SHAFR/H-Diplo Conference Report (Report #3)

2004 Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
Conference, University of Texas at Austin and the LBJ Library

Panel 29

Chair:  Francis J. Gavin, University of Texas at Austin

"The Committee for the Marshall Plan and Postwar American Liberalism"
George Fujii, University of California, Santa Barbara

"Between Alliance and Nuclear Menace:  US Policy toward German
Reunification and Disarmament Negotiations, 1955-1960"
Itsuki Kurashina, Rutgers University

"Anglo-American Relations and the Negotiations over Berlin in 1961"
Toshihiko Aono, University of California, Santa Barbara

Commentary:  Francis J. Gavin
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SHAFR/H-DIPLO Commentary by Garret Martin, g.j.martin@lse.ac.uk, LSE

As George Fujii stated at the start of his presentation, the Marshall
Plan still resonates today as an example of a very ambitious and
successful plan. Yet, the Marshall Plan was not the only plan put
forward in the aftermath of World War II. The Wallace Plan, for
example, was also concerned with the reconstruction of Europe. The aim
of this first paper was thus to try and understand what made the
Marshall Plan so successful in comparison to other plans, with
particular reference to the workings of the Committee for the Marshall
Plan (or CMP for short). As George Fujii pointed out, the CMP - first
created in November 1947 - worked extremely well as a marketing tool,
and was able to launch a massive campaign of support thanks to
leaflets, media ads, etc… But, more importantly, the CMP managed to
develop a certain ideology that could muster support for the Marshall
Plan. Now, Fujii was quick to point out that ideology was a tricky word
to deal with and could "like halitosis, become what the other person
has"! [1] Yet, he did offer his own definition of ideology, as more or
less a system that can simplify a complex set of ideas. Coming back to
the CMP, Fujii argued that its ideology offered a vision of America led
by liberal, but not socialist, ideas. The CMP shied away from the harsh
anti-Communist rhetoric of the Truman doctrine, which was a way of both
pleasing the Liberals who were uneasy with the tone of the Truman
Doctrine, and dividing the Left. George Fujii reminded the audience
several times that this work was useful in filling a certain gap in the
scholarship, as there had not been previously any serious study of why
the CMP ideology had proven so appealing to the American public. As a
point of comparison, the Wallace Plan stated that it agreed with the
ideas of the Marshall Plan, but opposed the means of implementation.
The Wallace Plan, unlike the Marshall Plan, proposed a massive
multilateral reconstruction plan through the United Nations. Wallace
truly believed that the UN could act as an international relief aid.
Yet, the support of the American Communists for the Wallace Plan
certainly did not help its cause. To sum up, the CMP played an
important role in presenting the Marshall plan as benign, helpful for
the American economy, and working towards the recovery of Europe.

The second paper, by Itsuki Kurashina, focuses on the link between
German reunification and disarmament in the Eisenhower, and essentially
argues that a key shift took place in American foreign policy during
the 1950s. Truman had first announced the link between those two
issues, claiming that German reunification was a precondition for any
serious disarmament talks with the Soviet Union. In essence, this link
was a way of showing American determination to make sure the Soviets
would accept German reunification on Western terms. According to
Kurashina though, the Eisenhower administration tried to abandon this
link between disarmament and German reunification. In terms of
historiography, there is a clear debate concerning how serious
Eisenhower was about disarmament. While some have claimed that the
administration was serious about disarmament, others have seen it as an
extension of the psychological warfare with the Soviet Union.
Kurashina, for his part, pointed out to some of his conclusions made
from recent research. First of all, Dulles appeared far more pragmatic
and flexible than normally assumed. Moreover, Dulles convinced
Eisenhower that the US should take the first step in the moratorium on
nuclear testing, and his policy was more than just propaganda (even
though public opinion certainly influenced him). Finally, Dulles
clearly rejected the link between German reunification and a nuclear
test ban treaty, thus giving priority effectively to disarmament with
the Soviet Union. In conclusion, Kurashina pointed out that the
Eisenhower administration followed the link until early 1956. In the
aftermath, it stuck to this policy, and that despite the increase in
tension in the late 1950s.

