SHAFR/H-Diplo Conference Report (Report #2)

2004 Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
Conference, University of Texas at Austin and the LBJ Library

Panel 22:  Henry Kissinger and US Foreign Policy in an Era of Transition

Chair:  Anna Nelson, American University [1]

"Kissinger and Triangular Diplomacy"
Jussi Hanhimaki, Geneva Graduate Institute

"Kissinger and Germany"
Holger Klitzing, University of Heidelberg

"Kissinger and Europe"
Klaus Larres, University of London

Commentary:  William Burr, National Security Archive
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SHAFR/H-DIPLO Commentary by Garret Martin, g.j.martin@lse.ac.uk, LSE

[Note:  Diacritical dots (~umlauts) and other special formatting
removed. -GF]

The first paper of the panel, presented by Professor Hanhimaki, sought
to assess the impact of the Nixon-Kissinger triangular diplomacy, as
part of his upcoming book _The Flawed Architect_. Hanhimaki argued that
the events in the Third World clearly showed the limits of triangular
diplomacy, as Kissinger's rationale did not do justice to many regional
conflicts. In particular, he made reference to two conflicts in order
to strengthen his case about the limits of the Nixon-Kissinger
strategy. First of all, the Indo-Pakistani war of December 1971 was
first and foremost a complicated regional war, but it became entangled
in the triangular diplomacy. While Nixon and Kissinger were keen to
prevent a full conflict, their priority was to safeguard their strategy
of the triangular diplomacy. They lacked in effect a real strategy
during the conflict. Restraining Pakistan would have meant leaning
towards the Soviet Union and impeding relations with China (India had
just signed a treaty with the Soviet Union and Pakistan had good
relations with China). Thus, the US tilted towards Pakistan.
Considering that Pakistan started the war, it seems that they were the
ones taking the tilt most seriously. In addition, by siding with the
losing side and against India, the US hardly helped their status in the
Third World. The second conflict referred to was the Angolan civil war.
This conflict was originally one along tribal lines, but was gravely
complicated by external actions. Of the three factions involved in the
war, the US and China supported the FNLA (National Front for the
Liberation of Angola). This in turn convinced the Soviet Union to give
more support the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola).
American and Chinese support encouraged the FNLA to attack the MPLA,
causing the Soviets to respond and the MPLA leaders to ask Cuba for
troops and aid. Later, in 1975, a strengthened MPLA counter-attacked
against the FNLA and UNITA, the latter supported by South Africa. The
Angolan conflict had very important consequences for the main powers.
For the US, Angola had shown that detente with the Soviets did not work
on a global scale. For China, Angola confirmed that the US was
powerless against the Soviets in the 3rd World, and China chose more
moderate policies in the rest of the decade. Finally, the Soviets
interpreted Angola and other successes as an indication that the tide
of the Cold War was turning in their favor. In conclusion, Hanhimaki
stated that the triangular diplomacy did not create "world equilibrium"
as claimed by Kissinger. Instead, it actually encouraged Soviet
expansion and aggressive behavior.

The second paper, by Holger Klitzing, focused on Kissinger and Germany,
and especially Kissinger's reactions to Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik.
Klitzing tried to put forward three main arguments: Kissinger's
cautious welcome of Brandt's Ostpolitik was shaped by his fear of
German nationalism ("nobody is more stupid than a clever German"
according to Kissinger himself); Kissinger tried to appear more German
than the Germans on the issue of reunification; Kissinger did not want
Bonn to take the lead of detente with the Eastern Bloc. Klitzing
emphasized, though, the fact that Kissinger's views on Germany were not
necessarily shared by the rest of the US government. The State
Department and William Rogers in particular, actually welcomed Brandt's
policies as beneficial for the West. But, Kissinger seemed to have far
more doubts than State when it came to Ostpolitik. Deep down, Kissinger
continued to perceive West Germany as a fragile state, and he feared
that Ostpolitik could not only gain its own momentum, but also
undermine the stability of the German state if it failed. Kissinger,
along with others in the National Security Council, pushed thus for
more control on the Berlin and German question. Kissinger, as opposed
to State, wanted to only sympathize with the goals of Ostpolitik,
rather than the policy itself. Eventually, relations between Kissinger
and Brandt improved after the Berlin Treaty of August 1970 - Kissinger
felt it effectively sealed the German division - but he continued to
remain wary as far as the goals of Ostpolitik went.

