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David Horowitz says he finds it difficult to believe that there could really have been Americans who called for a pullout of U.S. forces from Vietnam without realizing that this would lead to a Communist victory there. There were, in fact, many such. Some greatly overestimated the role of non-Communist elements in the National Liberation Front (NLF), and did not realize that an NLF victory would mean Communist rule. Others overestimated the strength of the Saigon government, or underestimated Communist strength and determination, or both, and thought the Saigon government could survive an American pullout. In 1971, a Lou Harris poll found that a substantial majority of the American people (58% to 29%) believed that it was "morally wrong" for the US to be fighting in Vietnam. Only a bare plurality (42% to 39%), however, felt that a coalition government in South Vietnam that included Communists would be acceptable, if this were the only way to achieve peace (Washington Post, May 3, 1971, A14). Evidently, of the 58% who felt that the US war effort was immoral, at least 16%, or more than one-quarter, thought the the US could get out without this leading to the Communists even getting a share of power in South Vietnam. There were probably far more than 16% who thought the United States could pull out without this leading to complete Communist domination. Failure to realize that an American pullout would lead to Communist victory certainly reflected a poor understanding of the situation, but a low level of understanding of international affairs was pretty normal, in the United States in those days. Supporters of the war who were under the impression that the Viet Cong were North Vietnamese, or that an American withdrawal would lead to Chinese domination, were showing no higher a level of understanding. Edwin Moise History Department Clemson University