The final paper, by Toshihiko Aono, focuses on the shift towards
negotiations by the Kennedy administration during the Berlin crisis. In
particular, Aono wanted to highlight two influences on the Kennedy
administration that are often overlooked, i.e. the British influence
and the influence of world public opinion. In April 1961, Dean Acheson
and the State Department were opposed to negotiations on Berlin with
the Soviet Union, as they feared it would make the US appear weak.
Britain, on the other hand, disagreed with Acheson's analysis. Sixteen
years after the end of World War II, the Berlin situation was abnormal.
By refusing to negotiate, the Western world would appear unbending. The
difficult Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna in June 1961 only
further convinced Britain of the need for negotiations. Khrushchev's
memorandum on negotiations could potentially make the Soviets look good
in world public opinion. Thus, the British tried to influence the US
government on three levels. Firstly, they used the opportunity of
Kennedy's visit to London in June 1961. Secondly, Home [2] also pressed
the British case during his visit to Washington. Finally, Britain
relied on contacts between lower level officials of both governments.
Behind this work on several levels, Britain did not try to press the US
government too hard. Britain was aiming for subtle influence, in order
not to leave any imprints on the American decision-making. In effect,
they wanted the US to reach on its own the decision to negotiate. By
late June, Kennedy was also tilting towards negotiations. The Vienna
summit had confirmed the need to show American firmness, while
simultaneously underlining the importance of negotiations. Kennedy
ultimately realized that the European Allies might not support an
American buildup of force if this move was not accompanied by a turn
towards negotiations. By August 1961, Rusk's proposals to Britain, West
Germany and France were very close to the British position advocated
earlier in the year. To sum up, Aono argues that Britain played a
partial, but relevant role in American decision-making.

Professor Frank Gavin provided then some very thorough and interesting
comments for the panel and the specific papers.  For Gavin, the three
papers were very well researched, showing a renewed concern with
transatlantic relations and the management of an alliance in difficult
times. The three papers effectively show that the key issues of the
Cold War were as much about intra-bloc issues than anything else. In
addition, the panel highlights how all decades had their share of
transatlantic crises, covering all sorts of issues. Thus, the papers
only remind us that alliances are far from being natural organizations.

Moving on to specific comments about each paper, Prof. Gavin really
enjoyed George Fujii's piece for several reasons. He enjoyed the fact
Fujii looked in details at the ideas behind the Marshall Plan, and he
encouraged him to look beyond this example. He pointed out that Fujii
could even look at other cases, like those who opposed any plan to
reconstruct Europe. In addition, Gavin thought that the part of the
paper on the strategies used by the CMP to win the support of the
American people was especially impressive. Finally, Prof. Gavin made
several recommendations: did the CMP encourage the Communist support of
the Wallace Plan, as a way of undermining its support with the American
people? The paper could have drawn a sharper line by looking at those
who were against any plan, as the division between them and those who
advocated plans was far more sharp. The conclusion was possibly too
sweeping, but Prof. Gavin really appreciated the fact Fujii tackled
difficult concepts such as ideology.

Kurashina's paper takes on the scholars who feel that the Eisenhower
administration had no interest in disarmament. It disagrees with the
post-revisionist idea that Eisenhower only wanted to go through the
motions of disarmament, for reasons of propaganda. It argued that there
was in fact a shift in American policy towards disarmament from 1956
onwards. The key shift was abandoning the link between disarmament and
German reunification. Yet Prof. Gavin sees several challenges with this
paper: was there such a massive shift in American policy in the 1950s?
how important were the disarmament negotiations in the overall foreign
picture of the Eisenhower administration? Personally, Gavin does not
think that Eisenhower was particularly bothered about the failure of
the disarmament talks, and did not invest a lot of political credit.
Finally, were arms negotiations a necessarily good policy in the first
place? Would an arms control agreement have prevented East-West crises
like the one in Berlin? Such agreements do not deal with the key issues
that caused tension during the Cold War.

Aono's paper deals with the issue of influence, a key question within
an Alliance. He argues in effect that Britain was far more willing to
negotiate than the US, and wanted to push the US towards negotiations.
Yet, was the US government really against negotiations. Personally,
Prof. Gavin is not so sure of this. Kennedy was not against
negotiations per se, but he believed that negotiations with the Soviets
were particularly difficult. Moreover, Gavin feels that the paper
misses out on the fact that the US government also needed to deal with
France and West Germany, which really frustrated Kennedy. Moreover, the
paper does not really deal with the issue of nuclear sharing. Did the
Soviet Union start the Berlin crisis to prevent the nuclearization of
West Germany? If the Soviets started the crisis to guarantee the
stability of East Germany, why did the crisis go on after the Berlin
wall was built? Finally, how can you measure world public opinion?
Overall, this was a very entertaining and stimulating panel, reminding
us how important role crises have played in the transatlantic relations
over the last fifty to sixty years.

Garret Martin (g.j.martin@lse.ac.uk)
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

Notes:

[1] This particular definition of ideology comes from Terry Eagleton's
_Ideology:  An Introduction_, (London, New York:  Verso, 1991).

[2] Lord Home (Sir Alec Douglas-Home).  British foreign secretary from
1960-1963, later prime minister, opposition spokesman, and again
foreign secretary.

For a complete listing of all sessions at SHAFR 2004, the conference
program may be viewed at http://www.utexas.edu/cola/shafr/program/.

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Copyright (c) 2004 by H-Diplo, all rights reserved.  For any proposed
use, contact the H-Diplo Editors at h-diplo@h-net.msu.edu or the
H-Diplo article discussion coordinator, George Fujii, at
gfujii@umail.ucsb.edu.
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