The final paper of the panel, by Professor Klaus Larres, focused on
Kissinger and European integration, as part of his ongoing major study
on the transatlantic relations in the 1960s and the 1970s. According to
Larres, the Nixon administration had no new policy towards Europe and
effectively took its European allies for granted. Busy with other
theaters, it saw Western Europe as too weak - and Kissinger in February
1970 only listed Western Europe as only his fifth priority in foreign
policy. But, relations with Western Europe still proved far more
difficult than Nixon and Kissinger had anticipated. The 1970s were a
complex time, and a period of strong economic competition as Western
Europe started to believe it did not need to rely so much on the US in
the economic sphere. Nixon accused the European Community of using
unfair trade patterns and pushed for more lowering of the trade
barriers. During the Nixon administration, contacts between the US
government and the European Commission were very marginal. The
administration officially professed its support for European
integration, but in practice did nothing to help it. The US government
tended to prefer a confederate Europe, because it would be easier to
maintain American influence - by divide and rule and relying on
bilateral relations. In addition, Nixon disliked both Harold Wilson and
Ted Heath, meaning that the US could not really rely on its traditional
"special relationship" with Britain. Kissinger did declare that 1973
was the "year of Europe", and sought to improve relations with the
European allies while maintaining American leadership. But, issues such
as the 1973 Yom Kippur war and defense spending only served to sustain
friction between Western Europe and America. It was only during the
Ford administration that the transatlantic relations improved, as Ford
paid more attention to his allies.

William Burr provided very insightful comments on the three papers. As
he mentioned, this is a great time to work on Kissinger, with more and
more files being opened in NARA [2] (such as Kissinger's telephone
conversations). The three papers shed great light on the
Nixon-Kissinger administration, its need to maintain power, to maintain
its credibility and its leadership in detente. Turning to his specific
comments about each paper, Burr pointed out that the second paper could
have been more integrated in the general historiography. On the third
paper, Burr points out that it would have been nice to see more focus
on the European side of decision-making. In addition, Burr felt that
the paper tended to downgrade Nixon's commitment to uphold the security
guarantees to Western Europe, despite Congressional pressure. But,
Prof. Larres is certainly right when he argued that Nixon and Kissinger
tended to take their European allies for granted. Finally, Burr
commended Hanhimaki's paper as well researched and well argued, but
questioned whether the Soviets were truly capable of mobilizing the
same forces as the US in their global activism - i.e. image of the
Soviet Union as the incomplete paper. Overall, this was a very
interesting and thought provoking panel. The only disappointing point
was the fact there was so little time available for questions after the
presentations and comments.

Garret Martin (g.j.martin@lse.ac.uk)
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE}

Note:

[1] The printed and online versions of the program list Warren Kimball
as the chair of this panel.  Prof. Kimball was replaced by Prof. Nelson.
[2] NARA- National Archives and Records Administration.  Reference here
is to the (NARA) National Archives facility in College Park, MD
(Archives II), which currently holds the Nixon Presidential Materials
and many others materials of interest to foreign relations
scholars.  See http://www.archives.gov/facilities/md/archives_2.html,
accessed 7 July 2004, for more information.

For a complete listing of all sessions at SHAFR 2004, the conference
program may be viewed at http://www.utexas.edu/cola/shafr/program/.

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Copyright (c) 2004 by H-Diplo, all rights reserved.  For any proposed
use, contact the author, Garret Martin, at g.j.martin@lse.ac.uk or the
H-Diplo article discussion coordinator, George Fujii, at
gfujii@umail.ucsb.edu.
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