor Mayzal writes: "It seems that Nasser understood, early into the crisis, that there would not be a Soviet military move to support him." In fact, there is quite substantial evidence from Nasser himself that he believed he had such a guarantee with relation to any potential U.S. interference. In his speech of May 26, 1967 he described the Soviet attitude as "splendid one...and [it] even said she will resist, with the Arabs and Arab nation, any interference, and any aggression." In his speech of May 29, Nasser related how he recieved all the arms needed from the Soviets as a result of a trip he made to the SU in 1966. He then revealed the contents of a letter he had just received from Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin in which he stated that "the Soviet Union supports us and will allow no country [i.e. the U.S.] to interfere until the situation returns to what it was before 1956." This reference is critical because before 1956 the Gulf of Aqaba was closed to Israeli shipping, and Nasser had closed it again because of the Israeli "threat" to Syria. He knew full well that this closure meant war, and now he was saying that the Soviets were fully supporting this move, even to the extent that it would deter the U.S. if necessary. On July 19 the Soviet news agency Tass confirmed that it told Nasser it would not enter any conflict unless the U.S. did so. Even after the disastruous loss, Nasser had praise for the Soviet role. On November 23, 1967 he said: "Our old friendship with the Soviet Union proved to be invaluable to us in facing this crisis. The Soviet Union from the first day of the war, showed itself to be a worthy ally." Considering the fact that, as noted in the March 5, 2004 post, Nasser truly believed the Arabs were strong enough to beat the Israelis, his only real concern was the U.S. coming to Israel's rescue. Since both Nasser and the Soviets acknowledge that the latter had committed to prevent U.S. involvement, such a commitment amounted to green light for Nasser to pursue policies which could only lead to war. John C. Zimmerman [1]. The post is in the the H-Diplo logs at http://snipurl.com/1g977
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